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Moving Ahead With Human-Machine Communication
Leopoldina Fortunati1  and Autumn Edwards2 
1 Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Physics, University of Udine, Udine, Italy
2 School of Communication, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, United States of America 
For this volume, we selected 10 articles we found groundbreaking for their innovative 
contribution to the field of human-machine communication (HMC). This field becomes 
increasingly interdisciplinary since it attracts contributions from disciplines such as sociol-
ogy and anthropology, as well as communication and media; we would like to see even 
more philosophy and politics. Interdisciplinarity is important to building an integrated lens 
through which to look at this new field and to solidifying social sciences as an attractive 
intellectual home for studying HMC. The range of topics addressed in these 10 articles is 
wide, branching in many exciting directions. However, when considered holistically as a 
collection, the articles in this volume deal substantially with four layers of discourse, which 
are relevant to moving forward the HMC project. They are as follows: (1) updates to the-
oretical frameworks and paradigms (MASA; Lombard & Kun), (2) examination of ontol-
ogizing and prototyping processes (Etzrodt & Engesser; Banks et al.), (3) a critical turn 
regarding gender (Liu) and ability/disability (Davis; Denhert & Leach), and (4) exploration 
of HMC in organizational contexts (Gibbs et al.; Johanssen & Wang; Piercy & Gist-Mackey; 
Prahl & Van Swol). 
1. Progressing on CASA With the MASA Paradigm and  
Discussing it From Another Angle
Innovation at the theoretical level is necessary to work out a new field of research such as 
HMC but it is understandable that at the beginning scholars try to use the theories that 
they have inherited from past or contiguous fields. There are a plethora of theories avail-
able today, starting from those developed to address the field of mediated communication, 
passing through telephone communication (fixed and mobile) and especially through 
computer-mediated communication. Among these theories, we observe that the most 




ISSN 2638-602X (print)/ISSN 2638-6038 (online)
www.hmcjournal.com
 7
Copyright 2021 Authors. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license.
8 Human-Machine Communication 
Actors), the influential paradigm proposed by Nass and colleagues in the 1990s (Nass et al., 
1994; Nass et al., 1996; Nass et al., 1997). According to CASA, people treat computers in 
some of the ways they treat humans by mindlessly applying to them the same social rules 
they use in human-human interactions. In this volume of Human-Machine Communica-
tion, Lombard and Kun in their article, “Social Responses to Media Technologies in the 
21st Century: The Media Are Social Actors Paradigm,” revisit CASA by expanding it and 
launching a new paradigm: the Media Are Social Actors (MASA) paradigm. This para-
digm is elaborated in a very sophisticated way by introducing the distinctions among social 
cues, the effects of social cues on medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses, 
and then by examining the role of individual differences and contextual factors. Lombard 
and Kun also propose consideration of mindless and mindful anthropomorphism as two 
complementary mechanisms for understanding MASA. Based on evolutionary psychology 
explanations for sociality, they offer nine formal propositions and suggestions for future 
research to test and apply MASA. In the previous volume of Human-Machine Commu-
nication, Gambino, Fox and Ratan (2020) first proposed an extension of CASA, arguing 
that humans do not necessarily implement social scripts associated with human-human 
interactions as predicted by CASA, but perhaps also social scripts that have been developed 
for interactions specific to media entities. Their extension enables us to explain previous 
dissonant findings and expands scholarship regarding HMC. 
The problem first addressed by Reeves and Nass (1996) is the acknowledgment that the 
spontaneous and immediate response to media is faulty. Humans respond in social ways 
to mediated representations that mimic real life, but without exerting the cognitive effort 
to determine how to respond in the right way. There are two crucial questions that await 
empirical investigation. The first is: How long does this shift from perceiving media as real 
people, places, and things to representations of them take? The second is: What happens 
when people realize the true nature of the media? The problem of the delay of time in 
understanding the real nature of technology is an old one and is addressed both by CASA 
and also by the Uncanny Valley theory by Mori (1970). 
It is curious that in front of all the theories elaborated to address mediated communi-
cation, the media equation and CASA framework (Nass et al., 1996; Reeves & Nass, 1996) is 
identified as the one that seems to be the most suitable for helping the scholarship deal with 
the world of HMC. Thus, it is relevant to understand why this framework is considered so 
useful for this new field of studies. Gambino et al. (2020) argued that CASA is well-suited 
to accompany scholars in the HMC field because it is based on humans’ understanding of 
social interaction. With the purpose of enhancing usability, they continue, designers have 
tried to reduce the cognitive effort it takes to use digital technologies by activating users’ 
existing mental models. Designers and engineers create interfaces that reflect patterns of 
human communication and imitate offline forms of social interaction (Nass & Brave, 2005; 
Shneiderman et al., 2017). In effect, CASA presents the great advantage of prefiguring the 
immediate, potential patterns of human attitudes and behaviors in the field of social robots 
and virtual assistants. We argue that, however, this will not be sufficient because the field 
of social robotics is not limited to designing technological artifacts equipped with some 
primary and secondary cues, but is complicated by the question of the anthropomorphism 
even at the highest degrees (see Lombard and Kun in this volume). 
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Reeves and Nass (1996) have explained that people treat media as humans because their 
“old brains” did not evolve in a way to immediately distinguish mediated representations 
from their real-life counterparts. They write, 
The human brain evolved in a world in which only humans exhibited rich so-
cial behaviors, and in a world in which all perceived objects were real physical  
objects. Anything that seemed to be a real person or place was real. During near-
ly all of the 200,000 years in which Homo Sapiens have existed, anything that 
acted socially really was a person, and anything that appeared to move toward us 
was in fact doing just that. Because there were absolute truths through virtually 
all of human evolution, the social and the physical world encouraged automatic 
responses that were, and still are, the present-day bases for negotiating life. . . . 
Modern media now engage old brains. (p. 12)
They frame their argument by adding two other important elements: the first is that 
this incorrect perception is not only a question of the old brain but also a question of users’ 
inattention and, second, that when users regain possession of their reasoning abilities they 
understand that their perceptions were wrong. In their words, “people frequently live life 
mindlessly and with little introspection” (p. 12) and there is “good evidence that media are 
real first, and false only after we think about it” (p. 13). Gambino et al. (2020) and Lombard 
and Kun (in this volume) have already advanced substantially the field’s relationship to and 
application of the CASA framework. Here we would like to add new paths of discourse by 
arguing that, although this explanation might seem correct in evolutionary terms, it should 
be reframed in the light of perspectives coming from the historical, sociological, and semi-
otic (and hermeneutic) disciplines that we will discuss here. 
From a historical point of view, we recall that in the Western world people have expe-
rienced the diffusion of automata especially during the renaissance and modernity. These 
automata replicated human features, as in the case of the Writer, the Musician, and the 
Draftsman, the three automata-androids built by Jaquet-Droz in the second half of the 18th 
century. The automata presented the same problem as contemporary media: they impli-
cated a delay only after which the public could understand the truth of the technological 
artifact or even come to terms with the impossibility on the part of the public to understand 
this. In other words, the public at first glance did not understand that the automata were 
artifacts and this was the outcome of a deception. The Catholic Church opened a contro-
versy on their alleged, demonic aspect, which was attributed to the magic halo that sur-
rounded them and that derived from this delay between apparent and real/revealed nature. 
Through this delay, according to the Catholic Church, passed the infringement conveyed 
by automata as their aims were to not only surprise but also to trick the public. The related 
debate was connected to the old issue of “authenticity.” As discussed by Baron (2013) the 
issue of authenticity crosses the long story of robots especially in their representation as 
androids or gynoids. 
If we look at this problem from a sociological perspective, it turns out that humans do 
not always pursue authenticity and grant themselves various degrees of freedom in playing 
with inauthenticity. However, the foundations of any society are built upon authenticity, 
a basis on which humans will to some extent derogate, albeit only tactically. The implicit 
10 Human-Machine Communication 
social contract, which is at the basis of the functioning of society, organizations, institu-
tions, and sociality and which functions for mutual consent, is also based on a high degree 
of authenticity of the individuals and their social identities. Thus, at a certain point, one has 
to come back to authenticity. As Seabright et al. (2021, p. 19) argued, humans are “willing to 
punish those whom they believe to be cheating or unjust to others, even at a cost to them-
selves and even if they themselves have not been directly harmed by the cheating or unjust 
act” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fischbacher, 2001). In conclusion, our old brains already 
have experienced this problem of distinguishing simulation from reality, which is not a 
unique manifestation of contemporaneity but is much older.
Second, the development of our brains and cognitive abilities may not follow a linear 
growth path that facilitates more ready distinction between the seemingly real and the real. 
We have also to consider that newer changes to our apparatus of thought and perception 
could render us in some ways less rather than more skilled in dealing critically with person-
ified objects. As Simmel argues, with modernity our old brains have weakened themselves 
by being increasingly exonerated to think. In his essay on “The Metropoles and the Life 
of Spirit” (1903/1995), he describes how in the modern world the technology embodied 
in objects of daily use exempts individuals from previously required gestures, skills, and 
efforts. While things embody an increasing number of cultural layers, people become less 
and less culturally equipped and capable and the dissonance that follows transforms the 
modalities and the very meaning of existence and experience. Let us consider, continues 
Simmel (p. 54), the amount of culture that has been incorporated in the last 100 years in the 
objects and the cultural progress of individuals in the same period of time—even only in the 
upper classes. From this comparison, a terrifying difference in growth emerges to the det-
riment of individuals and even a certain regress of their culture (in terms not of education, 
but sensitivity and ideality) to the extent that the individual is less and less capable of cop-
ing with the luxuriant development of objective culture. Simmel’s vision has not remained 
alone. For example, Barthes (1957) argued that to understand society, it is necessary to 
focus on the myths and symbology attached to the objects of everyday life. Douglas and 
Isherwood (1979) pointed out that objects serve to build social alliances or alienation. For 
Appadurai (1986), objects have social lives, are socialized things, and have social potential. 
Latour (1994) stated that it is impossible to build the social only with the social, and sociol-
ogists must recognize the role of objects as mediators of social interaction. Finally, Karin 
Knorr Cetina (1997) observed in modern societies an “increased orientation toward objects 
as sources of the self, of relational intimacy, of shared subjectivity and social integration” 
(p. 32). In conclusion, objects, and particularly technologies, have been increasingly recog-
nized as unintentional mediators of social relationships. These overall observations seem 
to be prophetic given that while we build increasingly “smart” and “intelligent” artifacts, 
human IQ seems to decrease in the most recent decades (Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015). To 
conclude, our old brains in the last century probably have experienced a process of down-
sizing, which, even if recent, must be taken into account in the general framework of our 
reasoning. 
A third and maybe most important consideration coming from semiotics is that our old 
brains have experienced narration (Chatman, 1980) and play since humans began to com-
municate through language. Oral societies communicated using forms such as narratives, 
myths (in particular, cosmogonies), legends, fables, and so on (Ong, 1986). When societies 
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shifted from orality to literacy, the structure and mechanisms of narration were incorpo-
rated in written texts, as well. Thus, reading is a new cognitive function in evolutionary 
terms, because it was invented only 5,500 years ago (Dehaene, 2007; Wolf, 2007). By con-
trast, although it is impossible to recompose the phylogenetic history of narrative behavior 
and to affirm its evolutionary origin in a totally founded way, the structure and mechanisms 
of narration are very old and readers’ brains are used to them (Cometa, 2017; Tomasello, 
2005). Aristotle considered fiction a serious matter because it is capable of extending knowl-
edge, allowing us to imagine what can happen in the future, and to be ready and open to 
any event (Consoli, 2011). When readers read a text, they make a pact with the authors 
(Sartre, 1960, p. 46), which consists of willingly suspending their disbelief in what they are 
told and believing in the world that is narrated to them (Eco, 2016). As readers, our brains 
are accustomed to cooperating in textual actualization and to considering as true the fic-
tional notions provided by the author (Eco, 1983). Those whom authors consider as their 
Model Readers are, therefore, required to make this considerable “pact.” Users are required 
to experience simulation, identification, and empathy (e.g., Rizzolati and Sinigaglia, 2006) 
and to share or not in what the author proposes. They have to collaborate based on their 
real-world competence and, when they don’t, must accept what is provided by the authors. 
Authors not only ask readers to pretend they know things about the real world that readers 
don’t know, but also to believe that they should pretend to know things that don’t exist in 
the real world (Iser, 1987). 
In addition to fictionality, another secret of the attraction of the narrative text is that its 
format has a magnitude smaller than the boundless one of the world of reality. Narrative 
worlds have more defined boundaries and this allows us to be more comfortable than in the 
real world. Although between the real and narrative worlds there is a relationship of partial 
identity, conceivability, and accessibility, the fictional world is more conceivable and acces-
sible than the real world. More important is that the possible world of fiction is not an entity 
detached from the reality that gave it birth, but is a real part of this same reality. Eco (1985) 
explained clearly that possible worlds as epistemic constructs are real insofar as they are 
embedded, beyond syntactically, in the real world that produces them. They are not parallel; 
they are one inside the other and each of them participates a little in the reality of its own 
container. Thus, fiction requires the revision of our relationship with the real world through 
the ability to move in and out of the text (Montani, 2014) or to apply the two narrative fac-
ulties: decoupling and simulation (Cometa, 2017). Considering the complex relationships 
between fiction and reality leads us to examine play. Narration has the same function as 
play: Children play with dolls, kites, or wooden horses to familiarize themselves with the 
physical laws and with the tasks and roles that one day they will have to perform seriously. 
Likewise, reading stories means playing a game through which you learn to make sense of 
the immensity of things that happen in the real world. This is the therapeutic function of 
fiction and the reason why people tell stories. 
The shift that people have undergone in respect to media is that they have transferred 
to media their experiences regarding narration and, in general, the content that media con-
vey, and began to read the media themselves as texts (Cosenza, 2009). The relationship, the 
implicit contract that there is between the author and the reader, has been transferred to 
the relationship between the user and the medium. This displacement is a mechanism that 
our brains use often to approach new things. They reduce the impact of novelty by creating 
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an oblique relationship with the new thing. Thus, based on what we have said so far, the 
motivation for why we treat media as if they were humans may be different from that pro-
posed by Reeves and Nass (1996), because other factors—such as automata, the noticeable 
slowing or decline of IQ, and especially fictionality and play—intervene in the framework, 
and some of them are old.
The fourth consideration comes from semiotics and lies with symbols. An alternative 
to CASA’s proposition that humans mindlessly treat computers and robots as real people 
because their old brains have not evolved to immediately tell the difference is that comput-
ers and robots may be interpreted as symbolic humans, understood to represent but not to 
be human persons. In their figural “semiotic triangle,” Ogden and Richards (1923) posit that 
meaning is worked out in the relations between symbol (an item used to represent other 
things or ideas), reference (the initial thought associated with the symbol), and referent (the 
actual thing or object of meaning), an idea comparable to C. Peirce’s earlier (1839–1914) 
Sign Theory (Peirce, 1998). When people respond to a virtual assistant, for example, as if it 
were a human, they may interpret (reference) the agent (symbol) as directly “standing for” 
or “standing in for” a human person (referent). 
Long before computers were social actors in the research paradigmatic sense, they were 
human social actors in the lifeworld. As detailed by Grier in When Computers were Human 
(2005), in the mid-1700s, astronomers attempted to use the laws of gravity to predict the 
return of Halley’s Comet, but the calculations proved too onerous for a single scientist. 
This necessitated a division of mathematical labor resulting in the creation of a new occu-
pational role: the computer, or person whose job was to perform scientific calculations by 
hand. At first, computers were predominantly young men. However, by the 19th century, 
women, people of color, polio survivors, Jews, and others who faced grim labor prospects 
were hired to reduce costs. There was a concomitant association of computers with women, 
in specific. According to Hicks (2018), pre-electronic computation jobs were quickly fem-
inized because they were perceived as rote and de-skilled. Ultimately, the computers’ roles 
and functions were replicated and off-loaded to electronic machines bearing their old job 
titles. A similar lineage can be traced in the case of robots. As it is well known, the word 
“robot,” derived from the Czech word for slave (robotnik), was first used in 1921 by Karl 
Čapek, whose play R.U.R. was about machine men that were built to work factory assembly 
lines and later rebelled against their human masters. Even in its earliest usage, the robot 
symbolized in both form and function the human being whose labor was forced and whose 
servitude was involuntary. Thus, human beings were the first computers and, in a symbolic 
sense, human beings were also the first robots. 
The symbolic treatment of some people as robots continues. Several recent news sto-
ries have focused on what it means to be treated as a machine in organizational spaces. 
For example, Saintato (2020) writing for The Guardian suggests that people are treated like 
robots when corporations apply the unprecedented efficiency of the digital and data revolu-
tions to the human workforce in terms of time management, surveillance, behavioral pro-
filing, performance quantification, and replacement with cheaper and newer models. We 
contend that if one wonders whether their job is at risk of replacement by a robot, they need 
mainly consider the degree to which they are presently treated as a robot. This is because 
robotization of the human workforce tends to directly precede automation processes, as we 
will explain below. The idea is widespread that automation could enter factories because 
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workers themselves had become the Great Industry appendages of the machines. How-
ever, at cognitive and cultural levels the notion that a person can be replaced by a robot in 
industry and also domestic spaces demonstrates a certain symbolic equation of the robot 
and human and perhaps illuminates why people sometimes treat robots like humans. This 
symbolic transfer is evident in our classrooms when, for instance, women express dismay 
at their peers’ sexist abuse of female-voiced virtual assistants: “Is this how you treat (or 
how you wish you could treat) the women in your life?” These students express the view 
that such AI systems obviously are meant to represent them, to symbolize them as human 
women, and that disrespect of the symbol damages also the object of its reference. For 
them, using polite language with Alexa or Siri does not arise from the mindless applica-
tion of human scripts, but from the same process that encourages careful treatment of a 
flag to not denigrate the nation for which it stands. More generally, this perspective can be 
framed in light of what Danaher (2017), in the context of sex robots, terms the “symbolic- 
consequences argument.” Although problematic aspects of robot symbolism are perhaps 
removable and reformable (Danaher, 2017), symbolism itself remains endemic to social rela-
tions with robots. 
Like narration and play, symbols are ancient and are constitutive of what makes humans 
human in the first place. From the analog virtual realities of cave paintings and human 
sculpture to language, to the digitally-rendered mind spaces and anthropomorphized arti-
facts of current technology, the ability to create and use symbols, or to overlay abstract and 
fictional structures onto our physical reality, is a marker of human social evolution (Dana-
her, 2017, p. 8; Harari, 2016). When we interpret or respond to the symbol in light of what 
it represents, it is not necessarily because of a naïve conflation or a mindless attribution that 
they are the same. Rather, it is because we are used to this surrogating process that Sneddon 
(2015) has articulated as taking symbols in virtue of what they represent and which governs 
the relational aspects of human life (Sneddon, 2015 as discussed in Danaher, 2017, pp. 7–8). 
Therefore, whereas CASA’s “old brains engage new media” formulation leads naturally to a 
focus on mindless versus mindful attribution processes, these hermeneutic and semiotic 
interpretations of robots/media as narrative texts and symbolic humans beg scholarly atten-
tion to issues of literacy and representation, respectively. 
This discourse on why people treat media as humans is only sketched and needs to be 
further developed and integrated. Surely, two issues need future empirical research. The first 
is the need to understand what happens after people have realized their mistake (i.e., that 
machines are not humans). A partial response might arrive from semiotics: the cooperation 
that is required of users needs time to unfold. The text to be read proposes itself as a becom-
ing, dynamic process: readers actualize over time successive portions and consistent macro 
propositions of it (Eco, 1985). Narration requires a progressive comprehension, which is 
the outcome of the reader’s negotiation with the text (Cecchi, 2019). In the hermeneutics 
of the relationship between narration and the experience of time (Ricoeur, 1985/1988), the 
exemplary exercise of imagination accompanies the horizon of waiting (Jauss, 1967/1969). 
Again, users need time to make sense of any text.
The second open issue is to understand why among the various strategies that readers 
generally apply to a text we have often transferred to media the naïve one. Let us outline 
the problem. Readers apply to texts several strategies according to their skills. There is a 
“naive reading” when readers identify themselves completely with the story and with the 
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characters and mistake the story they are reading for true (Eco, 1983). This is obviously a 
“perspective error”: in this case, readers do not realize that the events and characters of the 
narrative work have a limited existence. Then, there is an “available reading” when readers 
are aware of the (partially or totally) fictitious nature of a narrative text, are willing to tem-
porarily suspend their disbelief, to accept the story as if it were true, and also the rules of 
the game. They identify themselves with the story, experience the emotions that the text and 
the author want to arouse (the ability to identify with the story of the characters is necessary 
to the functions of evasion and catharsis of reading, which are among the main functions 
sought by literature). Finally, there is a “critical reading” when readers do not foresee the 
identification of the reader in the story they are reading; it is a second, specialized reading 
which aims to criticize and interpret a text (Eco, 1983). Probably users often apply to media 
a naïve reading because information and communication technologies are relatively new 
and users have a limited repertoire, understood as the ensemble of conventions necessary 
to establish a situation common to the artifact and to themselves, as well as limited mental 
schemes and scripts. It is not surprising if the first strategy adopted by users is to apply a 
naïve reading and the mental schemes and scripts that users have tested in human-human 
communication in the real world. But after a while, as Gambino et al. (2020) argued, things 
change.
There is another element of the CASA theory to correct. Reeves and Nass (1996) argue 
that “people’s responses to media are fundamentally social and natural” (p. 251). In the next 
section, we will see how it is more appropriate to substitute the term natural with cultural.
2. Ontologizing and Prototyping Moves
The second strand addressed in this volume offers two relevant articles, which advance 
the debate, the first on ontology and the second on prototyping. Etzrodt and Engesser, in 
the article “Voice-based agents as personified things: Assimilation and accommodation as 
equilibrium of doubt,” contribute to the debate on the ontology of humans and machines 
(as well as animals and simple objects) by proposing a sophisticated investigation of the 
nature of doubt regarding voice-based agents, based on Piaget’s ontological classification 
of object-subject and thing-person, their associated equilibration processes, and the key 
factors of the situation: the user and the agent. They documented that the majority of their 
participants classified voice-based agents into personified things, although this classifica-
tion remains fragile. The notion of personified things summarizes well how the boundaries 
between humans and robotic technologies are becoming less clear. Much of the ontologi-
cal debate on the human-machine communication field has focused so far on the increas-
ing blurring of the boundaries between the various elements of the relation: human and 
machine, for example (Edwards et al., 2019; Guzman, 2020). Recently, the epistemologist 
Nikhil Bhattacharya, in a path-breaking seminar, argued that if we want to really progress 
with this question, we need to focus on the two elements of the interaction: the human 
and the machine (robot). In front of their blurring boundaries, there is the need to trace a 
dividing line that remains essential between humans and robots. Sandry (2015) articulates 
the value of blurred yet meaningful boundaries by drawing on N. Katherine Hayles’s (2005) 
posthumanist argument that:
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the ‘boundaries are both permeable and meaningful,’ such that humans can 
still be regarded as ‘distinct from intelligent machines even while the two are  
becoming increasingly entwined’ (2005, p. 242). She suggests that if, even as 
they are drawn together, a clear idea of the remaining difference between human 
and machine is retained, the development of ‘a dynamic partnership between  
humans and intelligent machines’ can be proposed (Hayles, 1999, p. 288).  
(Sandry, 2015, p. 91) 
We can understand what machines are and are becoming only if we can understand 
who we are. Technology is a key place to study humans because humans have always lived 
technological lives. However, the two concepts are both elusive. So far, instead of work-
ing hard on this issue, several scholars have preferred to indulge in a kind of praise of the 
machines and their intelligence and smartness. We try to initiate a path that should be able 
to help us answer these two questions in the future, although we are afraid, much time and 
effort will be needed to arrive at some substantial responses. 
So, what is a robot, and what are its capabilities? Merely arriving at a definition of robot is 
difficult (Sarrica et al., 2020). Not by chance, Nourbakhsh (2013, pp. 14–15) wrote “never ask 
a roboticist what a robot is. The answers change too quickly.” The robot body is too multiform 
and too mutant to allow a univocal answer to the extent that from a semiotic perspective, 
they can be considered a highly variable geometrical machine (Montanari, 1999). The mul-
tiform body of robots is given by the fact that robots may assume many forms: androids and 
gynoids, machine-like (such as Roomba, Bimby, Turtlebot), plantoids, zoomorphic and the-
omorphic robots, drones, voice-based assistants, intelligent agents, computer AI programs, 
chatbots, ambient assistive living technologies, computational, intelligent games/storytell-
ing devices, embodied conversational avatars, automatic health care, and educational ser-
vices. The database ABOVE available in open-source format (https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/341835020_A_Comprehensive_Approach_to_Validating_the_Uncanny_Valley_ 
using_the_Anthropomorphic_RoBOT_ABOT_Database [accessed Nov 08 2020]) includes 251 
different types of real robots even if it is far from being exhaustive. Second, changes in 
robots’ bodies are very fast and not always intelligible, as many of these kinds of robots 
are still at the prototype level. The prototyping status implies that we do not know many 
things we should do. Bhattacharya (2020), in his seminar, raised the example of GPT-3T, a 
language learning program able to talk in the style and manner of a famous psychologist, to 
conclude that we don’t really know the linguistic capabilities of machine learning, because 
the machine may not react the way you think. The tremendous advances that are made in 
this kind of computer AI programs lead them to undertake very sophisticated interpersonal 
conversations and give responses that you cannot anticipate. Robots have such a multiform 
and mutant body that it becomes difficult to talk of robots’ identity as well as of robots’ capa-
bilities, in general, because there are too many differences between them. 
As to the other element of communication and interaction, the human being, we pose 
the same questions: What is a human being? What are their capabilities regarding thinking 
and doing things? In what ways are these capabilities different from those of robots? Reflec-
tions about what a human being is are first of all pertinent to the philosophical field and in 
fact some philosophers elaborated thoughts over time, although in a non-systematic way. 
Bhattacharya (2020) recalls some pivotal moments and protagonists of these reflections 
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and focuses on the Western Europe of the XVII century. In this century, a series of wars 
(like the civil war between Protestants and Catholics, the Thirty Years War, and the devel-
opment of the colonization of the Americas) bloodied the world, leading philosophers to 
ask themselves the question of what human beings were. Thomas Hobbes tried to answer 
the question by embracing the old Latin phrase homo homini lupus (“man is wolf to man”) 
and describing human society as bellum omnium contra omnes (“the war of all against all”), 
when the situation that characterizes the conditions of the state of nature occurs. René 
Descartes contributed to the reflection on the definition of what humans are by arguing 
that the human being, like all animals, is a machine constituted by sub-machines. Strangely 
enough, comments Bhattacharya (2020), “modern medicine is still based on such a hypoth-
esis.” Michel de Montaigne, living in a society experiencing colonialism, faced the problems 
that in America Europeans encountered very strange kinds of people (e.g., cannibals). Were 
they human beings or not? The answer he found to this question was that the human being 
is a product of the culture in which they are raised. Montaigne stated, continues Bhattacha-
rya (2020), that if he had been raised in a cannibalistic society, he too would have been a 
cannibal. Human beings are raised in cultural frameworks that shape their thinking and 
feeling. As Tomasello (1999/2005) argued, a human nature independent from culture does 
not exist; human nature is culturally situated to the extent that we should talk of human 
natures.
Why do we have cultures? We have cultures for the same reasons for which we have 
societies. According to Anolli (2005), cultures are collective constructions, which give shape 
and substance to human existence and define a specific perspective on reality. Tomasello 
(1999/2005) conceptualizes culture as a process and argues that humans are the outcomes of 
a double evolution: biological and cultural. Evolutionary social sciences so far have recon-
structed humans’ evolution or by contrasting them with animals and in particular with 
nonhuman primates or contrasting among them key types of social organizations, such 
as small-scale societies and large-scale societies (Seabright et al., 2021). In the first case, 
the comparison has always been made with nonhuman primates, because these show a 
little genetic difference (which, in the case of chimpanzees, is only 1%). What is unique 
to human beings, according to Tomasello (1999/2005), is a series of capabilities, which are 
made possible by humans’ high propensity to sociability. They are the abilities to under-
stand and interpret others as communicative and intentional agents; to build a network of 
bonds and motivations in the groups that are the basis of communication; to spontaneously 
share information and experience; to imitate the actions of others; to pursue the joint shar-
ing of attention toward an object or event that implicates the focalization of the reciprocal 
psychological resources on the same object or event; to manage the dissociation between 
means and purposes, which, when practiced in pretend play, favors learning by simulation. 
All of these capabilities are at the basis of cultural learning and lead to that symbolic 
condition, which for Deacon (1977) was the species-specific characteristic of humans. The 
great propensity for sociality that distinguishes human beings, also nourishes the processes 
of sociogenesis, which, according to Tomasello (1999/2005), thanks to the social cooper-
ation of a multiplicity of individuals, are effective forms of creation and invention. These 
creative forms are at the base, he continues, of language and mathematics, the majority 
of cultural practices and artifacts, and cultural learning. All of these processes, argues 
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Tomasello, have transformed some phenomena, which were typical of all the primates, such 
as communication, dominance, exchange, and explorative behavior, in human cultural and 
social institutions like language, state, money, science.
In the second case, evolutionary social scientists such as Seabright et al. (2021) looking 
at small-scale societies offer another series of interesting findings for our topic of inter-
est here. They document that in this type of societies humans have an evolved cognitive 
specialization for reasoning about social exchange and social learning. Furthermore, in 
small-scale societies, continue Seabright et al. (2021), humans are used to several enjoy-
able activities, such as storytelling, music-making, singing and dance, sport, and communal 
beer-drinking. These activities, which have been handed down over time to the present 
day, are those we call today “forms of communication sociability” (Fortunati et al., 2013) 
and that play a central role in socialization, information exchange, and/or entertainment. 
Furthermore, in small societies, ethical behaviors are appreciated because they help the 
social organization. Saucier et al. (2014), for example, demonstrate that a lexical study of 
traits ascribable to humans in 12 isolated languages covering most habitable world regions 
outside of Europe show jealousy and crookedness are relatively ubiquitous human traits. 
Purzycki et al. (2018) similarly identified honesty and dishonesty as prominent cross- 
cultural indicators of good and bad people, respectively. In addition to such behavioral 
norms, there is widespread acceptance of the idea that one should aspire to find virtuous 
people as social partners, and avoid anti-social individuals. Moreover, cooperation and col-
laboration are very much appreciated by humans in small-scale societies whereby coopera-
tors prefer to connect to other cooperators in social networks (Smith et al., 2017; Stieglitz et 
al., 2017). These collaborative activities include both those that are meant to provide public 
goods and those that can be described as rituals, in which the activity itself represents the 
collective benefit being provided. Bhattacharya (2020) provides another key insight: Most of 
what we are is biopsychological and our selves are mostly settled on the basis of upbringing. 
These two elements are evolutionary products that shape our lives. Sketched above what a 
human is, we can initiate tracing some meaningful dividing lines between a present-day 
robot and human. Of course, we are not able to make a precise and exhaustive analysis and, 
as we noted above, both the nature of robots and concepts of humanity shift over time, but 
we can at least outline some elements of remaining and important distinction. 
 ▶ A robot is not born from a mother and cannot experience pregnancy and 
giving birth. 
 ▶ A robot has no infancy and is not shaped by a community of adults (experi-
encing primary and secondary socialization). In fact according to Gray and 
colleagues (2007), whereas humans are perceived to be high in agency and 
experience, animals like dogs are considered high in experience and low in 
agency, and robots are perceived to be high in agency and low in experience.
 ▶ A robot does not have consciousness of itself and its being in the world  
(Faggin, 2021).
 ▶ A robot does not feel emotions, amuse itself, and pretend to care.
 ▶ A robot is not a cultural subject, only a cultural object.
 ▶ A robot does not share food and drinks with humans.
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 ▶ A robot does not have an authentic comprehension of social institutions.
 ▶ A robot does not have goals or purposes, as Bhattacharya (2020) points out, 
“beyond carrying out a pre-assigned program.”
 ▶ A robot has no conception of what humans do and why.
 ▶ A robot does not perceive the environment in sociocultural, emotional, and 
spiritual ways, only in a physical way. 
The drawing of boundaries around and between humans and machines (i.e., ontol-
ogizing) is closely related to the process of prototyping, or determining what something 
exemplifies by fitting it within an overarching category. Especially when we encounter new 
interlocutors, relationship configurations, and interaction contexts, as is often the case in 
HMC, we ask ourselves, “What is it?” As the constructivist communication tradition has 
long stressed, prototyping is important because our answers to that question will lead us 
to activate certain stereotypes (what does it do?) which will then influence perception and 
communication by guiding the application of mental constructs and the activation, modi-
fication, and use of interaction scripts (Edwards, 2018, p. 46; see also Edwards et al., 2019). 
In their article, “Forms and Frames: Mind, Morality, and Trust in Robots Across Prototyp-
ical Interactions,” Banks et al. advance the knowledge on prototyping in HMC by focusing 
on the prototypicality of interaction, or the degree to which a human-robot interaction 
represents its larger interaction form. Banks et al. propose social, task, and play as three 
distinct higher-order interaction forms and examine via experimental methods their dif-
ferential effects on how people perceive the mind, morality, and trust (worthiness) of a 
humanoid social robot. Although mind ascription and moral evaluations did not differ 
based on the interaction form, participants expressed more trust following the task inter-
action, a form of interaction the authors suggest may be most aligned with our common 
mental models regarding the nature, behavior, and skills of robots. In the end, participants’ 
perceptions of the interactions were more influential to their trust and attitudes than were 
formal properties of the interaction, leading Banks et al. to conclude that “schema-aligned 
task interactions and perceived playfulness are gateways for building trust in robots” (p. 97). 
Trust remains a crucial issue in HMC. As Lutz and Tamó-Larrieux (2020) argued in Vol-
ume 1 of Human-Machine Communication (“The Robot Privacy Paradox: Understanding 
How Privacy Concerns Shape Intentions to Use Social Robots”) trust is a key element for 
developing comfort with social robots and determining their appropriate and ethical uses.
3. Overcoming Binary Discourse: A Critical Turn in Human- 
Machine Communication Research
The third major strand in this volume includes three articles that challenge dominant 
but unquestioned discourses of power and privilege infusing HMC. In the article “Social 
Robots as the Bride? Understanding the Construction of Gender in a Japanese Social Robot 
Product” Liu concentrates on Azuma Hikari, the beautiful anime-style girl that is produced 
as a hologram device by Gatebox Inc. As opposed to voice-based assistants like Siri, Alexa, 
and Cortana, Azuma Hikari is designed as an intimate companion, a “comforting bride” 
with whom to simulate marriage. Using a mixed-methods approach, Liu combines semiotic 
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analysis of the official visual materials released by Gatebox Inc. with the heterogeneous 
engineering approach proposed by Gehl (2014) to critically consider the obscured and hid-
den aspects of Azuma Hikari that in daily interactions with users become salient alongside 
the official marketing materials. Liu’s analysis reveals that Azuma Hikari leverages stereo-
typical representations of a Japanese “ideal bride” and reproduces through interaction an 
unequal gender relation where users are disciplined to play the role of “wage earner” and 
master-like husband. As Liu concludes, the humanization of objects is often associated with 
the objectification of humans. This research is a valuable contribution that encourages sys-
tematic attention to how HMC is reflective and productive of human gender relations and 
also models an exemplary methodological approach for doing this work.
Davis and Stanovsek, in their article “The Machine as an Extension of the Body: When 
Identity, Immersion, and Interactive Design Serve as Both Resource and Limitation for the 
Disabled,” focus on the interplay between the technological affordances of a social virtual 
world and the people with disabilities (PWD) who interact via avatars in this online com-
munity. Arising from their ongoing, multiyear ethnographic study of embodiment among 
PWD in the virtual world Second Life (SL), Davis and Stanovsek address two research ques-
tions: (1) How do PWD who function as avatars report the technological affordances of 
virtual environments as functions of online identity in support of social or professional 
interaction? and (2) What elements of platform design (affordances) either support or 
inhibit social function among PWD in SL? 
Results from thematic analysis demonstrate the important relationship between avatar 
choice, which may be congruent or incongruent with the user’s physical self along many 
identity markers, and the development of identity and also the fundamental and increasing 
integration of technology itself with identity, ability, and access to professional and social 
communities. Through their analysis, Davis and Stanovsek further show that “while these 
affordances may allow for an expression of identity tied to ability, creativity and sociability 
not accessible in the physical world,” they also “create new barriers to accessibility for indi-
viduals who have found freedoms in their embodied online surrogate” (p. 133). 
Dehnert and Leach in their article “Becoming Human? Ableism and Control in Detroit: 
Become Human and the Implications for Human-Machine Communication,” present a case 
study of the choose-your-own-adventure video game Detroit: Become Human to reveal how 
people may rely on ableist discourses to make sense of relationships with machines. They 
detail how ableist communication scripts cast machine partners as both sub- and superhu-
man, signifying lack and also excess in relation to the socially constructed “normal body,” 
and how those scripts manifest in control and cyborg anxiety (i.e., “the fear that the perfor-
mance and embodiment of a disabled person exposes the porous and permeable bound-
aries of what it means to be an able-bodied and able-minded human,” p. 139). This case 
study serves as a demonstration and vehicle for Dehnert and Leach’s broader call for crit-
ical approaches to understanding the communication scripts people use in HMC. In their 
words:
A critical perspective on a constructivist research paradigm in HMC attunes us 
to the ubiquitous yet powerful societal systems of oppression that guide commu-
nication scripts: structures such as heteronormativity and Whiteness that have 
been intensively theorized by critical communication scholars. (p. 138)
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Rightly, Dehnert and Leach contend that uncritical acceptance of the automatic (naïve, 
mindless) transfer of scripts developed in human interaction will thwart our ability to resist 
and rescript harmful relations, both human and human-machine. 
These articles regarding gender (man and woman) and body representation (ability 
and disability) reveal the necessity to resume the debate that developed in the 1980s and 
that advocated a radical overcoming of binary thinking. In those years the feminist move-
ment contested a knowledge resulting from an abstract form of the real, based on dialectic 
and structured with such characteristics to preclude women, by forbidding them access 
to thought and, circularly, by prohibiting thought from accessing the world of women 
(e.g., Bordo, 1986; Costantini et al., 1981; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Janssen-Jurreit, 1982; 
O’Brien, 1981). Negri (1981) also wrote about dialectic in recognizing the rupture of this 
eternal formula of Judeo-Christian thought within political discourse. But the first con-
testation of Western thought, the disavowal of its formulas and its categories, starting 
with dialectic, dualism, and beyond which everything that was there was branded with a 
generic label of irrational—from circumstantial knowledge to emotionality, from bodily 
knowledge to participatory intuition—was put in place by women. The contestation of the 
binary discourse was necessary for women. The feminist movement not only criticized how 
gender and identity had been shaped but at the same time defended all the subjects who 
were beyond the famous fixed tracks. Today we welcome the notion of “gender contin-
uum,” which includes third genders, agender, two-spirit, and different dimensional models 
of gender (Søraa, 2017), but this has been made possible by the rupture of the binary 
perspective.
There is the same need to overcome the binary discourse involved in the dialectic 
abled/disabled, which is still too often based on the stereotyped, social representation 
of the abled as normal and the point of reference and the disabled as abnormal and the 
exception (Davis, and Denhert & Leach in this volume). This vision is not only simplis-
tic, narrow, and stigma-generating, but it also prevents us from seeing the reality of the 
so-called normal, which is imbued with disability during the life cycle. When able people 
become elderly they face and live with many disabilities: for example, they become visually- 
and hearing-impaired, they may have problems walking or have to move in a wheelchair, 
and so on (Cortés et al., 2003). Furthermore, chronic diseases are significant causes of dis-
ability and reduced quality of life for able people. Infancy is also a period in which children 
face many types of disability and need a long time to reach their muscle development and 
control mastery. Ability is something that children need to conquer through movement. 
Thus, disabled people are a very heterogeneous group and include as we mentioned above 
some who are “learning to be able” (children) and ex-able social groups (elderly), whereby 
scientific literature has increasingly begun to study them together with elderly people (e.g. 
Lee et al., 2021; Madhusanka & Ramadass, 2021). The history of digital technologies has 
documented that the devices designed for disabled people have been a frontier of tech-
nological inclusion since they have allowed the design of better technologies for all: see 
the debate on universal design versus assistive technologies (Vanderheiden, 1998) and the 
advantages and disadvantages related to each of these approaches. 
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4. Exploration of Human-Machine Communication in  
Organizational Contexts
A final group of four papers focuses on the exploration of HMC in different sectors of 
production. Gibbs et al., in their article “Negotiating Agency and Control: Theorizing 
Human-Machine Communication From a Structurational Perspective,” draw on structura-
tion theory to propose a conceptual framework to address HMC in organizational contexts. 
They note that in contrast with earlier organization technologies theorized primarily as 
tools, intelligent technologies may be considered agents with the potential to transform 
organizing and organizations. However, a robust understanding of the role of smart and 
communicative machines in organizational communication will require moving beyond 
individual-level analyses of agency and control. Gibbs et al. forward structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984) as a means of recognizing the recursive interplay of structure and agents in 
which each constitutes the other; agents create structures which both enable and constrain 
their practices, and their practices reproduce social systems and structures. They offer a 
theoretical framework to explain agency in HMC as “a process involving the negotiation 
of control between human and machine agents” (p. 153). Through illustrative organiza-
tional examples of A/B testing, humans in the loop, and automated journalism, Gibbs et al. 
demonstrate the value of the dialectic of control; the “reciprocal power relationship between 
active agents and institutional forms of control” (p. 161) in organizational contexts which 
now include algorithmic as well as human and institutional forms of control. They con-
clude their discourse by presenting an exciting and important future research agenda for 
the application of the structurational framework in the HMC field.
Johanssen and Wang, in “Artificial Intuition in Tech Journalism on AI: Imagining the 
Human Subject,” explore the field of tech journalism by presenting an interesting analysis 
of journalistic frames and discussing the new trend of Artificial Intuition (AI acting intu-
itively). Through a qualitative thematic analysis of tech journalism articles (from 2016–
2019) that discussed Artificial Intuition as it relates to human subjectivity, Johanssen and 
Wang demonstrate that the narratives typically claimed intuition could make AI more effi-
cient, autonomous, and human, and sometimes claimed that it could outperform or sur-
pass human abilities and intuition. The rational/computation framing of tech journalism is 
examined in contrast to philosophical and psychoanalytic explanations of intuition, which 
introduce greater complexity and call for more attention to explainability, transparency, and 
bias in AI systems. 
Piercy and Gist-Mackey in “Automation Anxieties: Perceptions About Technological 
Automation and the Future of Pharmacy Work” investigate workers’ anxiety in respect to 
the diffusion of automation in the pharmacy context. Noting an increasingly technologizing 
work landscape, they orient their research toward the general question: “How do employ-
ees perceive the future of human-technology collaboration?” (p. 192) Specifically, they test 
the skills-biased technical change hypothesis (SBTC hypothesis) which predicts that low-skill 
work is the most likely to be transformed or replaced in automation processes by examining 
the mental models about automation in a sample of pharmacists and pharmacy technicians. 
Their results are largely supportive of the SBTC hypothesis and demonstrate the impor-
tance of examining the influence of anxieties on mental models surrounding HMC issues. 
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Prahl and Van Swol in their article “Out With the Humans, in With the Machines? 
Investigating the Behavioral and Psychological Effects of Replacing Human Advisors With 
a Machine” analyze the behavioral and psychological effects of replacing humans with 
robots in the financial sector. The authors report the results of an experiment in which 
participants were tasked with making a series of financial forecasts in a low or high demon-
strability situation after receiving advice from a machine advisor, a human advisor, or an 
advisor replaced by the other agent type (human-machine) halfway through the experi-
ment. Human advisors were rated as broadly more favorable (expert, useful, similar), an 
effect magnified when the human was replaced by a machine during the experiment. Prahl 
and Van Swol discuss the numerous and complex factors that must be considered when 
effectively introducing machine advisors into organizational contexts and note that “it is 
not only humans who are replaced with will be unhappy; the people who work with these 
new machines may not be happy either” (p. 226). 
All of these articles address timely and important questions related to various organiza-
tional contexts and contribute to moving the research on HMC ahead. They also indicate the 
need to acknowledge that the penetration of robotics, virtual assistants, intelligent agents, 
chatbots, and so on in the production sphere takes place along with the penetration and 
development of a cluster of processes or factors as indicated by Evans (2017): soft automa-
tion, digitalization, AI, big data, social media, and 3D printers. These factors interpenetrate 
and empower each other creating smart and networked environments both in factories and 
services and in the urban setting. Together, they are reshaping the industrial world in the 
direction of cutting production costs by increasingly reducing the use of the human labor 
force. However, as Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out in 1966, 
what the modern-day technical civilization has of chaotic and monstrous does 
not derive from the very idea of  a technical civilization or from some essence 
of technology as such. In modern society, technology has acquired by now a 
characteristic position and structure, whose relationship with the needs of  
human beings is profoundly incongruous: evil, therefore, does not derive from 
the rationalization of our world, but from the irrationality with which that ratio-
nalization takes place. (p. 108)
It is the perception and the experience of this irrationality that create, for example, the 
pharmacy workers’ anxiety which Piercy and Gist-Mackey investigate or the negative emo-
tions and mistaken behavior that decision-makers experience when a human is replaced by 
a machine in the financial sector, documented by Prahl and Van Swol.
Although the research on HMC in organizational contexts we publish in this volume 
is interesting and relevant, there is also the need for innovative research on self-driving 
cars. After the special issue of the International Journal of Communication (vol. 13, 2019) 
“Cars and Contemporary Communication: Machine, Medium, Mobility” edited by Thilo 
von Pape, Gerard Goggin, and Laura Forlano, it is time to advance the debate on commu-
nication between humans and this type of machine. This debate does not involve only the 
self-driving cars, the cars of the future, but also and especially the automation processes 
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involved in the cars that we drive today and the cars that we will buy tomorrow. Important 
processes of robotization, as argued by Fortunati and colleagues (2019), concern current 
cars as well as many other machines that populate our everyday life. These processes have 
taken place against a backdrop in which cars have become over time a central hub of social, 
communication, and technology developments. Today, cars are a key place of encounter 
and hybridization between mobility, media use, mediated and analog communication, and 
activities such as driving. Furthermore, they have been transformed into a complex node 
of communication flows with different degrees of automation. Drivers are bombarded by 
flows arriving from road infrastructures such as traffic lights and road signs, from the car 
itself such as satnav systems and geowebs supporting driving and wayfinding, from pedes-
trians, as well as from car passengers. Drivers in turn have to communicate with pedes-
trians directly and through the car, with other cars, the road infrastructure, and the other 
passengers. On top of these information exchanges, Goggin (2012) argued that in-car com-
munication also flows across multiple channels: mobile phones, internet, TV, and radio, 
with the consequence that drivers assume many different communicative roles: they are 
conversation interlocutors, users of mobile media, and audiences. It is extremely important 
for the HMC field and for humans that we advance the study of robotization processes in 
this communication context. 
5. Conclusion 
The four layers of discourse that this second volume of Human-Machine Communication 
contains substantially advance key debates in the field. The foundations of the major the-
oretical frameworks are progressing and the methodological tools are subject to ongoing 
innovation. Furthermore, the research methodologies used in this field are less confined 
to strictly quantitative and experimental ones, and increasingly integrate qualitative and 
mixed methods. Likewise, it is encouraging to witness critical approaches to HMC emerg-
ing alongside and also challenging the more traditional and administrative approaches 
to theory and practice. We still need to better understand the actual practices of use of 
technologies, which are at the basis of the big issues, if we want to progress substantially 
in this field (Suchman, 2019). However, we are aware that we face serious limitations in 
exploring the daily practices of use, especially of social robots, because these are still at the 
prototyping level and, thus, users have a very limited direct experience of them. This call 
for additional research on situated use practices, as well as our call for greater integration 
of historical, sociological, and semiotic/hermeneutic insights, for work that interrogates 
and challenges structures of privilege, exploitation, and oppression, and for research that 
extends HMC inquiry into transforming and transformative communication technologies 
like the automobile, is offered with excitement and appreciation for our wonderful com-
munity of researchers, theorists, and practitioners. We extend our gratitude to the brilliant, 
generous, and constructive scholars who comprise the editorial board and to the scientists, 
critics, and practitioners who submitted their excellent work. 
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Abstract
Clifford Nass and his colleagues proposed the Computers Are Social Actors (CASA) para-
digm in the 1990s and demonstrated that we treat computers in some of the ways we treat 
humans. To account for technological advances and to refine explanations for CASA results, 
this paper proposes the Media Are Social Actors (MASA) paradigm. We begin by distinguish-
ing the roles of primary and secondary cues in evoking medium-as-social-actor presence 
and social responses. We then discuss the roles of individual differences and contextual fac-
tors in these responses and identify mindless and mindful anthropomorphism as two major 
complementary mechanisms for understanding MASA phenomena. Based on evolution-
ary psychology explanations for socialness, we conclude with nine formal propositions and 
suggestions for future research to test and apply MASA.
Keywords: computers are social actors, media are social actors, medium-as-social-actor 
presence, social presence, social cues, mindlessness, anthropomorphism
Introduction
Among the more surprising research results in the study of human-computer interaction 
are those of Clifford Nass and his colleagues demonstrating that computer users apply social 
rules from human-human interactions when they use computers. A series of experiments 
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and more (Nass et al., 1994; Nass et al., 1996; Nass et al., 1997). Nass proposed the Comput-
ers are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm to describe the phenomenon and an approach to 
studying it and expanded on the idea with Byron Reeves in their book The Media Equation 
(Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996).
The original CASA paradigm was proposed over a quarter century ago. Today we are 
surrounded by many more media technologies, including wearable devices, smartphones, 
digital assistants, and humanoid robots (Carolus et al., 2019; Kanda et al., 2009; Perry, 2014). 
While growing research has been applying the CASA paradigm to understand interactions 
with these emerging technologies, the general tenet that users respond to computers and 
other media technologies as if they were real people requires more subtle and detailed expli-
cations that account for media users’ behavior. Although the CASA paradigm and the Media 
Equation describe a series of experimental findings about individuals’ social reactions to 
technologies, one caveat to the theoretical framework is that it lacks explicit propositions 
that researchers can examine, test, and refine. Thus, to build a more refined framework, 
we propose the Media are Social Actors (MASA) paradigm as a structured extension of 
the CASA paradigm. We suggest that an enhanced framework that builds on the CASA 
paradigm, expounds the effects of social cues, describes the psychological mechanism of 
social responses, and provides propositions that scholars can test will not only direct future 
research on human-technology interaction but also meet the criteria of explanatory power, 
predictive power, falsifiability, heuristic value, and internal consistency that Chaffee and 
Berger (1987) outlined for a rigorous theoretical framework. 
We expand the CASA paradigm from the perspective of social cues, as social cues are 
a key factor that leads to users’ social responses. For example, Nass (2004) noted that social 
cues which may trigger applying etiquette rules to computers include language, voice, a 
face, emotion manifestation, interactivity, perceived engagement with the user, and filling 
of social roles. Another reason to approach the expansion of the paradigm through social 
cues is that cues can evoke medium-as-social-actor presence. Medium-as-social-actor pres-
ence refers to the idea that when a medium itself presents social cues, individuals perceive it 
(with or without conscious awareness) not as a medium but as an independent social entity 
(Lombard & Ditton, 1997). While sometimes researchers use social presence to describe 
medium-as-social-actor presence experiences, social presence may involve other mean-
ings such as the “subjective quality of the medium” (Short et al., 1976, p. 66) or parasocial 
interaction (Horton & Wohl, 1956). Thus, in this paper, we will consistently use the term 
medium-as-social-actor presence to avoid misunderstandings (for definitions of other 
types of social presence, see Biocca et al., 2003; Lombard & Jones, 2015). Although not 
all CASA studies have examined medium-as-social-actor presence, and presence need not 
always lead to behavioral social responses, social responses can be considered as a reflection 
and indication of users’ medium-as-social-actor presence experiences. 
While much literature has examined the effects of social cues on users’ social responses 
to technologies (e.g., Araujo, 2018; Nomura & Kanda, 2015; Terzioğlu et al., 2020), most 
research has focused on either the effects of single social cues or the cumulative effects 
of social cues. A large body of research suggests that technologies with more social cues 
can evoke stronger social responses than ones with fewer social cues (e.g., Burgoon et al., 
2000; Ghazali et al., 2018; Tung & Deng, 2007). By contrast, limited research has clarified 
the distinctions among these social cues. It is likely that individual social cues can exert 
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different effects on users’ responses (Abubshait & Wiese, 2017). Therefore, in this paper, we 
suggest that (1) the quality of social cues should receive more attention in future research, 
(2) the roles of individual differences and communication contexts should be considered 
in the paradigm, (3) the two prominent psychological explanations for social responses, 
mindlessness and anthropomorphism, can be unified and applied to explain a wide variety 
of human-machine communication (HMC) scenarios, and (4) specific propositions should 
be developed and refined to derive future research questions on HMC.
Expanding the CASA paradigm to the MASA paradigm through the examination of 
social cues has three major benefits. First, from a theory construction perspective, broaden-
ing the CASA paradigm will expand the value and applicability of an important theoretical 
framework. By refining and clarifying the concepts, assumptions, and propositions of the 
MASA paradigm, researchers can better understand, explain, predict the effects of, and 
generate new questions about our increasingly common communication experiences with 
diverse technologies.
Second, when interaction with technologies mimics natural human communication, 
people expend less cognitive effort (Gambino et al., 2020), making the experience more 
efficient and intuitive. And when interactions account for users’ personalities, identities, 
and demographic characteristics along with the communication context, the experience 
is further enhanced. We can therefore apply the propositions of the MASA paradigm to 
improve the design, enhance the users’ experience, and therefore increase the success, of a 
variety of media technologies (Bartneck et al., 2008; Biocca et al., 2003).
Third, expanding CASA to MASA highlights important ethical issues in technology 
development. As designers can more easily embed different social cues in technologies, 
we will need to consider the potential for unethical manipulation of user responses. Those 
who devise, promote, adopt, and study presence-evoking technologies should be mindful 
of their concomitant risks (Lombard, 2009).
The Roles of Cues, Individual Differences,  
and Contextual Factors
To elaborate the mechanism of the MASA paradigm, below we first explicate the role of 
social cues. We demonstrate the intrinsic distinctions among social cues, the effects of social 
cues on medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses, and then briefly introduce 
the role of individual differences and contextual factors in our theoretical framework. 
Social Cues
Although many researchers have studied the effects of social cues (Tanis & Postmes, 2003; 
Walther et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2010), few have explicitly defined the term. Social cues 
can serve as affordances (Sundar et al., 2015), reflect physical attractiveness (Antheunis & 
Schouten, 2011), or be conceived as contextual information (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986). Here 
we specifically adopt Fiore et al.’s (2013) definition of cues as “biologically and physically 
determined features salient to observers because of their potential as channels of useful 
information” (p. 2). Fiore and colleagues distinguished social cues and social signals, where 
social cues can be understood as physical or behavioral features displayed by a social actor 
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and social signals are the meaningful interpretations of these social cues by the perceivers. 
This is an important stepping-off point because social cues have been used interchangeably 
with social signals in some literature (Wiltshire et al., 2014). Examples of social cues include 
a social actor’s voice, humanlike appearance, and eye gaze, whereas social signals include 
perceivers’ translation of these and other cues into an understanding of the social actor’s 
emotion (e.g., indicated by the actor’s smiling face), attention (e.g., indicated by eye con-
tact), empathy (e.g., indicated by hugs or language), and so on. 
Based on this distinction, although the early CASA researchers manipulated computers 
to have personalities, genders, or conversation patterns, what they actually controlled were 
various sets of social cues. For instance, in their manipulation of gendered computers, Nass 
et al. (1997) assigned a female voice and a male voice to the computers and found that a 
female computer was perceived to be more familiar with love and relationships, whereas a 
male computer was more knowledgeable about technical subjects. Similarly, when oper-
ationalizing computer personalities, Nass and Lee (2001) controlled the levels of speech 
rate, volume, fundamental frequency, and pitch range to differentiate introverted and extro-
verted computers. 
Although the role of social cues has been examined in much of the CASA literature, 
one question that Nass and Moon (2000) raised in their suggestions for future research is 
whether there exist some dimensions of a computer that are more likely to evoke social 
responses compared to others, and how different combinations of them would impose 
additive or synergetic influence on social responses. Although no sufficient findings have 
been established to advance a hierarchy of social cues which indicates the distinct power 
of each single cue over users’ presence experiences and social responses, some scholarship 
at least organizes and compares various pairs of social cues. For example, Nass and Steuer 
(1993) examined the effects of different voices and of the same or different computer boxes 
producing the voices. They found that the voice manipulation had greater effects than the 
box one in predicting perceived accuracy and fairness of an evaluation session in human- 
computer interaction. Reeves and Nass (2000) also noted that sight and sound dominate 
human perception and play a more important role than other senses that can relay social 
cues like smell. Thus, it can be inferred that there should be a group of cues that are more 
likely to generate individuals’ social perception than others. This postulation is consistent 
with the cognitive miser theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), based on which researchers suggest 
that how a person is construed is determined by the quality of available visual inputs. The 
cognitive process of person perception may occur automatically when critical cues such as 
facial features are available to the perceiver, but the same process may not be activated with-
out the presence of these cues (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Martin & Macrae, 2007). Therefore, 
in the process of activating users’ medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses, 
what matters is not only the quantity of social cues, but also the quality of social cues.
Based on prior research, we identify two groups of social cues, primary cues and sec-
ondary cues, to refer to their different effects on users’ social reactions. Primary cues are 
those that are most salient and central to humans’ perception of socialness. Responses 
to these primary cues are based on individuals’ evolutionary bias toward humanlike (or 
animal-like) characteristics. Each primary social cue should be sufficient but not necessary 
to evoke social responses. By contrast, secondary cues are those that are less salient and less 
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central to humans’ perception of socialness. They are neither sufficient nor necessary to 
evoke social responses.
Primary Cues
We include face, eye gaze, gesture, human-sounding voice, and humanlike or animal-like 
shape as major examples of primary cues. These cues have been found to evoke humans’ 
evolutionarily based responses. For instance, researchers have found that infants are sen-
sitive to fearful, surprising, and angry facial expressions (Kobiella, et al., 2008; Schmidt & 
Cohn, 2001; Serrano et al., 1992). Paredolia, which refers to the illusion in which people see 
faces in inanimate objects (e.g., taking a car’s headlights as eyes and its bumper or grill as 
mouth) (Takahashi & Watanabe, 2013), also supports the idea that the face is a powerful 
cue in triggering social perception. Past research has corroborated that including a face as 
a social cue can lead participants to perceive computer agents as more trustworthy, persua-
sive, and positive (Gong, 2008; Shamekhi et al., 2018). 
As an important social feature of a face, eye gaze is another evolutionarily significant 
characteristic of human beings. Eye gaze delivers the social signals of attention, emotion, 
or acknowledgment (Andrist et al., 2015; Fink & Penton-Voak, 2002). Past research has 
shown that even 12-month-old infants can follow the gaze direction of robots (Okumura 
et al., 2013). 
Another social cue that serves as a basic element of our daily nonverbal interaction is 
gestures (Krauss et al., 1996). Johansson (1973) found that our visual perception of biologi-
cal motion is keen enough to identify gestures that are made up of only 10 to 12 bright spots 
representing different human body joints. Prior literature has suggested that technologies 
designed with movable arms, hands, and/or bodies that imply intentions, motives, mental 
states, and social rituals can evoke our social perception (Salem et al., 2013). For instance, 
letting users shake hands with the robot NAO before negotiating with it led to more coop-
eration between users and robots (Bevan & Fraser, 2015). 
The other two primary cues, human-sounding voice and human- or animal-like shape, 
have already received much attention in the field of HMC. Many studies have demon-
strated that human-sounding voice, whether actual or synthetic, has greater effects than 
machine-sounding speech in evoking social responses (Chérif & Lemoine, 2019; Chiou et 
al., 2020; Xu, 2019). The human voice has especially been perceived as a natural and pow-
erful cue and can more easily encourage individuals’ learning performances compared to 
a machine voice (Mayer, 2014; Nass & Brave, 2005). Interacting with Siri is an example of 
how a technology paired with mere vocal cues can raise individuals’ involuntary awareness 
of a social entity. Fortunati (2003) used the phrase “the body reaches where the voice does” 
to highlight the idea that voice serves as an extension of the body in our daily interaction 
(p. 62). 
Designing humanlike or animal-like shape into technologies has been effective in forg-
ing an attractive appearance. For instance, Pixar’s mascot Luxo is designed to have a head 
and a body to increase its popularity. Martini et al. (2016) found that the degree of robots’ 
humanlike appearance has a positive relationship with individuals’ attribution of intention-
ality to the robots. Hinds et al. (2004) found that participants felt less responsible for a 
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task when collaborating with a humanlike robot than with a machinelike robot partner, 
meaning that participants attributed more trust to the humanlike one than the machinelike 
one. Using fMRI, research has further suggested that even observing animal-like shadows 
created by finger movements on a screen activates the same brain activity as verbal commu-
nication, implying that perceiving animal shadows involves the same physiological reaction 
as decoding human speech (Fadiga et al., 2006).
One might argue that humans shifting from acceptance to revulsion when a technol-
ogy appears highly humanlike but falls short of a perfect human replica (Mori et al., 2012) 
counters the classification of humanlike shape as a primary cue. While it is true that users’ 
affinity for the machine may plunge at the occurrence of this “uncanny valley,” experi-
encing eeriness itself is a manifestation of strong medium-as-social-actor presence, as it 
shows that humans develop strong emotional responses to a machine that approximates 
human appearances. Mori et al. (2012) postulated that the eerie sensation could be due to 
the human instinct that protects us from potential dangers, including members of different 
species appearing to be humanlike, which supports the idea that our responses to human-
like technologies are sensitive and intuitive.
Secondary Cues
Compared to primary cues that evoke evolutionary-based responses, secondary cues have 
less power in activating users’ social perception and responses. Below we identify a few 
representative examples of secondary cues. 
Whereas human or animal size could be a contributing factor to users’ social responses 
to technologies (Duffy, 2003; Takayama & Pantofaru, 2009), it is not always evocative. 
Walters et al. (2009) found that while in single trials a short robot led participants to allow 
for a closer approach distance than a taller robot, the effect faded away in repeated tri-
als over three weeks. Additionally, when explaining the uncanny valley effects, Mori et al. 
(2012) used the Bunraku puppet to indicate that audiences tend to ignore the size of the 
puppet but concentrate on its appearances. 
As a basic human means of exchanging social information (Dunbar, 2004), language 
use has been found to trigger social perception and responses (Sah & Peng, 2015; Xu, 2020). 
However, it is classified as a secondary cue here because it does not always lead to strong 
social responses. For instance, a water bottle with the label “drink me” may induce greater 
levels of social reactions than one with the label “drink it.” Thus, the effects depend on 
the variations in language. Informal language, warm (i.e., friendly and conversational) lan-
guage, and language with vocal fillers and self-referential statements have been found to be 
more evocative than formal language, cold language, and language without paralinguistic 
cues (Goble & Edwards, 2018; Hoffmann et al., 2020; Sah & Peng, 2015).
Motion attracts our attention and may influence our social responses (Reeves & Nass, 
2000). The Heider-Simmel (1944) experiment suggests that even simple dots that randomly 
move on a computer screen can be interpreted to have intentions. So can different forms of 
automatic doors that move with different speeds and trajectories (Ju & Takayama, 2009). 
However, movements have strong effects on social perception only when they become sym-
bolic or conversational (Krauss et al., 1996). That is, movements that reveal communicators’ 
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purposes, mental states, and adherence to social rituals are more likely to evoke social reac-
tions than random movements (Hoffman & Ju, 2012; Xu, 2019). For instance, Fiore et al. 
(2013) found that an iRobot Ava that gave way to participants as it traveled across a hallway 
evoked stronger social presence than one that did not yield to participants. Thus, depending 
on their speed, trajectory, frequency, and social meanings, a technology’s motion cues may 
trigger different levels of social perception (Mori et al., 2012). 
Compared to a human-sounding voice, a machine-sounding voice is generally perceived 
as unnatural and unpleasant (Gong & Lai, 2003). A machine-sounding voice has gener-
ally been found to be inferior to a human voice in evoking medium-as-social-actor pres-
ence experience (Chérif & Lemoine, 2019). Moreover, the level of social responses evoked 
by a machine’s voice, or other symbolic sounds, depends on the relationship between the 
technology and its users. In our daily interaction with technologies, alarm system voices; 
smartphone ringtones; SMS, calendar, and other alerts and reminders; the myriad sounds 
built into Windows, iOS, and other computer operating systems; and even the ticking and 
chiming of mechanical clocks all suggest the potential interpretation of a social actor for 
users who have come to understand, be comfortable with, and rely on them.
Social Signals
Beyond the primary and secondary cues, technologies can present social cues that can be 
interpreted as social signals in HMC (Fiore et al., 2013; Streater et al., 2012). That is, single 
or combinations of primary and/or secondary social cues can constitute abstract human 
characteristics including personalities, identities, and so on. Perceiving these social signals 
may require prolonged exposure to or interaction with the technologies. Contextual factors 
may also help individuals sense these abstract human characteristics. Below we provide 
some examples of social signals that are composed of social cues.
The ability of a media technology to be responsive or interactive should be sufficient 
on its own to trigger users’ social perception and responses (Kim & Sundar, 2012). But 
presenting interactivity requires technologies to demonstrate a constellation of cues, which 
may include a physically embodied robot’s eye contact, nodding, and smiling, or a chatbot’s 
timing of response, message contingency, and so on (Jung et al., 2014; Lew et al., 2018). 
Perceived personality and social identity of a media technology also requires a constella-
tion of cues. A systematic review (Mou et al., 2020) suggests that personalities of machines 
can be operationalized via cues such as speech styles, vocal features, movements, and prox-
imity. In addition, social identity can be easily perceived based on minimal, but meaning-
ful, cues. For instance, Eyssel and Kuchenbrandt (2012) assigned different names to two 
robots, one German name and one Turkish name. Participants in the group with the same- 
nationality robot were more likely to evaluate the robot’s performances as positive (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988; Kuchenbrandt et al., 2013). 
Some people (and animals) in our lives become our companions, and some media 
technologies (e.g., Tamagotchi, books, smartphones) can provide the same sense of social 
connection. Early uses and gratifications research suggested that people’s ritualized use of 
television is related to higher affinity with the television itself rather than the content it 
presents (Rubin, 1983). The physical presence of a technology itself is an essential cue and 
36 Human-Machine Communication 
the additions of several others (e.g., sound, touch) can enhance the perceived social com-
panionship. 
All human beings are unique; aside from genetic and physical differences we all have 
different life experiences (Orwig, 2014; Turkle, 2012). We associate uniqueness with other 
people and value it in our interpersonal relationships (Eastwick & Hunt, 2014). Many tech-
nologies can also be perceived as being unique, either because they come to us with these 
features or are designed or adapted for personalization. For example, many personal and 
mobile computers, virtual assistants, and other technologies ask users to provide a name 
for them; some people install custom ringtones and “skins” for electronic devices, and 
location-based mobile systems can provide customized context-aware information to assist 
users with decision-making (Choi et al., 2017). Even iRobot’s Roomba vacuum cleaners can 
be personalized with a “skin toolkit” to increase users’ acceptance of the device and their 
commitment to use it more (Sung et al., 2009). 
A combination of social cues may cause individuals to infer the health status or the life 
span of technologies (Lechelt et al., 2020). When an old technology (e.g., mechanical clock, 
television, computer, smartphone, robot, etc.) begins to wear out or falter or is damaged in 
an accident, the owner may take it to a “doctor” (repair person) and wait with worry and 
impatience for a report on whether and how it will “recover.” Even when technologies lose 
their functional value, or the developers stop supporting their use (e.g., the shutdown of 
servers that supported the Jibo Robot), the owners of the technologies may still find social 
value in keeping them as companions or for reimagined uses (see Lechelt et al., 2020). 
Other cues and signals that could evoke medium-as-social-actor presence and social 
responses include olfactory cues (Chen, 2006), haptic cues (Blakemore, 2016; Li et al., 
2017), interpersonal distance (Syrdal et al., 2006; Takayama & Pantofaru, 2009; Walters et 
al., 2009), and degree of flexibility (Duffy & Zawieska, 2012). It should be noted that even 
within a single cue, there exists significant components that evoke different effects. For 
example, vocal cues contain volume, pitch, tone, vocal outbursts, and so forth (Vinciarelli 
et al., 2009). 
Individual Differences and Contextual Factors
We have suggested that social cues differ in their power over users’ social responses. These 
social cues can further be converted into social signals that act as perceived human charac-
teristics such as personalities, identities, and so on. As part of the MASA paradigm, here we 
further suggest the importance of individual differences and contextual factors that likely 
play a role in users’ medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses.
Anthropocentrism is “the tendency of individuals to perceive the world from a 
human-centered perspective, in which humankind is the most significant of all entities” 
(Nass et al., 1995, p. 229). A person high in anthropocentrism is less likely to believe that 
technologies can, and should, take on physical and psychological attributes of people and 
occupy human social roles, which would likely suppress their medium-as-social-actor pres-
ence.
The CASA research has suggested that individuals’ own personalities play a role when 
interacting with technologies; for example, a robot that demonstrated a complementary 
personality (Lee et al., 2006). Related to users’ personalities, individuals with greater desire 
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for social interaction are more likely to modulate their presence experiences by looking for 
social cues (Gardner et al., 2005) and perceiving social actors when they use technologies 
(Epley et al., 2007).
Epley et al. (2007) argued that children are more likely than adults to ascribe human 
emotions to external entities (e.g., angry clouds, happy sun). Flavell et al. (1990) found 
that children are more likely to perceive mediated actors or objects as “real.” The same 
logic applies to medium-as-social-actor presence. In her book Alone Together, Turkle (2012) 
observed children’s interaction with the toy Furby and noticed that children believe that 
Furby can burp, understand language, and may one day “die.” All these observations suggest 
that age is an influential factor in our responses to technologies (Edwards et al., 2019).
Beyond these factors, individuals differ in their knowledge about, experience with, 
and ability to think critically about technologies, which should lead to different levels of 
medium-as-social-actor presence. For example, Nass and Moon (2000) suggested there was 
no evidence that computer experts are immune to social responses to computers. Johnson 
and colleagues (2004) found that those with more computer use experiences reported more 
positive affect in response to a computer’s flattery and more favorable judgments of the 
computer. In addition, Lee (2010) found that people who were more analytical and rational 
were less likely to respond to flattery effects of computers compared to those who were 
intuitive and experiential.
Prior literature has suggested the potential of many other individual differences in lever-
aging our medium-as-social-actor presence experiences. For example, Salem et al. (2013) 
found that participants preferred robots that occasionally performed incorrect gestures 
over those that always performed perfect ones, implying that our tolerance of imperfection 
may help determine our social attitudes toward technologies. For people who have unreal-
istically high expectations for the performance of technologies, every disappointment high-
lights the true nature of the technologies, so these people will be less likely to have strong 
social responses to them (Paepcke & Takayama, 2010; Waddell, 2018). Likewise, individuals’ 
willingness to suspend disbelief may determine whether we treat a machine more as a tool or 
as a social entity (Duffy & Zawieska, 2012). Moreover, individuals with different attachment 
styles diverge in their intention to seek social cues and form social relationships with other 
social actors (Cole & Leets, 1999; Epley et al., 2007). Other relevant individual differences 
include gender, self-esteem, tolerance of uncertainty, tendency to make attribution errors, 
and so on (Epley et al., 2007; Nass et al., 1995; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009).
As with other types of presence (Slater & Wilbur, 1997; Won et al., 2015), a wide vari-
ety of factors related to the context of our exposure to and interactions with technologies 
may impact our experiences of medium-as-social-actor presence. These include, but are by 
no means limited to, the nature of the activity or task involved, the setting (e.g., public or 
private), the number of people present and our relationships with them, the amount and 
accuracy of information available to us regarding the nature of the technology, and even 
the time of day. More broadly, aspects of our culture are important factors (Bartneck et al., 
2007). These include the prevailing attitudes toward technologies such as robots assuming 
social roles (Nass et al., 1995), the degree of industrialization that provides exposure to 
various technologies (Epley et al., 2007), the culture’s tolerance of privacy invasion and data 
sharing (Nitto et al., 2017), and the subtle ways languages not only reflect but potentially 
guide our perceptions. To illustrate the power of language norms, note that in English at 
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least, clocks have “faces” and “hands,” chairs have “arms,” needles have “eyes,” streets have 
“shoulders,” and computers and many other technologies can “die” (if we don’t “kill” them 
when they don’t “cooperate”).
MASA Mechanisms: Unifying Two Explanations 
So far we have presented the roles of primary cues, secondary cues, and social signals in 
the MASA paradigm. And we’ve discussed how, along with these factors, individual differ-
ences and contextual elements may further moderate the breadth and depth of users’ social 
responses. Below we discuss two major explanatory mechanisms that have been supported 
in prior literature on CASA: mindlessness and anthropomorphism. Instead of viewing the 
two mechanisms as competing explanations for users’ social perceptions and responses, we 
suggest in the MASA paradigm that these two mechanisms can be unified and account for 
different social response scenarios.
Mindlessness refers to the explanation that people are naturally oriented to the social 
rather than the asocial cues of technologies (Langer, 2000; Nass & Moon, 2000). This may 
be based on evolutionarily based cognitive traits or learned from cues having been demon-
strated repetitively in interpersonal communication, so that individuals “mindlessly (and) 
prematurely commit to overly simplistic scripts drawn in the past” (Nass & Moon, 2000, 
p. 83). In contrast, anthropomorphism refers to a more active phenomenon, “the tendency 
to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents (e.g., animals, nature, gods, 
and mechanical or electronic devices) with humanlike characteristics, motivations, inten-
tions, or emotions” (Epley et al., 2007, p. 864). 
While both mindlessness and anthropomorphism seem to be logical explanations for 
people’s social perception and responses, both of them have been found to have limitations. 
Regarding mindlessness for instance, Fischer and colleagues (2011) noticed that some par-
ticipants laughed when receiving a robot’s greetings, indicating that they found something 
odd and amusing about the interaction with the robot. Mou and Xu (2017) found that 
participants demonstrated two different personalities in interactions with chatbots versus 
humans. These studies suggest that users’ responses to machines are not as mindless and 
spontaneous as to humans. Anthropomorphism cannot account for all CASA findings 
either. For example, Lee (2010) found that compared to text-only conditions, computer 
interfaces with anthropomorphic cartoon characters enhanced the social attractiveness 
and the trustworthiness of the computer, but they did not amplify flattery effects, which 
challenges the prediction that more anthropomorphic characters would facilitate stronger 
social responses (Lee, 2010).
The two explanatory mechanisms are seemingly antagonistic, as mindlessness occurs 
“without extensive thought or deliberation” (Moon, 2000, p. 325), and anthropomorphism 
“involves the thoughtful, sincere belief that the object has human characteristics” (Nass & 
Moon, 2000, p. 93). However, a closer investigation into the role of technology cues may 
parse out the interrelationship between them. Specifically, Nass and Moon (2000) argued 
that to elicit mindlessness, an object must exhibit “enough cues” to bring forth social 
responses (p. 83), which implies that mindlessness may not occur when the cues are not 
evident or sufficient. On the other hand, anthropomorphism emphasizes the ascription of 
human mental or emotional states to nonhuman agents ranging from imagined ghosts to 
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computer-generated dots (Duffy, 2003; Morewedge et al., 2007), which implies that even 
when objects are not designed with social cues (e.g., dots, clouds), anthropomorphism 
may occur as humans can mindfully assign human attributes to these nonhuman agents. 
Considering that Kim and Sundar (2012) noted that anthropomorphism can occur mind-
lessly or mindfully, we use mindless anthropomorphism and mindful anthropomorphism 
to unify the explanations for medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses. Spe-
cifically, mindless anthropomorphism should have more explanatory power when media 
technologies display cues that are of high quantity and high quality. In other words, if 
technologies demonstrate a group of primary social cues at the same time (e.g., Ishiguro’s 
Gemonoid [Nishio et al., 2007] or Samsung’s virtual human Neon [Vincent, 2020)]), users 
may not help having mindless, intuitive, and spontaneous responses to the technologies as 
these cues are natural, nuanced, and powerful. By contrast, when people experience strong 
medium-as-social-actor presence with technologies that are sufficient in neither the quality 
nor the quantity of cues, mindful anthropomorphism should be better at explaining the 
experience, as such scenarios indicate that individuals deliberately and thoughtfully attri-
bute human characteristics to these technologies with limited cues (e.g., children imagining 
that their toys can speak to each other, drivers assigning names to their cherished cars) (see 
Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 The Relationships Among Social Cues, Technologies,  
and Explanatory Mechanisms 
Note: The placement of technologies in this figure represents only an approximation of the 
characteristics of prototypical examples of each technology. 
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The distinction between mindless and mindful anthropomorphism may be useful in 
understanding two related questions raised in CASA. The first question stems from the fact 
that although Nass and Moon (2000) endorsed the mindlessness explanation, CASA “fails 
to pinpoint precisely when and why mindless behavior will occur” (Nass & Moon, 2000, 
p. 96). Our mapping of mindless anthropomorphism and mindful anthropomorphism 
provides a reasonable, literature-based, and testable contention about which mechanism 
may be more explanatory depending on the nature and number of technology cues avail-
able to users.
The second question is related to the CASA assumption that technologies must demon-
strate enough cues to elicit mindless social responses (Nass & Moon, 2000). What qualifies 
as enough, or in other words, how social the cues need to be to induce mindless responses, 
is unclear. Our categorization of cues as primary and secondary, along with the scope of 
application of mindless versus mindful anthropomorphism, provides a testable suggestion 
that in order to evoke mindless responses, the cues should ideally be sufficient in both 
quality and quantity. While research will need to establish the relative impacts of different 
combinations of high quality (primary) cues and secondary cues, the definition of primary 
cues suggests that quality is of paramount importance. 
As with the effects of cues on medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses, 
the activation of mindless versus mindful processing is contingent upon a series of factors 
including the specific combination of cues, individual differences, and contextual factors. 
Thus, it is possible that some individuals may mindlessly respond to media with fewer social 
cues or mindfully respond to media that demonstrate more social cues. This is consistent 
with Fischer’s (2011) speculation that individuals differ in their inclination to be mind-
less and Fussel and colleagues’ (2008) finding that users demonstrate different degrees of 
anthropomorphism in their spontaneous responses to actual robots versus their carefully 
considered conceptions of robots.
We also readily acknowledge that other possible explanations for social responses that 
have received less attention in the CASA literature may become more useful in explaining 
our increasingly complicated and diverse media use practices. These include the source ori-
entation explanation (Solomon & Wash, 2014), cognitive load explanation (Lee, 2008), and 
folk explanations of behavior (Malle, 1999). 
Evolutionary Foundation and Propositions  
of the MASA Paradigm
Above we have differentiated primary cues from secondary cues and parsed out the rela-
tionship between mindless and mindful anthropomorphism. Below we first suggest how the 
MASA paradigm and the social perceptions and responses it seeks to predict and explain 
are established upon three inter-related interpretations of socialness. Then we formally list 
the propositions of the MASA paradigm based on the arguments presented here and above.
In the CASA literature and so far in this paper the term social is treated as a “primitive” 
term (Chaffee, 2009) with a meaning that is widely understood; essentially something is 
social if it involves human perceptions and behaviors in response to other humans. But 
given its role in CASA and MASA, it is important to be clear about what is meant by this 
term. Here we provide three related conceptualizations of socialness. All three are consistent 
Lombard and Xu 41
with the precepts of evolutionary psychology that suggest we have developed our cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral abilities via natural selection (Brewer, 2004; Sokol & Strout, 2007). 
First, our brain is social. Theory of mind suggests that we can infer others’ intentions, 
desires, and motivations based on their social cues (Adolphs, 2009; Banks, 2020; Frith & 
Frith, 2005). By predicting others’ intention and actions, humans can adjust their own 
actions accordingly, and more effectively communicate and collaborate with others (Hare, 
2007). Research has shown that in this inference process, the amygdala, an important struc-
ture in the medial temporal lobe of our brain, is activated to regulate our social perception 
and behavior (Adolphs, 2009). The tenet of theory of mind is consistent with the idea of 
egocentric modeling (Epley et al., 2007), which suggests that humans can only experience 
the world from their own perspective. Although we can speculate about others’ intentions, 
we may make false predictions and cannot know exactly what it is like to be another ani-
mate or inanimate entity. Given the importance of interpreting social cues and the inherent 
challenges we face in doing so, the notion of the social brain means that no matter with 
what object we interact, we are at least somewhat oriented to perceive the object as social.
The second interpretation of being social indicates that our way of living is social. Here, 
social means being interdependent and cooperative (Brewer, 2004; Tomasello, 2014). Based 
on the perspective of adaptation, to resist environmental risks and avoid potential threats, 
primitives select to live in groups, make tools, and collaborate with each other. These means 
of coordination and collaboration have acted as a buffer between the individuals and actual 
and potential ecological changes (Caporael & Brewer, 1995). The instinct to avoid dan-
gers is so imprinted in our adaptation that today we are still “hardwired” to monitor the 
world around us for threats (Shoemaker, 1996). It is consistent with Reeves and Nass’s 
(1996) explanation that our brain has not evolved to distinguish mediated objects and non- 
mediated objects. It is also aligned with the findings regarding arousal and attention pat-
terns in television viewers (Reeves & Thorson, 1986)—at some level viewers respond to 
movement and change even if the potential threat is only shown on an electronic display 
screen. 
These two interpretations of humans’ social orientation can help us understand how 
users can perceive technologies with even limited cues, including technologies not created 
or used for communication (i.e., not media technologies), as social. For example, imagine a 
person who sees a hammer for the first time and needs to figure out how to use it. Although 
a hammer serves primarily a simple, functional purpose, it can be perceived as social in 
that first, observing the shape of the hammer, feeling the weight of the head, and finding 
out that the handle is designed to be held by one hand, is a process of using minimal visual 
and haptic cues to predict the potential use of the technology. And second, using the ham-
mer to strike other objects or pull out nails can be viewed as an interdependence between 
the user and the tool to accomplish a goal. Using technology is a form of collaboration that 
in our long history humans have enacted to attempt to improve our living conditions. So 
even though a technology may present limited cues and be designed for a simple purpose, 
it retains a subtle social element that we are hardwired to perceive.
The third interpretation of being social refers to our being adaptive and flexible. 
Research has found that although humans are not the only animals that infer each other’s 
mental states, humans have evolved to develop the propensity for flexibility in using social 
cues during communication and cooperation with others, which is less evident for animals 
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like chimpanzees (Hare, 2007). Demonstrating flexibility across different scenarios is likely 
to precipitate humans’ cooperation process. This evolutionary characteristic is also inher-
ent in our interaction with technologies. Some may argue if a study discovers that humans 
do not treat machines as humans, the study refutes the CASA proposition. However, the 
MASA paradigm holds that our social responses to technologies vary just as our social 
responses vary when we encounter and interact with children, foreigners, strangers, and 
friends (and among individuals within these categories) (Katagiri et al., 2001). As tech-
nologies transform to become multi-modal, ubiquitous, context-aware, and even invisible 
(Campbell, 2020; Fortunati, 1995; Ling, 2012), humans apply our ability to develop flexible 
and even unique social rules for interactions in all kinds of HMC scenarios. As an example, 
typing letters using a keyboard is a skill we learn so that we can interact with computers, but 
the behavior itself is ultimately a form of interdependence, which is considered the essence 
of being a social species (Caporael & Brewer, 1995; Tomasello, 2014).
We have explicated what social means in the MASA paradigm. We have also advocated 
for distinguishing the quantity of social cues and the quality of social cues presented by 
technologies. In addition, we explained how mindless and mindful responses can be dialec-
tically applied to different technology use scenarios. Below we present a set of propositions 
based on the theoretical and empirical evidence discussed above. Specifically, Proposition 
1 is related to the evolutionary foundation of the MASA paradigm. Propositions 2 to 6 are 
related to the different effects of social cues. Propositions 7 to 9 are based on the relation-
ship between mindless and mindful anthropomorphism. 
P1: Every media technology has at least some potential to evoke medium-as- 
social-actor presence and corresponding social responses.
P2: It is not only the social cues but also the combination of social cues, so-
cial signals, individual factors, and contextual factors that lead to medium-as- 
social-actor presence and corresponding social responses.
P3: Some social cues are primary: Each is sufficient but not necessary to evoke 
medium-as-social-actor presence.
P4: Some social cues are secondary: Each is neither sufficient nor necessary to 
evoke medium-as-social-actor presence.
P5a: All other conditions being equal, individuals are more likely to experience 
medium-as-social-actor presence and socially respond to media technologies 
that display cues with more human characteristics (quality of cues). 
P5b: All other conditions being equal, individuals are more likely to experience 
medium-as-social-actor presence and socially respond to media technologies 
that display more social cues (quantity of cues).
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P6: All other conditions being equal, the quality of cues (primary vs. secondary) 
has a greater role in evoking medium-as-social-actor presence and correspond-
ing social responses than the quantity (number) of cues.
P7: Individuals vary in their tendency to perceive and respond to media tech-
nologies as social actors.
P8: Individuals’ social responses to media technologies can occur with either 
mindless or mindful processing.
P9a: All other conditions being equal, media technologies that display more 
cues (quantity of cues) are more likely to lead individuals to mindlessly perceive 
them as social actors. Conversely, all other conditions being equal and given the 
same level of social responses, media technologies that display fewer cues (quan-
tity of cues) are more likely to lead individuals to mindfully perceive them as 
social actors.
P9b: All other conditions being equal, media technologies that display cues with 
more human characteristics (quality of cues) are more likely to lead individu-
als to mindlessly perceive them as social actors. Conversely, all other conditions 
being equal and given the same level of social responses, media technologies that 
display cues with fewer human characteristics (quality of cues) are more likely to 
lead individuals to mindfully perceive them as social actors. 
Contributions, Scope, and Future Research
The MASA paradigm follows the major tenet of the CASA paradigm and expands it to 
more media technologies, including emerging and future technologies. The MASA par-
adigm can make the following contributions. First, the original CASA paradigm and the 
Media Equation described a series of experiments on users’ social responses to comput-
ers and televisions. They did not explicitly list what propositions scholars could rely on to 
derive additional research questions. The MASA paradigm lists nine propositions here so 
that future research can test, refine, and enhance the theoretical framework in its predictive 
power, explanatory power, falsifiability, heuristic value, and so on (Chaffee & Berger, 1987).
Second, most prior research has primarily focused on the effects of single social cues 
or the cumulative effects of social cues, while the quality of social cues—whether they are 
central to our perception of socialness—has not been systematically examined. The MASA 
paradigm suggests that there exists a hierarchy of social cues that represents their potential 
to evoke social perceptions and responses. With knowledge about the quality of social cues, 
designers and developers may scrutinize different effects of social cues and find the optimal 
combination of cues to create positive use experiences.
Third, the paradigm identifies the roles of individual differences and contextual factors 
in generating users’ medium-as-social-actor presence and social responses. It provides an 
analysis of the whole communication scenario in which individuals are perceivers, technol-
ogies are manifestations of social cues, and contexts guide perceptions and responses, with 
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all of these elements influential in evoking medium-as-social-actor presence and social 
responses (see Figure 2). Future research can test the moderating roles of particular individ-
ual differences and contextual factors while investigating users’ social reaction to different 
sets of technology cues.
Fourth, the paradigm has articulated an evolutionary base and explained what it means 
to have “social” perceptions and responses. Social responses do not necessarily equate to 
human responses. Social perceptions and social responses occur because we have a social 
brain, live a social life, and are used to making adaptations to be cooperative and interde-
pendent. Based on this theoretical foundation, we have attempted to provide answers to 
Nass and Moon’s (2000) questions about (1) what dimensions of technologies are more 
powerful in evoking social responses, (2) when mindless processing is more likely to occur, 
and (3) how “social” a technology should be to bring forth mindless social responses. We 
believe that the current MASA paradigm can be useful in future research on social responses 
to technologies and we encourage theoretical refinements in the paradigm that can bring 
greater understanding of human behaviors with respect to technology and make possible 
the practical benefits of improved product design and user experience.
Despite these contributions, some may wonder about the technologies to which the 
MASA paradigm applies and whether the term MASA could be replaced by TASA (i.e., 
Technologies are Social Actors). Here we refer to a technology as a “machine, device, or 
other application of human industrial arts” (ISPR, 2000, presence defined). We refer to 
media technologies as “artifacts or devices used to communicate or convey information” 
(Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2006, p. 23). In explaining that the MASA paradigm is rooted 
in evolutionary psychology we noted that humans are at least somewhat oriented to per-
ceive technologies as social. Therefore, as part of the MASA paradigm, we acknowledge that 
people’s social responses may occur to all technologies (sometimes even beyond technolo-
gies), especially when people mindfully and consciously anthropomorphize those technol-
ogies that are not designed to be used for social purposes. As media and communication 
scholars, however, we concentrate more on media technologies, including both traditional 
and emerging ones such as books, televisions, computers, smartphones, tablets, and so on. 
More importantly, we call it the MASA paradigm because this term reflects a shift of focus 
FIGURE 2 The Media Are Social Actors paradigm
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from media as channels for message transmission to media as interlocutors or communi-
cators (Gunkel, 2012). Although the role of media technologies may neither be entirely of a 
communication channel nor of a communication terminal in the current media landscape 
(Guzman, 2018), the MASA paradigm is targeted at the phenomena in which users perceive 
media technologies to be independent social entities, and partially or sometimes fully over-
look their nature as mere machines or communication channels. 
Several paths are available for researchers to investigate the validity of the MASA para-
digm and refine and expand it. First, researchers should conduct empirical studies to verify 
the nine preliminary propositions. Studies can explore whether there exists a hierarchy of 
social cues that reliably elicit different degrees and/or particular types of social responses. 
Although few methods can provide direct evidence to investigate propositions that require 
differentiating users’ mindless and mindful processing, researchers can use a combination 
of methods and measures, including both objective and subjective ones (e.g., fMRI and 
EEG versus interviews) and real-time and retrospective ones (e.g., secondary task reaction 
time and think aloud protocols versus post-exposure memory tests and questionnaires), to 
look for the convergence of results. 
Second, researchers should look beyond CASA studies to test whether and how find-
ings and predictions from other interpersonal communication theories and computer- 
mediated communication (CMC) theories can be adapted to the MASA paradigm. Some 
interpersonal communication theories researchers might examine include Communica-
tion Accommodation Theory (Giles, 2008), Communication Privacy Management Theory 
(Petronio & Durham, 2008), Expectancy Violation Theory (Burgoon & Hale, 1988), Uncer-
tainty Management Theory (Bradac, 2001), Interpersonal Deception Theory (Burgoon et 
al., 2008), and the Theory of Imagined Interaction (Honeycutt, 2002). Some CMC theories 
or models that have been applied but could be explored further include the Social Identity 
model of De-individuation Effects (SIDE) (Reicher et al., 1995) and Social Information 
Processing Theory (Walther, 1996).
Third, researchers can further examine and add details to the psychological processes 
described in the MASA paradigm. For example, how do attention and memory influence 
medium-as-social-actor presence? What determines whether presence will lead to behav-
ioral social responses? As researchers have not achieved consensus on the explanations for 
the phenomena captured in the CASA paradigm, more research should be conducted to 
account for the mental processes that underlie people’s social perceptions of and responses 
to today’s and tomorrow’s diverse and evolving technologies.
Finally, researchers should explore and discuss with designers how they can apply the 
MASA paradigm and findings. Though most of the time richer media presentations can 
bring about better experiences, higher medium-as-social-actor presence (as with any type 
of presence) does not necessarily produce higher efficacy or popularity. Thus, designers 
should be fully aware of the advantages and disadvantages of their choices in applying the 
paradigm. They should also consider the larger ethical issues involved in creating technolo-
gies that lead users to perceive and treat media as social actors. As it is possible to view users 
of these technologies as victims of deception, unconscious responses, and the manipulation 
of presence (Biocca et al., 2003; Lombard, 2009), designing and marketing technologies that 
evoke medium-as-social-actor-presence and social responses should be based on thought-
ful, informed, and ethical analyses.
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Abstract
We aim to investigate the nature of doubt regarding voice-based agents by referring to 
Piaget’s ontological object–subject classification “thing” and “person,” its associated equil-
ibration processes, and influential factors of the situation, the user, and the agent. In two 
online surveys, we asked 853 and 435 participants, ranging from 17 to 65 years of age, 
to assess Alexa and the Google Assistant. We discovered that only some people viewed 
voice-based agents as mere things, whereas the majority classified them into personified 
things. However, their classification is fragile and depends basically on the imputation of 
subject-like attributes of agency and mind to the voice-based agents, increased by a dyadic 
using situation, previous regular interactions, a younger age, and an introverted personality 
of the user. We discuss these results in a broader context.
Keywords: artificial agents, classification, ontology, social actor, hybrids
Introduction
When it comes to being social, people are built to make the conservative error: 
When in doubt, treat it as human. (Reeves & Nass, 1996, p. 22) 
In 2011, Apple launched Siri, the first commercialized voice-based agent (VBA). More 
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most popular being the Google Assistant (launched in 2012), Microsoft’s Cortana (2013), 
and Amazon’s Alexa (2014). However, neither users nor scientists have yet been able to 
completely grasp the nature of these VBAs (Guzman, 2019). Thus, clarifying the funda-
mental question of ‘what is it?’ has become one of the main research issues within human- 
machine communication (A. Edwards et al., 2020). In this paper, we will explore the nature 
of these VBAs by investigating how they are categorized as objects, subjects, or in-between. 
We aim at making the classification of commercial VBAs and the associated processes of 
“equilibration” (Piaget, 1970/1974) accessible for empirical research.
Both CASA and Social Presence Theory argue that VBAs are what Reeves & Nass (1996, 
p. 22) describe as objects of doubt. Research under the CASA paradigm (Nass et al., 1994), 
postulating that computers are social actors, has provided multifaceted evidence that peo-
ple exhibit diverse social reactions toward various technological artifacts such as traditional 
media, computers, avatars, or robots. Social Presence Theory (Short et al., 1976) assumes 
that these reactions are caused by the perception of mediated social entities as being pres-
ent (Lombard et al., 2017), or by the failure to recognize those entities as artificial (K. M. 
Lee, 2004), and specifically as “non-human” (Latour, 2005). Although even marginal social 
cues can trigger social reactions and the feeling of presence (e.g., Reeves & Nass, 1996), 
anthropological similarity can further enhance them (e.g., Appel et al., 2012; Horstmann 
et al., 2018). In particular, voices are notably powerful indicators of social presence (Reeves 
& Nass, 1996) and being able to talk can be an indicator for being alive (Turkle, 1984/2005, 
p. 48). 
Although a large body of research in the past 30 years has investigated the conse-
quences of this doubt (e.g., the activation of social heuristics), we know very little about the 
doubt itself. It is still unclear toward “whom” or “what” (Gunkel, 2020, p. 54) people react 
when they are interacting with (artificially intelligent) machines. The various terminolo-
gies used to describe them, such as “evocative objects” (Turkle, 1984/2005), “quasi-objects” 
or “hybrids” (Latour, 1991/1995), “epistemic things” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001), “non-humans” 
(Latour, 2005), “subject objects” (Suchman, 2011), or “social things” (Guzman, 2015) illus-
trate the difficulty of capturing their essence. Although definitions differ considerably, com-
mon to all terms is the reference to ambiguous entities possessing both object qualities and 
subject qualities, whose unique combination creates new qualities beyond the sum of its 
parts (Roßler, 2008). In the paper at hand, we aim at investigating the categorization of these 
doubtful objects.
For this purpose, we will argue that the doubt arises from an irritated ontological 
object–subject classification by referring to the epistemologist Piaget (1970/1974). We will 
outline how people resolve the irritation through specific equilibration processes by assign-
ing the irritating object to an existing scheme or modifying these schemes gradually. 
The second part of the paper is dedicated to influences on this classification. Research on 
artificial agents indicates that attributes of the situation (A. Edwards et al., 2019; Purington 
et al., 2017), of the users (Epley et al., 2007; E. J. Lee et al., 2000; Woods et al., 2007), and of 
the agents themselves (e.g., Nass & Moon, 2000; Reeves & Nass, 1996) may be relevant. 
Based on an empirical approach, we designed a scale for the classification, assessed 
situational, individual, and technological influences in an online survey, and validated the 
findings with a second sample. By investigating the degree to which people classify a VBA 
as social actor, ranging between thing and person, and the identification of influences we 
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intend to advance the concept of human–machine communication and contribute to the 
CASA paradigm.
Classification of Voice-Based Agents
Voice-based agents like Siri, Alexa, and the Google Assistant are a subtype of artificial social 
agents, with an operating system based on artificial intelligence and natural language pro-
cessing using a disembodied voice emanating from a device (e.g., smartphone, loudspeaker 
box) to communicate with the users and execute their tasks. They are still a reasonably 
new technology, meaning that people lack exhaustive previous experience with this unique 
conversational interface (Guzman, 2015; Krummheuer, 2015). However, there are signs 
for human-machine agent interaction scripts (Gambino et al., 2020), suggesting a gradual 
object–subject classification of artificial agents. Thus, we ask to which degree people classify 
VBAs into the object–subject classification (RQ1).
Voice-Based Agents as Objects of Doubt
Referring to Piaget’s studies on epistemology (1970/1974), we assume the most fundamen-
tal way of gaining knowledge about a new object is figuring out if it is part of the “psycho-
morph” or the “physicomorph” scheme, which are diametrical poles of the same ontological 
classification. Turkle (1984/2005, p. 34) referred to these poles as “psychological” and “phys-
ical.” Gunkel (2020, p. 54) arrived at a similar conclusion by referring to Derrida’s distinc-
tion of “who” and “what.” The psychomorph scheme (“who”) is defined by subjects, which 
are living beings, equipped with capacities like thinking or feeling, and the potential of 
agency (Piaget, 1970/1974, p. 48). Thus, it is an analog to the scheme “other persons” (Gun-
kel, 2020, p. 54), and used “to understand people and animals” (Turkle, 1984/2005, p. 34). 
In contrast, the physicomorph scheme (“what”) is defined by inorganic, non-living objects, 
which are sufficiently comprehensible in terms of precise, logical-mathematical categories, 
and deterministic causal laws (Geser, 1989, p. 233). That is, it is an analog to the scheme 
“things [that] are mere instruments or tools” (Gunkel, 2020, p. 54), and “used to understand 
things” (Turkle, 1984/2005, p. 34). While the physicomorph scheme (hereinafter referred 
to as thing theme) results from empirical experience (e.g., physical perception and move-
ment), the psychomorph scheme (hereinafter referred to as person theme) originates in the 
introspective experience of a subjectivity (Piaget, 1970/1974). This theoretical approach is 
related to the impossible verification of subjectivity (Gunkel, 2020; Turing, 1950) or agency 
(Krummheuer, 2015), as well as to the imputation of mental states to objects (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978) and the gradual assignment of personhood (Hubbard, 2011), as discussed 
prior in Etzrodt (2021). 
Despite the growing ability to distinguish between psychomorph and physicomorph 
due to the individual’s development and its constant confrontation with the environment 
(Piaget, 1970/1974; Turkle, 1984/2005), some objects remain a challenge. Between things 
and persons, there exists a wide range of objects (e.g., plants, animals, or artificial entities) 
that can be regarded as objects of doubt. Recent empirical research confirms the doubtful 
nature of various artificial social agents: Guzman (2015) noted in her qualitative interviews 
a constantly shifting use of the pronouns “she” and “it” when people talked about the VBA 
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Siri. It seemed that Guzman’s respondents were torn between the association of a person 
and a thing, which she traced back to the interviewees’ focus of attention. If their “attention 
turns away from Siri the voice or Siri the image to Siri the program, Siri again becomes a 
thing” (Guzman, 2015, p. 195); thus, she concludes, people “recognize certain character-
istics of humans and machines within them” (p. 257). A. Edwards (2018) found a similar 
inconsistency, when she asked her participants to choose two out of the three entities (social 
robot, human, and primate), that had more in common in relation to the third. Although, 
participants combined humans and primates in opposition to social robots, based on robots 
being artificial and non-living things, some coupled robots and humans in reference to 
their (assumed) resemblance in embodiment, intellect, and behavior, and the capability to 
interact socially through talking and understanding. 
Voice-Based Agents as Objects of Equilibration
Once the classification of an object is in doubt, the irritation has to be resolved. People 
need to decide if machines are “mere things . . . or someone who matters . . . or something 
altogether different that is situated in between the one and the other” (Gunkel, 2020, p. 56). 
Piaget (1970/1974) refers to this as equilibration—a balancing and self-regulating process, 
which is achieved through assimilation or accommodation (Figure 1). 
Equilibration of Doubt





FIGURE 1 Equilibration of Doubt  
(Inspired by Piaget, 1970/1974 and Geser, 1989)
Assimilation is the assignment of an irritating object, such as the VBA, to an exist-
ing scheme: the thing scheme (objectification) or the person scheme (subjectification). As 
a result, people overestimate either the VBA’s objecthood or subjecthood. Particularly for 
Siri, Guzman (2015) found that some people explicitly described it as an entity, while others 
viewed it as a device. Similar associations were found by Purington and colleagues (2017) 
in the user comments about Alexa (Amazon Echo). They demonstrated that, although the 
objectifying pronoun “it” was used by the majority of the authors, some favored the per-
sonifying pronoun “she.” The preference of objectification is confirmed for social robots by 
A. Edwards (2018), where more than half of the respondents regarded social robots as 
things in contrast to living and natural subjects such as humans or apes. Therefore, we 
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formulate the hypothesis (H1): VBAs are assimilated more often to the thing scheme than 
to the person scheme.
Accommodation refers either to the modification of an existing scheme or to the cre-
ation of a new one (Piaget, 1970/1974). Regarding the modification of the object–subject 
classification, the thing scheme can be modified by adding person attributes or the person 
scheme can be enriched with thing attributes. Apart from that, people may build a hybrid 
scheme, featuring a more or less balanced combination of attributes from things and per-
sons (hybridization). While modification draws on existing heuristics and changes them 
slightly, hybridization requires the active acquisition and construction of completely new 
heuristics. 
Research on VBAs implies accommodation: In addition to the “spectrum from fully 
human to fully machine,” Guzman (2015, p. 227) identified an “overlap in the middle” con-
cerning the ontology of Siri, as a result of a reconfigured “understanding of humans and 
machines to the degree that we now share characteristics” (p. 257). Purington and col-
leagues (2017) found a mixed use of the pronouns “she” and “it” for Alexa in the same user 
comment. Furthermore, some user reactions suggest accommodation through the simulta-
neous activation of social and non-social scripts, such as inappropriate, rude, or insensitive 
social behavior toward artificial agents: For example, people abuse social robots (Broad-
bent, 2017), and direct bullying and sexual harassment toward VBAs like Alexa (Cercas 
Curry & Rieser, 2018). 
Influences on the Classification of Voice-Based Agents
Although social reactions toward computers are fundamentally human, exist in all groups, 
and occur even in the case of weak social cues (Reeves & Nass, 1996), there is evidence that 
object–subject classification varies due to factors at the levels of situation, user, and agent. 
Thus, we ask to what extent do factors at the levels of the situation, the user, and the agent 
influence the object–subject classification of VBAs (RQ2)?
Attributes of the Situation
The ontological classification of machines can differ between various situational interac-
tions and social contexts. A. Edwards and colleagues (2019) found that a positive expec-
tancy violation during an initial interaction with a social robot reinforces the feeling of 
social presence and reduces uncertainty. Leite and colleagues (2013) suggested a change in 
relationship through prolonged interaction. Furthermore, personification increased when 
Alexa was embedded in multi-person households such as families (Lopatovska & Williams, 
2018; Purington et al., 2017). Against this backdrop, we assume that previous interactions 
with VBAs affect the classification (H2) and its use in the presence of others increases the 
classification’s preference for the person scheme (H3).
Attributes of the User 
Age appears to be a major influence on classification. Children are known to attribute sub-
ject status to objects in general (Piaget, 1970/1974) and artificial agents (Epley et al., 2007; 
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Turkle, 1984/2005) more strongly than adults do. Apart from that, users’ attributes seem to 
affect the perceived attributes of the agents rather than their classification. In this context, 
age in general affects perceived similarities between a participant’s and a robot’s personality 
traits (Woods et al., 2007). In contrast, the impact of gender appears inconsistent. Gender 
neither affects the perception of a social presence for synthesized voices (K. M. Lee & Nass, 
2005), nor the evaluation of flattery behavior of the VBA (E. J. Lee, 2008). However, the 
attribution of personality to robots may be gender-specific (Woods et al., 2007); and match-
ing genders of the user and the VBA alters social reactions (E. J. Lee et al., 2000). Besides, 
personality traits of the user have been crucial for research, reflecting differences between 
individuals as well as parallels in interaction in general. Although research did not find 
effects of the user’s personality on the perception of social presence, matching personalities 
of user and VBA may influence perceived characteristics—regarding the trait “extravert–
introvert” (Nass & Lee, 2001), and similarity—regarding the trait “neuroticism–emotional 
stability” (Woods et al., 2007). Closely related to personality is a person’s affinity for tech-
nology (Attig et al., 2017), which is particularly noticeable regarding the novelty of VBAs.
Attributes of the Agent
The VBA’s conversational mode exhibits subject-likeness, involving expressed effective and 
meaningful behavior and the imputation of agency and mind. However, it is still unclear to 
what extent they are relevant for the object–subject classification.
Agency as expression of effective behavior. Due to the recently increased capabilities 
of machines to mimic natural human behavior their genuine agency is conveyed more 
strongly (Guzman, 2018). VBAs can directly answer users, communicate with and control 
other smart objects in their environment (e.g., switching lights on and off), collect and pres-
ent information from the internet, activate apps, or initiate purchases. Thus, in the context 
of VBAs, the term agency refers to an effect, originating from interaction with the envi-
ronment and other beings, which may be interpreted as behavior similar to humans (e.g., 
A. Edwards, 2018). Within the framework of social interaction theory, this effect refers 
to the ability of interdependence (Simmel, 1908) and orientation (Weber, 1922) toward the 
behavior of others—thus, they are affecting others and are affected by others. The most 
basic indicator for interdependence between VBAs and users is the VBAs’ expression of 
receptiveness to vocal commands. For instance, Alexa lights up a blue ring on the Amazon 
Echo and a blue line on the Amazon Echo Show to indicate it is “listening.” To demonstrate 
the ability of orientation the VBA needs to express attentiveness in the first place (Biocca et 
al., 2003). Alexa does this by additionally turning a brighter light toward the direction of the 
sound source in most Echo devices. The feeling of receptivity increases the perception of 
sociality—including that of computers (Burgoon et al., 1999) and agency in general (Appel 
et al., 2012; Guadagno et al., 2007). However, it is unclear to what degree the VBA’s classifi-
cation is altered if their behavior is perceived as effective.
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Mind as expression of meaningful behavior. The human-like voice and the use of language 
are expressions of meaningful behavior, which is closely linked to consciousness (Reichertz, 
2014), and a theory of mind (Epley et al., 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Thus, the 
language- and voice-based subjectivity transcends the ability to interact effectively by add-
ing meaning to its actions. Meaningful behavior is crucial for orientation in any social 
interaction and based on mutual understanding, on similarity in thinking and/or feeling 
(to some degree), and the assumption of intentional actions. That is, before an orienta-
tion toward the actions of others is possible, these actions must be understood based on 
one’s own and the anticipated other’s experiences within a shared (natural or social) world 
(Schütz, 1974). In particular, the conversational mode of VBAs incorporates such specific 
assumptions of similarity in thinking and feeling to a certain degree: First, the use of words of 
a certain language, and that VBAs understand these words, refers to a specific shared social 
world between users and VBAs. Second, by referring to themselves as “I,” VBAs suggest that 
they are person-like, self-conscious entities, which operate according to the same rules as 
their human users. 
Furthermore, the meaning of actions is closely related to the assumption of intentional-
ity, in contrast to accidental actions or for purely physical reasons (Simmel, 1908). The sim-
plest complex of intentionality that can be attributed to an action are motives (Schütz, 1974). 
According to Schütz, it is sufficient to put oneself in a typical position with typical motives 
and plans. Personality constitutes the origin of these typical motives, attitudes, and mindsets 
of persons as subjects. It contains both the assumption about behavior that is based on typi-
cal human nature, typical decisions, reactions, or feelings and on ways in which individuals 
differ from each other (Buss, 2008). Therefore, a perceived personality suggests a subject 
who chose to act in a specific manner, but theoretically could have responded in a different 
way (Higgins & Scholer, 2008). As a result, if personality is attributed to a VBA its actions 
may be no longer viewed as random—regardless of whether they were programmed to imi-
tate intention or whether they are behaving intentionally by nature. Research confirms the 
attribution of personality traits to synthetic voices (e.g., C. Edwards et al., 2019; Ray, 1986) 
and very specific personalities to the commercial VBAs Alexa and the Google Assistant 
(Garcia et al., 2018). However, it is uncertain whether the quantity or quality of perceived 
personality traits of the VBA alter the object–subject classification. Previous CASA research 
has concentrated on the quality such as the personality trait “extraversion” in interpersonal 
interactions and uncovered extraverted voices are generally perceived as more socially pres-
ent (e.g., K. M. Lee, 2004; Nass & Lee, 2001; Nass & Moon, 2000). Although extraversion 
may be relevant for social reactions toward VBAs, it is unanswered if extraversion or other 
personality traits or that personality traits are attributed in the first place are relevant for 
their classification. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses
An overview of the relevant variables, research questions, and hypothesized influences can 
be found in the theoretical model (see Figure 2). 




































FIGURE 2 Theoretical Factor Model 
Method
Sample
In late 2018, we conducted an online survey with a demonstrational design (N = 853) among 
all students of a large German university, recruited via the university’s student mailing list 
(response rate of 2.6%) and randomly assigned to either the VBA Alexa (Amazon Echo) or 
the Google Assistant (Google Home). Participants had a mean age of 24, ranging from 17 
to 50 years, 52% of whom were male, 76% were undergraduates, and 23% graduates. The 
sample was (on a 6-point scale) above average creative (M = 3.67, SD = 1.00), conscientious 
(M = 3.46, SD = 0.86), and emotionally stable (M = 3.2, SD = 0.93), as well as moderately 
agreeable (M = 3.1, SD = 0.86) and extraverted (M = 3.1, SD = 1.09). It expressed an affinity 
for technology above average (M = 4.01, SD = 1.20, 6-point scale). 
Most of the participants already knew the names Alexa (96%), and the Google Assis-
tant (71%) in general, and 84% knew their assigned VBA. Although one third owned the 
assigned Google Assistant (33%), only some possessed Alexa (7%). The primary sources of 
knowing Alexa were indirect ones: advertisement (43%) and contact through other people 
(24%), which however, were also important for Google Assistant (17% advertisement, 12% 
other people). Other indirect sources were non-fictive media (Alexa: 16%, Google Assis-
tant: 7%) and rarely fictive media (Alexa: 6%, Google Assistant: 1%). If the participants had 
used their assigned VBA prior to the survey’s demonstrational interaction, most of them 
had used it primarily alone (60%) and moderately frequent (M = 3.3, SD = 1.45, 5-point 
scale).
According to its average age the student sample belonged to a cohort widely labelled as 
Generation Z, which differs from the previous cohort (commonly labeled as Millennials) 
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in political, economic, and social factors (Dimock, 2019; Singh, 2014). Regarding these dif-
ferences of generations and the classification’s development during aging, the study was 
repeated with an older sample (Millennials)—all employees of the same university, recruited 
via the university’s staff mailing list (response rate of 6.2%)—to validate the findings and 
specify cross-generational effects. The staff sample (N = 435) was, on average, 10 years older 
(with a mean age of 33, from 18 to 65 years), 65% were graduates, 26% were undergradu-
ates, and 3% had a doctoral degree. Participants were slightly more conscientious (M = 3.71, 
SD = 0.78) and had less affinity for technology (M = 3.96, SD = 1.20), however, their prior 
experiences with the assigned VBA resembled those of the student sample.
Procedure
Although both assistants’ German voices were female, they differed in their characters, 
the way they were advertised, and their manufacturing companies’ image. To distinguish 
between possible variations caused by the mentioned differences and general classifications 
of VBAs, one group of participants assessed Alexa, another the Google Assistant. To get 
impressions as close as possible to the true perception of the two VBAs, we chose a demon-
strational design by simulating interactions with pre-recorded videos with the original 
answers of the voice-based loudspeaker variants of the Google Assistant or Alexa to pre- 
defined questions in German (Table A1 in the study’s OSF repository). Before the simulated 
interaction, participants reported their previous experiences with various VBAs (including 
the assigned VBA) and typical usage situations. During the simulated interaction, they acti-
vated four videos of the VBA’s answer one after the other by clicking on the question. After 
the interaction, they classified the VBA and assessed perceived attributes. 
Questions for the VBAs were selected that had been advertised previously by Amazon 
or Google as preferable interaction features (e.g., in commercials or on the website), and 
that had the potential to exhibit personality characteristics of the VBA. If a VBA provided 
multiple answers to the same question, we randomly selected one. Because people form 
their impressions within the first few seconds of contact with a voice (Ray, 1986), the video 
sequence for each simulated interaction had a duration between 7 and 17 seconds. The vid-
eos can be obtained from this study’s OSF repository.
Measures
Object–Subject Classification. To examine the object–subject classification, we drew on 
the diametrical relation of the thing scheme and the person scheme described above and 
asked participants: “What would you say, is Alexa [or the Google Assistant] rather like 
a thing (object) to you or rather like a person (subject)?” Because “person” refers to the 
status “personhood,” it can be assumed with Hubbard (2011) that it is a gradual assign-
ment, whose highest degree is represented by the term “person.” To address the continuum 
between the schemes we used a 100-point scale, consisting of the two poles “thing (object)” 
and “person (subject).” 
As discussed in Etzrodt (2021), the broad-scale allowed intuitive answers—independent 
of the participant’s ability to verbalize the classification (Turkle, 1984/2005, p. 48). It also 
allowed to detect minor forms of accommodation and to distinguish between modification 
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and hybridization (see Figure 3). As described by the author, classification as the result 
of assimilation into the thing or the person scheme refers to the absence of any previous 
accommodation, indicated on the scale by the ratings of 1 or 101. Thus, VBAs are added 
to the existing scheme (thing or person), but the scheme itself does neither get in conflict 
with the other nor does it change. Classification as a result of accommodation depends 
on pre-existing structures (Piaget, 1974, p. 34), referring to a change or reaffirmation of 
the categories’ borders (Turkle, 2005). Hence, Etzrodt (2021) concludes, the accommodated 
classification is measured by a weak or strong merging of the thing and the person scheme, 
implied if people were distancing from one of the poles on the scale. A weak merging is 
represented by ratings close to one of the schemes (2–33 and 67–100), indicating the mod-
ification of a dominant scheme by implementing elements of the other. A strong merging 
is represented by ratings near the scale’s center (34–66), indicating a hybridization with a 
more or less balanced reunion of both schemes. To determine how sophisticated the equil-
ibration process was, we asked how confident participants were in their classification on a 


























FIGURE 3 Equilibration on the Object–Subject Classification Scale (1 to 101),  
Etzrodt (2021)
Attributes of the situation were measured as previous knowledge of and interactions with 
the assigned VBA and the social contexts in which these interactions are usually embedded. 
Previous knowledge assessed if the participants had ever heard about or knew any VBA—
independent of their assigned VBA. Previous interactions differentiate between participants 
who had contact with their assigned VBA for the first time through our survey or knew this 
VBA solely from fiction or non-fiction media, advertising, or had seen others using it, but 
had none or only minimal prior interactions, and those who had continuous previous inter-
actions through ownership. Therefore, the first group can be assumed to have had none or 
only few equilibration processes before the study. In contrast, the latter group was likely to 
have had undergone this process several times. In addition, we considered the frequency of 
use on a 5-level rating scale from “very occasionally” to “very often.” We assessed the social 
contexts of use by asking if participants usually used the VBA in multi-person contexts 
(family, friends, or acquaintances) or dyad contexts (the absence of other people). 
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Attributes of the user were assessed by the user’s personality, affinity for technology, and 
demographics such as age and gender. Personality was measured with the “Big Five Inven-
tory” short scale using the original 5-level rating scale (Rammstedt et al., 2013). Principal 
component analysis (PCA) confirmed the factors agreeableness, conscientiousness, emo-
tional stability, extraversion, culture (creativity) (χ2(45) = 1451.02, p < .001, KMO = .60, 
most factor loadings and h2 > .60). “Agreeableness” exhibited the poorest performance and 
was interpreted with caution. Affinity for Technology was measured with nine items of the 
German ATI Scale (Franke et al., 2018), indexed into one component via PCA (χ2(36) = 
5375.01, p < .001, KMO = .91, Cronbach’s alpha = .92, factor loadings .63–.88; h2 > .60). The 
PCAs in the staff sample confirmed these factors (see OSF).
Attributes of the Agent. Agency was conceptualized as an assigned capability to act, 
divided into the three dimensions: similarity to the behavior of the respondent (“Does not 
behave like me—behaves like me,” 7-level rating scale), attributed attention of the respec-
tive VBA, and the feeling of interdependence. Subsequent operationalizations were realized 
either for Alexa or Google Assistant. For easier reading, only the Alexa variant is provided 
in the examples. The two latter dimensions were measured with five items based on the 
reduced relational communication scale by Ramirez (2009), using the original 6-level rating 
scale, but formulated for a hypothetical situation (“Imagine you and Alexa are having a con-
versation . . . ”). However, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that these items 
loaded on the dimensions attention (“How attentive is Alexa to the interaction?”, “How 
strongly is Alexa involved in an interaction?”), and interdependence (“How much is Alexa 
adapting to the interaction?”, “How ready is Alexa to have an interaction with you?”, “How 
strongly does Alexa respond to your comments or questions?”) suggested by Biocca and 
colleagues (2003). To assess convergent validity, the standardized factor loadings, average 
variance extracted (AVE), and reliabilities (omega and Cronbach’s alpha) were examined. 
The CFA showed both an excellent model fit for the dimensions (χ2 (4) = 8.987, GFI = .994, 
CFI = .995, TLI = .989, RMSEA = .044) and a moderate convergent validity (AVE >.51, 
omega > .68, Cronbach’s alpha > .66), confirmed by the staff sample (see OSF).
Attributes of the Agent. Mind was operationalized as the VBA’s similarity in thinking and 
feeling (e.g., “Thinks like me–does not think like me,” 7-level rating scale), the VBA’s abil-
ity to understand its user (“How well does Alexa understand you?”, 7-level rating scale), 
and attributed personality traits. The modified Minimal Redundancy Scale based on Lang 
(2008) was used to measure the VBA’s personality on a semantic differential using the origi-
nal 6-level rating scale, indexed to the Big Five factors. However, not all human personality 
traits worked for the VBAs. CFA identified the items warmhearted, selfless, over-accurate, 
confident, self-contented, open, loving company, and inventive as insufficient. After their 
removal the model produced an excellent fit (χ2(80) = 227.330, GFI = .964, CFI = .964, 
TLI = .950, RMSEA = .046), a good reliability with most factor loadings larger than 0.7, 
and a moderate convergent validity (AVE > 0.40, omega > 0.50), confirmed by the staff 
sample (see OSF). As a result, the factor culture includes items exclusively referring to cre-
ativity (creative, imaginable, artistic) and was interpreted accordingly. In line with previous 
research (Garcia et al., 2018; Guzman, 2020), participants had problems assigning emotions 
to the VBA explaining why the factor emotional stability displays the poorest performance. 
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The factor was maintained for comparison with subsequent studies but was interpreted 
cautiously. 
Results
Data was analyzed using R. In particular, the VBAs’ classification and attributes showed 
non-normal, mainly positively skewed and heavy-tailed distributions. Thus, robust 
tests (packages WRS2, and robustbase) were used to control the results of common sta-
tistical tests. The stepwise robust regression found several outliers (with weights = 0 or 
~= 1). Although, the significance of the predictors was equal, the estimates differed slightly 
between OLS and robust regression. Thus, to avoid inaccuracy, we report the estimates of 
the robust regression. Reported results apply to the student sample and will be validated 
by the staff sample. The supplemental tables and figures can be found at this study’s OSF 
repository. 
Equilibration of the Object–Subject Classification 
Almost one out of three participants assimilated VBAs into an existing scheme, while more 
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Object–Subject Classification (1 = Thing, 101 = Person)
FIGURE 4 Density Plot and Box Plot‚ of the Equilibration  
on the Object-Subject Scale, Student Sample
As predicted (H1), in case people did assimilate, they almost always objectified VBAs 
(Table 1). In contrast, apart from two people, the VBAs were not subjectified at all. In case 
people accommodated, most of them classified the VBAs into modified schemes primarily 
with respect to the thing scheme (49%, Table 1), whereas only a minimal number of people 
(2%) modified the person scheme. Thus, VBAs were mainly classified as things supple-
mented by aspects of a person. However, 17% classified the VBA into a hybridized scheme. 
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TABLE 1 Equilibration of the VBA 
Student Sample Staff Sample
n % n %
Assimilation Thing scheme 263 31.0 141 32.7
Modified thing scheme 419 49.4 208 48.3
Accommodation Hybrid scheme 148 17.4 67 15.6
Modified person scheme 17 2.0 15 3.5
Assimilation Person scheme 2 0.2 0 0.0
Note: On a scale from 1 to 101, 1 = thing, 2 to 33 = modified thing scheme, 34 to 66 = hybrid 
scheme, 67 to 100 = modified person scheme, 101 = person scheme
Although most of the participants were quite certain with their classification (M = 4.34, 
SD = 0.89), the further they moved away from the thing scheme, the more uncertain they 
became, r = –.54, t(842) = –18.56, p < .001. However, the LOESS graph (Figure 5) indicates 
that the uncertainty increases if the classification moves away from any existing scheme. 
Although very few people subjectified VBAs, they did it with the same level of certainty 
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FIGURE 5 Classification Correlated With Certainty  
About the Classification, Student Sample 
Influences on the Object–Subject Classification
To identify relevant influences on the classification (RQ2) we conducted a stepwise robust 
regression (SRR). The SRR indicated that more participants classified Alexa further away 
from the pole thing than Google Assistant if the previous experienced situations were held 
constant (Table 2, Model 2). However, the explained variance was low, and including the 
VBAs’ agency eliminated this effect (Table 2, Models 4). 
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Attributes of the Situation. As predicted in H2, previous interactions affected the classifi-
cation (Model 2, Table 2). If people owned the VBA they classified it more distanced from 
the pole thing than people who presumably equilibrated their classification for the first 
time. Contrary to our assumption (H3), the absence of other people increased the distancing 
from the mere thing scheme. However, the explained variance was still less than 1%, and the 
effects disappeared after including the VBAs’ agency (Table 2, Model 4).
Attributes of the User. As age increased, the classification tended toward the thing scheme 
(Table 2, Model 3). In contrast, people with more affinity for technology tended to distance 
from the mere thing scheme (Table 2, Model 3). In line with K. M. Lee & Nass (2005) the 
gender of the user was not significant at all for the classification. However, personality traits 
were. Agreeable users were more inclined to classify the VBA distanced from the thing pole, 
while more emotionally stable and extraverted users exhibited objectification tendencies. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the model remained small and the inclusion of the 
VBAs’ attributes eliminated most effects. Whereas agency negated the effects of age, affinity 
for technology, emotional stability, and agreeableness (Table 2, Model 4) assumed mind 
negated the effects of extraversion (Table 2, Model 5).
Attributes of the Agent. Perceived agency contributed significantly to a classification dis-
tanced from the mere thing scheme and increased the explained variance to 22% (Table 
2, Model 4). The VBAs’ attentiveness (M = 3.3, SD = 1.29) and interdependence (M = 3.9, 
SD = 1.23) were rated moderately high, whereas their behavior was not perceived as very 
similar (M = 2.1, SD = 1.64). However, only increasing attentiveness and similar behavior 
increased a distanced classification from the pole thing. The effects held when mind attri-
butes were added but weakened substantially. 
Perceived mind increased the explained variance to 34% (Table 2, Model 5). Although 
the similarity of mind was rated low, the VBAs’ thinking (M = 2.12, SD = 1.61) was assumed 
to be more similar than their feeling (M = 1.60, SD = 1.61). Consistently, distancing of the 
thing scheme was predicted to a higher degree by similarity in thinking than in feeling (Table 
2, Model 5). In contrast, the VBAs’ ability to understand the user was rated moderately high 
(M = 3.64, SD = 1.67) and also affected the distancing from the thing scheme to a simi-
lar amount. Participants assigned on average 16 out of 25 personality items to the VBAs 
(M = 16.5, SD = 10.2). They were perceived as very conscientious (M = 4.9, SD = 0.86), 
emotionally stable (M = 4.7, SD = 0.97), agreeable (M = 4.6, SD = 1.00), and extraverted 
(M = 4.5, SD = 1.09) but less creative (M = 3.0, SD = 1.33). Alexa was perceived as slightly 
more conscientious (M = 5.1, SD = 0.77) than Google Assistant (M = 4.7, SD = 0.91), 
t(644.34) = 5.803, p < .001. However, only the number of personality items and the VBAs’ 
creativity predicted a classification distanced from the mere thing scheme (Table 2, Model 5). 
Mediation Analyses. Based on the indications of previous studies (e.g., Nass & Lee, 2001; 
Woods et al., 2007), and because the VBAs’ attributes eliminated the effects of the situations’ 
and the users’ attributes, we investigated whether mediation effects were involved. We focus 
on mediated variables that had a significant impact on the classification in Models 1 to 3, 
verified by the second sample (see below), and on mediating variables which were signifi-
cantly affecting these. Results are reported in Table A2 (OSF).
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Alexa’s classification increasingly distanced from the pole thing, due to a higher per-
ceived capability of understanding the user compared to the Google Assistant. However, 
the explained variance is very low, thus the two agents do not differ very much from each 
other in this respect. Regarding the effect of the situation, both ownership and the previous 
use of the VBAs in the absence of others were mediated by agent attributes. Whereas own-
ership increased the VBAs’ similarity in behaving and thinking and its attributed attentive-
ness, previous use in the absence of other people heightened all agency and mind attributes 
of the VBA (except similar feeling), encouraging a classification distanced from the thing 
scheme. User attributes exhibit mediation effects for age and extraversion, both increasing 
a classification toward the pole thing. Whereas increasing age lowered the attributed atten-
tion, number of personality items in general, and the VBAs’ creativity, more extraverted 
users perceived less similarity in feeling and fewer personality items. Effects of matching 
the respondent’s and VBA’s personality indicated by previous findings (Nass & Lee, 2001; 
Woods et al., 2007) could not be confirmed.
Based on the results of the stepwise robust regression and the mediation analysis, the 
theoretical model was adapted (see Figure A1 in the OSF).
Validation of the Results by the Staff Sample
In this section, we will focus on the most important commonalities and differences in rela-
tion to the student sample. The staff sample confirmed the VBAs’ classification (Table 1), the 
amount of confidence (M = 4.45, SD = 0.84) and its relation to the classification, r = –.48, 
t(429) = –11.38, p < .001. The influences on the classification were partly confirmed (Table 
A3 in the OSF). Whereas, the impacts of age and extraversion (Model 3), the VBAs’ similar 
behaving (Model 4) and thinking, its creativity, and the interaction of similar thinking and 
feeling (Model 5) were confirmed, the influences of Alexa (vs. Google Assistant), ownership 
and previous use in the absence of other people on the classification were not (Model 2). 
However, the direction of the ownership’s and dyad’s effect remained and—consistent with 
the student sample—mediating effects of the VBAs’ attributes occurred, although some 
involved attributes differed (Table A4 in the OSF). The widespread impact of the previous 
dyadic use on the VBAs’ attention, similar thinking and feeling, and creativity was strength-
ened; the impacts of the users’ age through decreased attributed attention to the VBA and 
of the users’ extraversion through decreased perceived similarity in feeling were confirmed.
Discussion
In this paper we analyzed how people classify their counterpart when they interact with 
voice-based agents and how attributes of the situation, the user, and the agent influence this 
classification. By referring to Piaget (1970/1974), we introduced an empirically measurable 
gradual ontological object–subject classification of VBAs, based on a 100-point scale rang-
ing from thing to person, enabling the identification of the degree to which artificial agents 
are objects of doubt (Geser, 1989; Reeves & Nass, 1996; Turkle, 1984/2005). Using the VBA 
as an example, we have demonstrated the potential of this scale, providing the basis for sys-
tematic investigations into how people classify various machines and how the classification 
is affected.
Etzrodt and Engesser 73
Consistent with previous research (e.g., A. Edwards, 2018; Guzman, 2015), the major-
ity of our participants could not definitely classify VBAs. The object–subject classification 
ranged between the two schemes thing (“what”) and person (“who”), as predicted by Geser 
(1989) and Gunkel (2020). That is, most people were indeed in doubt. How people compen-
sated for this doubt was analyzed through the concept of equilibration (Piaget, 1970/1974): 
Whereas some people had assimilated VBAs by objectifying, almost none had subjectified 
them. However, most people had accommodated their classification by modifying the thing 
scheme, and some even hybridized it, but still with a bias toward the thing scheme. That 
is, people reaffirmed their lines between things and persons (Turkle, 1984/2005, p. 34) by 
embedding VBA in the world of things, partly enriched with aspects of the person scheme. 
Hence, VBAs are personified things. 
By understanding that people classify VBAs as personified things, counterintuitive 
findings (Gambino et al., 2020) can be interpreted more precisely. The thing aspect in the 
classification things and personified things, on the one hand, emphasized the VBA’s artifi-
ciality (see Guzman, 2015), thus encourages the reference “it” (see Purington et al., 2017), 
or the separation of machines from humans and apes (see A. Edwards, 2018). The person 
aspect of personified things, on the other hand, emphasized the VBA’s personhood, causing 
the simultaneous use of the pronouns “it” and “she” (Guzman, 2015; Purington et al., 2017) 
and the assignment of social machines to (living) beings (see A. Edwards, 2018). Whereas 
the aspect of personhood may cause social reactions toward artificial agents (see Appel et 
al., 2012; Horstmann et al., 2018), their dominant nature as things is likely to be responsible 
for rather timid, and normatively undesirable social reactions, such as insults or discourtesy 
(see Cercas Curry & Rieser, 2018; C. Edwards et al., 2019). 
However, the classification of personified things was characterized by high uncertainty. 
The further the participants moved away from the established thing or person scheme, the 
less confident they became about their classification. That is, classifying by assimilation is 
the easy way, it is the passive (habituated) assignment of an object to an existing scheme. 
Whereas accommodation—as an active cognitive process of reaffirming the boundaries of 
the schemes—is fraught with far more doubts. As a result, this classification of personified 
things is fragile and unstable and may change significantly in time—especially regarding 
further developments of the agents’ abilities and their societal embedding. Further longitu-
dinal research will be required.
How much VBAs were classified as personified things was—in accordance with pre-
vious research (e.g., A. Edwards, 2018; Moon et al., 2016; Nass & Brave, 2005)—mainly 
affected by the perception of the agent’s attributes of agency (behaves similarly, is attentive) 
and mind (thinks and feels similar, understands, has a vast personality, especially a creative 
one). However, for the same effect on the classification, it required a much lower degree of 
mind than agency. Hence, “personified things” expands “social things” (Guzman, 2015) by 
implying abilities associated with personhood—even if their degree is low (Hubbard, 2011).
However, attributes of the situation and the user did indirectly alter the classifica-
tion by affecting the VBAs’ assumed agency and mind. In accordance with prior research 
(A. Edwards et al., 2019; Leite et al., 2013), previous regular interactions positively affected 
the perception of VBAs as personified things. In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Pur-
ington et al., 2017), the main use of VBAs in the dyad situation (i.e., in the absence of oth-
ers) caused a stronger classification toward personified things, through increased perceived 
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agency and mind. One explanation for this may be that the dyad fosters a more intense 
experience and lacks the “blueprint” of a human being. As a result, the users can engage 
more effectively with the VBA but have only themselves for comparison to project sub-
jectivity. The effect found by Purington et al. may be caused by different dynamics. Thus, 
we encourage to further explore the dynamics of dyadic and multi-person environments 
regarding the classification.
Corresponding with Piaget (1970/1974), age was a crucial factor for subjectification by 
altering the VBA’s agency and mind (e.g., Woods et al., 2007): The younger the participants, 
the more attentive, creative, and substantial in personality the VBAs were perceived to be. 
An essential factor in this respect is the continually increasing experience with objects of the 
environment, which gradually complement the classification and thus extend the options 
for comparison of included objects in the scheme. 
Rather than an effect of matching personalities of the user and the VBA (Nass & Lee, 
2001), the findings were more ambiguous. Although VBAs were seen as very extraverted 
across subgroups, introvert people subjectified them more often, through increased percep-
tion of similarity in feeling and personality items in general. That is, introverts perceived a 
richer personality and emotionality in VBAs. Again, this phenomenon can be related to the 
above-mentioned projection of the users’ experienced own subjectivity (Piaget, 1970/1974). 
As introverts may experience themselves as rich in emotion and personality, even though 
they are—compared to extroverts—less inclined to express these qualities to others, they 
likely attribute the same intensity of feelings and personality to the weak expressions of 
the VBAs.
As with all research, this study has several limitations, of which its hypothetical interac-
tion with its pre-defined questions and answers is one. Additional studies need to validate 
the VBA’s classification in real interactions and with different contents. A second limitation 
is the paper’s focus on VBAs. Comparing various evocative technologies may allow a more 
distinct classification and may reveal differences in influencing attributes. Third, the clas-
sification of an object is the result of a dynamic equilibration process (Piaget, 1970/1974). 
Hence, we solely examined a snapshot of the process, not the process itself. However, it is 
unclear whether the classification resulted from initial or multiple equilibration processes. 
Most of the participants had at least some experience with the VBA, indicating potential 
prior equilibrations. Further research on the process itself, concerning initial and repeated 
equilibrations, influences, and related classifications, is needed. 
To conclude, human-machine communication in the context of voice-based agents 
indicates that people communicate with personified things defined by a moderate agency 
and a basic mind. The more VBAs behave, think, feel similar, are perceived to be attentive 
to, and understand their users, and are at least to some extent creative, the more they are 
classified as personified things. Although this requires a moderate agency, a rather limited 
mind is sufficient. Depending on the opportunities for comparison on different levels, the 
classification is more or less hybrid. Comparisons take place on an individual (age, person-
ality) and situational level (dyad). Age relates to the amount of experience with compara-
ble evocative objects, users’ personality relates to the comparison with their own behavior 
and mind, and the dyadic situation relates to the comparison with another human subject. 
However, the classification of VBAs as personified things is still fragile and they remain 
objects of doubt.
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Abstract
People often engage human-interaction schemas in human-robot interactions, so notions 
of prototypicality are useful in examining how interactions’ formal features shape percep-
tions of social robots. We argue for a typology of three higher-order interaction forms (social, 
task, play) comprising identifiable-but-variable patterns in agents, content, structures, out-
comes, context, norms. From that ground, we examined whether participants’ judgments 
about a social robot (mind, morality, and trust perceptions) differed across prototypical 
interactions. Findings indicate interaction forms somewhat influence trust but not mind 
or morality evaluations. However, how participants perceived interactions (independent 
of form) were more impactful. In particular, perceived task interactions fostered functional 
trust, while perceived play interactions fostered moral trust and attitude shift over time. 
Hence, prototypicality in interactions should not consider formal properties alone but must 
also consider how people perceive interactions according to prototypical frames.
Keywords: social cognition, trust, schema, framing, prototypicality, playfulness,  
temporality
Introduction
News and popular media depict potentials for social robots (embodied technologies that 
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humans. Those interactions comprise distinct orientations, dynamics, and outcomes that 
may fundamentally influence humans’ understandings of robots. In particular, since spe-
cific interactions may be understood as prototypical of common interaction types, people 
may draw on scripts or schema inherent to those forms when evaluating social robots. 
To better understand how interaction types may shape perceptions of robots, we draw on 
human communication literature to argue for an organizing framework of higher-order 
interaction forms and their prototypical features. We employ this framework to isolate the 
particular features of relational norms and aims and to empirically examine their influence 
on social perceptions of a robot. 
Thus, the goals of this research are twofold: to (a) conceptualize interactions as proto-
typical of interaction forms and (b) investigate those forms’ impact on robot perceptions. 
To these ends, we explicate the notion of prototypicality and how it emerges in interactions, 
and then argue for three higher-order interaction forms (social, task, play) comprising dis-
tinct sets of commonly co-occurring features. On that foundation, we present hypothe-
sis and formulate questions regarding interaction forms’ impacts on key social(-cognitive) 
evaluations of robots. After reporting experiment results, findings are discussed in relation 
to prior research on robot schemas, interactants’ individual frames for interaction forms, 
and temporality of social perceptions. Findings indicate that mind perception and moral 
judgment did not vary across interaction forms; trust differed mildly across manipulated 
interaction forms, but more strongly across perceived interaction forms, suggesting proto-
typicality is a matter of both formal and perceived properties.
Literature Review
Human communication scholarship indicates that individual-, group-, and societal-level 
differences can influence how meaning is made in communication processes. In order to 
find superordinate patterns that permit generalizable ideas about how communication 
unfolds, scholars often rely on the notion of prototypicality. Prototypicality is the extent to 
which an exemplar is a good representation of its category (Rosch, 1973). This tautological 
definition belies the construct’s dynamic nature as prototypicality relies on frequencies of 
exemplar encounters and perceptions of each exemplar’s representativeness (Nedungadi & 
Hutchinson, 1985). In other words, the more people encounter an exemplar and perceive 
it as representative of a category, the more likely that exemplar will emerge as prototypical 
of the category.
It may be tempting to consider prototypical exemplars, then, as comprising clear sets 
of features. For instance, one might say an interaction is “professional” if it has necessary 
features of formality, hierarchical relations, and workplace context. However, prototypi-
cality in communication is better considered as having fuzzy-set criteria: an exemplar’s 
representativeness of a category varies with the degree to which it adheres to a collection 
of sufficient-but-not-necessary qualities (see Ragin, 2000). Thus, a “professional” inter-
action is instead one that is sufficiently formal, hierarchical, and/or workplace-situated. 
Non-prototypicality would equate to “0” and perfect prototypicality would equate to “1,” 
with grades between. Although prototypicality is principally examined in individuals’ 
perceptions of other people, the notion is a useful conceptual starting point for forms of 
interaction.
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Prototypicality in Interaction 
Prototypicality emerges through systematically shared features (Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 
1985) that cumulatively guide people’s shared understanding of the world. Accordingly, 
specific interaction forms (i.e., higher-order categories) may be identified by considering 
features that commonly co-occur when agents interact in exemplar interactions. Identify-
ing such features is perhaps best grounded in a long-standing definition of communication: 
Who says What to Whom in which Channel with what Effect (Lasswell, 1948). Who(m) 
refers to the agents involved, What is the content of the messages, Channel includes the 
structural features of an interaction, and Effect is the outcome. As all communication is 
embedded in social situations governed by contextual factors and social rules (Goffman, 
1964), we add to the Lasswellian formula context and norms. Higher-order interaction 
forms can be identified, then, by common agents, content, structures, outcomes, context, 
and norms. Specific interactions are more or less prototypical of those forms as they are 
more or less adherent to the common features.
These six clusters of interaction features set the scope for further explicating systematic 
feature co-occurrence (see Figure 1). There is systematicity in agents in terms of their “kind,” 
where kind is discernible in demographics (e.g., gender expression), social category (e.g., 
blue-collar workers), or ontological category (e.g., robots; Guzman, 2020). Systematicity in 
content includes feature patterns in the subject matter and topic of interactions (Taboada & 
Wiesemann, 2010). Systematicity in structures comprise the composition of messages (How 
does an interaction unfold?) and channels (How is an interaction arranged?). Systematicity 
in outcomes is broadly construed as the individually or jointly (un)expected or (un)desired 
results of an interaction, such as goals (Homans, 1961) and effects (Altman & Taylor, 1973). 
Systematicity in context consists of the spatial and social environments (Bronfenbrenner, 
1977). Finally, systematicity in norms are implicit or explicit social rules for how individuals 
have or ought to behave in an acceptable fashion (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).
Agents Content Structure Context NormsOutcomes
Interaction Form





















FIGURE 1 Formal and Operational Layers of a Model  
for Interaction-Form Prototypicality
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Higher-Order Interaction Forms: Social, Task, Play
We have argued that six clusters of features have subsets that commonly co-occur across 
interaction exemplars. These co-occurrence patterns give rise to higher-order interaction 
forms—akin to how others have proposed operational user-agent interaction “cases” (e.g., 
deception, coercion) based on technical parameters choices, learning; Burr et al., 2018). 
We build on the notion of interaction-form prototypicality to argue for higher-order forms 
across which those cases (and others) may manifest. Prompted by exploratory work suggest-
ing differential social-cognitive effects across social, task, and playful interactions (Banks, 
2017), literature regarding those three interactions suggests variably co-occurring features 
and so candidacy as higher-order interaction forms.
Social interaction. Social interactions, broadly, are processes by which agents co-act 
(Mele, 2017). Under this definition, most interaction exemplars may be considered social. 
However, we refer specifically to interactions in which sociality is an end in itself. Co- 
occurring features manifest in relation to agents (widely varied, but generally of comparable 
power; Dahl, 1957), content (self- and other-relevant subjects such as life stories and opin-
ions; see Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003), structures (reciprocity, turn-taking, increasing self- 
disclosures; Rubin & Shenker, 1978), outcomes (feelings of relatedness, closeness, familiar-
ity, kinship; Aron et al., 1992), context (often third places or personal spaces during leisure 
time; Oldenburg, 2007), and norms (manners, attention, role-taking; Kurth, 1970). 
Task interaction. Task interactions are those constellated around exertion of mental or 
physical resources, primarily in service of an interested entity (Burke, 1971). That interested 
entity may be oneself (a person training for a marathon with an AI coach), another (an elec-
trician working for a homeowner) or an external entity (one performing cooperative labor 
for an employing company). Co-occurring features manifest in relation to agents (actors 
with complementary skill sets and authorities, generally motivated toward mutual benefit; 
see Cummings & Kiesler, 2008), content (goal- and process-relevant subjects; see Picker-
ing & Garrod, 2006), structures (standardized communication protocols, efficient channels, 
established timelines for repeated contact; Bolton, 2015), outcomes (achievement of the aim, 
feelings of competence, rewards for performance; Weiss & Kahn, 1960), context (co-located 
or mediated work spaces, hierarchical social structures; Poole, 1978), and norms (shared or 
tiered responsibility, distribution of roles, collaboration; Teh et al., 2012).
Play interaction. Playful interactions are autotelic communications situated outside of 
(albeit in relation to) everyday work or social life (cf. Huizinga, 1949). Although the notion 
of play may invoke strong associations with games (i.e., [semi-]structured challenge sys-
tems with negotiable outcomes; Juul, 2005), playful interactions also include other autotelic 
communicative activities (e.g., those in leisure, work, education, or culture; Frissen et al., 
2015) situated within a collectively pretended, superimposed system of rules (Frasca, 2007) 
and characterized by a mindset of gregariousness, frivolity, and reduced inhibition (see 
Barnett, 2007). Co-occurring features manifest in relation to agents (familiars with shared 
justification for the activity; Deterding, 2018), content (subjects related to the activity itself 
or communication that is silly, whimsical, funny, or teasing; Mäyrä, 2012), structures (game- 
or participant-defined frameworks for collaboration, competition, or creation; Boyan & 
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Banks, 2018), outcomes (hedonic and eudaimonic gratifications; Rogers et al., 2017), context 
(private spaces or formalized public play spaces; see Foucault, 1986), and norms (e.g., accor-
dance with or free from rules or boundaries, suspension of disbelief; Burke, 1971).
Interaction Forms and Social Perceptions of Robots
Social, task, and play interaction forms afford a tentative typology, and specific interaction 
exemplars (i.e., given conversations) variably fit into the higher-order categories based on 
adherence to some number of sufficient-but-not-necessary features. In this way, the forms 
are concrete enough to discern across more or less prototypical exemplars but still flexi-
ble enough to shift with emergent communication activities. Some exemplars are clearly 
and largely prototypical of an interaction form (most/all common features, closer to full 
prototypicality of “1”) while others have some degree of fit depending on the number of 
representative features (some features, prototypicality between 0 and 1). For instance, con-
sidering playful interactions, a robot playing soccer with a human in a park fits many afore-
mentioned features for prototypical play interactions; however, the same pair playing in a 
grocery store has lesser fit (as the context is not prototypical). This concrete-yet-flexible 
typology is useful for systematically exploring the influence of interactions—as complex 
feature-sets—on relational outcomes.
Prototypicality informs individuals’ schemas and frames that guide their expectations 
for an interaction. Schemas are “superordinate knowledge structures that reflect abstracted 
commonalities across multiple experiences,” shaping how people interpret new experiences 
(Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017, p. 618). Individually held frames are schema-derived filters that 
organize immediate experiences (Goffman, 1974) and serve as interpretive lenses (Scheufele, 
2000). In other words, sets of features held together in each higher-order interaction form 
are—through experience-derived schemas and frames—familiar and recognizable, guiding 
how people approach novel-but-familiar interactions. 
Prototypical social, task, and play interactions foster evolving schemas that include 
descriptive and procedural scripts as each is encountered in everyday life. Scripts are 
abstract representations of stereotypical event-sequences, accessed in response to relevant 
situational cues (Abelson, 1981): sets of ideas about what one and others should do in a 
situation. People engage in similar social-cognitive processes (e.g., mind perception; Banks, 
2020b) and interaction scripts (Edwards et al., 2016) when interacting with robots, though 
it is yet unclear whether the form of an interaction may influence these dynamics. In con-
sidering those potential effects, it is useful to first explore impacts on fundamental social 
judgments in relation to prototypical norms and outcomes. 
Mind perception. People’s perception of another agent as having a mind unfolds through an 
inferential mechanism (Theory of Mind; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) by which they overtly 
or indirectly surmise the agent’s mental states from discernible cues. Three perceived men-
tal capacities (Malle, 2019) are (a) reality-interaction capacity (mindful communication and 
action), (b) affective capacity (physiologically/emotionally experiencing emotional states), 
and (c) social-moral capacity (simulation of others’ minds and evaluating right/wrong). 
Social action often automatically promotes inferences of mindedness and since humans 
generally mentalize robots as they do humans (Banks, 2020a), making it likely that all three 
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interaction forms will promote some level of all three capacities, albeit with differential 
patterns. Because social interactions are grounded in self-relevant exchanges via norms for 
self-disclosure that engender relational intimacy outcomes (Altman & Taylor, 1973), 
(H1a) social interaction will promote highest perceived affective capacity. Task 
interactions feature shared responsibility and cooperation norms (Wageman & 
Baker, 1997) leading to incremental progress and effective task achievement out-
comes (Walliser et al., 2019), such that 
(H1b) task interaction will promote strongest reality-interactive mentalizing. 
With norms for fair play (cf. Consalvo, 2009a) and outcomes of coordination- 
driven achievement and positive affect (Oliver et al., 2015), 
(H1c) playful interactions will promote highest perceived social-moral capac-
ities. Because this indirect mental inferencing operates independently of more 
conscious judgments, it is also useful to consider: 
(RQ1) Does explicit mind ascription differ across interaction forms?
Moral evaluation. Perception of entities’ moral agency is key to a range of social cognitions 
(Moll et al., 2008) that may influence human-machine communication. Extrapolating from 
scholarship on media representations of morality, people show greater affinity for personas 
that express valued moral-character qualities (Tamborini et al., 2013) and desire punish-
ment for those that deviate (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976). Such moral evaluations may vary 
by interaction form, as a form’s prototypical features make salient the behaviors considered 
normatively “good” in an interaction and the types of outcomes that excuse “bad” behaviors. 
For instance, robots telling lies to humans in social interactions may be seen as immoral 
due to expectations for authenticity but found acceptable or desirable in play interactions 
where lies are prototypical (e.g., “poker faces”). 
In addition to discrete moral-character evaluations, explicit moral status ascription 
(overt decision on robots’ abilities to be or do good/bad) may vary across interaction forms. 
An interaction form’s prototypical norms and outcomes may give the human partner greater 
license for acknowledging moral status. However, because moral evaluations depend heav-
ily on the content of messages conveyed, behaviors performed, and people’s emotional 
responses to it (Avramova & Inbar, 2013), neutral content (as in the present study’s stimuli) 
could also prevent variation. Given these conflicting potentials, we ask: 
(RQ2) (How) does robot (a) character evaluation and (b) moral-status ascrip-
tion differ across interaction forms?
Trust(worthiness). Trust is a multifaceted construct understood as a weak induction (some-
where between full knowing and ignorance) that provokes surrender in the face of uncer-
tainty (Simmel, 1908/1950, 1900/1990). Within human-machine communication research 
it is defined as feelings of faith and reliance that a robot will not exploit one’s vulnerability, 
and it is understood as key to social acceptance of robots (see Ullman & Malle, 2018) as it 
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may play out in socioemotional distancing and intentions to engage them. Although extant 
literature suggests playfulness may be associated with positive engagement (Moon & Kim, 
2001), a robot’s performance may affect explicit ascription of trust (van den Brule et al., 
2014), and linguistics may influence social distance (Kim et al., 2013). However, it is yet 
unclear whether higher-order interaction forms may engender differences in trust. There-
fore, we ask: 
(How) do (RQ3a) explicit trust ascription and (RQ3b) trust-related intentions 
(i.e., future engagement and preferred social distance) vary across interaction 
forms?
In social judgments of robots, trust as a feeling-state is different from trustworthiness 
as the perception of another actor’s abilities or character (Colquitt et al., 2007). Robot trust-
worthiness is multidimensional (Ullman & Malle, 2019), comprising considerations of 
capacity (whether a robot is functionally capable and operationally reliable) and morality 
(whether it is inherently ethical and sincere). We predict that both types of trustworthi-
ness will vary by interaction form. As social interactions rely on norms of authentic self- 
disclosure and outcomes of relational closeness (Altman & Taylor, 1973) and play interac-
tions rely on norms of rule-following and fairness (Consalvo, 2009a), we hypothesize that 
(H2a) social and play interactions will promote highest levels of moral trustwor-
thiness. Regarding capacity trustworthiness, competence is known to precede 
trust in another’s capabilities (Sherwood & DePaolo, 2005) and capacity trust-
worthiness manifests partly through cooperative decision-making (McCabe et 
al., 2001), which is common to both task and play interactions. Following, it is 
likely that in comparison to social interactions, 
(H2b) task and play interactions will promote highest capacity trustworthiness 
perceptions. 
Method
The study implemented three exemplars prototypical of the three higher-order interaction 
forms (social, task, play) as a between-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of these conditions, resulting in n = 40 participants in the social condition, n = 38 
in the task condition, and n = 39 in the play condition. All study materials are available in 
online supplements: https://osf.io/n87bg/.
Participants
A convenience sample of students was invited to participate in a study on “interacting with 
robots in different situations” for course credit and US$5 compensation. After excluding 
three participants due to technical issues, impaired vision, and missing survey responses, 
the final sample comprised 117 participants aged M = 20.38 years (SD = 3.45, range: 18–40). 
In total, 43 participants identified as male and 74 as female. Ethnicities included Caucasian 
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(n = 75), Hispanic (n = 19), African (n = 9), Asian (n = 6), native American (n = 1), and 
mixed ethnicities (n = 7).
Procedure
The study’s procedure consisted of three stages. First, participants completed a pre-session 
online survey capturing covariates: robot experience, existing robot and technology atti-
tudes, and demographics. 
Second, they participated in an in-person lab session to complete the robot-interac-
tion procedure (see supplements for lab configuration). After giving informed consent, the 
experimenter guided participants into another room and briefly introduced them to the 
humanoid robot “Ray” (RoboThespian with “Pris” face and “Heather” American English 
voice, addressed with female pronouns); they were given the chance to introduce them-
selves. The experimenter briefly left the room as they “got to know each other” to minimize 
immediate novelty effects; Ray asked participants about academic majors, current studies, 
and hobbies, followed by a short description of Ray’s alleged leisure activities (“reading the 
news on the internet”). The experimenter then stepped back into the room and provided 
instructions for the assigned interaction that would unfold (sans experimenter) over the 
next 5 minutes. 
Finally, after those 5 minutes, the experimenter returned and led the participant back 
to the first room to complete a post-interaction survey out of sight of both robot and exper-
imenter. That survey included items capturing initial impression of Ray and of the inter-
action, and scales for perceptions of mind, morality, and trust. Participants were thanked, 
compensated, and dismissed.
Stimulus Interactions
The robot was controlled using Wizard of Oz methodology: although we told participants 
that Ray could “do a lot of things, like sensing its environment, listening and responding 
in conversations,” the robot was fully controlled from a hidden lab room. One of three stu-
dent assistants controlled Ray using 36 pre-defined interaction scripts consisting of verbal 
and non-verbal responses—including affirmatives (e.g., “Oh, very good.”), negatives (e.g., 
“No, I don’t think so.”), and ambiguous statements (e.g., “Interesting.”), as well as several 
condition-specific responses. A cover story rationalized limitations when participants 
wanted to talk with Ray beyond the predetermined script, explaining that Ray was still 
“learning how to speak to humans well,” that some “speech may be a little limited,” and they 
should not “be surprised if she doesn’t give the perfect answer to what you say.” The control-
lers were trained for 6 hours and ran tests with naive training participants. Form features 
associated with agents, structures, content, and context were controlled while prototypical 
features for norms and outcomes were manipulated (Table 1; see supplements for complete 
scripts and stimuli).
Social interaction. In the social condition, participants engaged in “friendly conversation” 
with Ray about everyday triangle-shaped things (a morally neutral topic). Instructions 
emphasized self-disclosures through talk about everyday experiences. Both interlocutors 
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were instructed to use a keyboard to type out topics discussed (typing was shown via Mic-
rosoft Word on a wall-mounted screen) to visibly display Ray’s agency in parallel with 
on-screen activities in other conditions. Ray’s condition-specific speech included requests 
to name triangles, think about a favorite triangle, explain an unfamiliar triangle, and spec-
ulate about triangles’ importance. 
Task interaction. In the task condition, participants “completed a task together” with 
Ray: cooperating on a CAPTCHA-like task to find hidden triangles in photographs. 
Instructions emphasized coordination and accuracy as goal outcomes. Ray’s actions were 
shown on-screen by a moving cursor and clicking identified triangles. Ray’s condition- 
specific speech included task-relevant suggestions, action narrations, and requests for help. 
Play interaction. In the play condition, participants were asked to “play a game” with Ray. 
The game was DeRu (InkKit, 2018): a puzzle game in which players cooperate to navigate 
triangles through obstacles to respective goal states. Instructions outlined game rules, goals, 
and emphasized turn-taking and having fun. Ray’s actions were shown on-screen through 
the control of the triangle game piece, and condition-specific speech included movement 
suggestions and narratives of actions.
Measures
All within-scale items responses were presented in a randomized order on 7-point Likert 
scales and averaged by subscale for further statistical analyses, unless otherwise indicated.
TABLE 1 Interaction Form Features Manipulated and Held Constant Across Conditions
Social Task Play
Agents Human students interacting with a female-cued robot who speaks, gestures, 
and indicates agency on-screen
Content “What things in your 
life are shaped like 
triangles?”
“identifying hidden  
triangle shapes in 
complex photographs”
“control a triangle  
and . . . get the triangle 
into its home”
Structure Turn-taking, self-disclosure, vocal messaging, exhibition of action on-screen, 
escalating complexity/difficulty
Outcomes “get to know each other” “accuracy in identifying 
triangles”
“having fun”
Context Sterile lab setting (across a table from Ray, with wall-mounted screen and 
keyboard/gamepad controls), with the interaction framed in the service of 
research




“complete a task 
together,” “accuracy,” 
specific instructions
“play a game together,” 
beating levels, challenge 
and achievement signals
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Mind perception. Participants were asked to complete the updated 20-item version of the 
multidimensional mental capacity scale (Malle, 2019) comprising three dimensions: reali-
ty-interaction capacity (α = .86), affective capacity (α = .86), and social/moral capacity (α = 
.86). Participants also rated the robot on the four-item dependency (i.e., mindlessness) sub-
scale of the perceived moral agency scale (α = .53; Banks, 2019) and were asked to explic-
itly indicate whether or not “Ray has a mind” (no/yes). Due to low internal reliability, the 
dependency subscale was excluded from further analyses.
Moral evaluation. The perceived moral agency scale’s six-item moral-capacity subscale (α 
= .89; Banks, 2019) was employed, complemented by the extended character morality ques-
tionnaire (Grizzard et al., 2020) consisting of four-item moral-foundation subscales: care (α 
= .85), fairness (α = .77), loyalty (α = .77), authority (α = .88), purity (α = .69). The purity 
subscale was adapted (in cooperation with the scale developer), replacing one item about 
smoking with one about a computer virus. Two items were dropped from analysis (“healthy 
lifestyle” from the purity set, “loyalty to friends” from the loyalty set) for low intra-dimen-
sion correlations (r ≤ –.02). Explicit moral status was measured by asking whether or not 
“Ray can be moral or immoral” (no/yes).
Trust(worthiness). Participants’ trust in Ray was operationalized as both trustworthi-
ness and trust-related intentions. Trustworthiness was captured via the multidimensional 
measure of trust (Ullman & Malle, 2019) with two dimensions: capacity trustworthiness 
(α = .85) and moral trustworthiness (α = .91). Participants also responded to a single 
dichotomous measure, asking “whether or not they trust Ray” (no/yes). Trust-related inten-
tions were captured via two measures concerning comfort with future interactions. First, 
physical, relational, and conversational indicators of social distance were employed using 
three Guttman-scale items (Banks & Edwards, 2019), range 0–6 with lower scores indicat-
ing more distance. Second, participants indicated degrees of willingness to meet with Ray 
again in three different scenarios: “to have a friendly chat,” “to work on a difficult problem,” 
or “to play a game.”
Manipulation check. Although stimulus interactions were carefully constructed according 
to prototypicality criteria, interactions within laboratory settings may be seen as a task in 
itself, irrespective of its features. Following, a single-item manipulation check was used to 
capture perceptions of the interaction as most similar to “having a conversation,” “complet-
ing a task,” or “playing a game.” Participants also were asked to describe their experience in 
an open-ended format.
Control measures. Participants documented attitudes toward robots via the Godspeed 
questionnaire likability subscale (α = .90; Bartneck et al., 2009) and prior experience with 
robots via a single Likert-style item. General attitudes regarding novel technologies were 
captured using technophobia (α = .77) and technophilia scales (α = .88; Martínez-Córcoles 
et al., 2017). Specific to the stimuli, Ray’s perceived humanlikeness and amiability were cap-
tured using the Godspeed anthropomorphism (α = .83) and likeability subscales (α = .88).
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Results
Analyses draw from a sample of N = 117; however, due to survey randomization error, 
the first 44 cases collected were only shown two of three dependent variable sets, so they 
suffer from data missing at random. See supplements for specific missing cases, descriptive 
statistics, and zero-order correlations. In checking effectiveness of the manipulation, par-
ticipants perceived all conditions as most similar to completing a task (see supplements). 
However, Chi-Squared testing across conditions demonstrated that no misaligned percep-
tions were significant (ps ≥ .150). Based on these discrepancies between assigned and per-
ceived interaction form, analyses evaluated both manipulated and perceived interaction 
forms as between-subjects factors.
Hypothesis Testing
In multivariate and univariate tests (as appropriate, given [non]correlations between depen-
dent variables), when significance was approached (p range .051–.100), moderate or larger 
effect sizes (Cramér’s V ≥ .21 [given df = 2] and univariate part. η2 ≥ .06) were interpreted, 
given smaller sample sizes inappropriately punish p values (Bowman, 2017). 
Mind perception (H1a–c, RQ1). MANCOVA compared mental capacities across dimen-
sions; participants’ general technology and robot attitudes and Ray’s perceived humanlike-
ness and amiability were covariates. There was no significant multivariate effect for mental 
capacities, Wilks’ λ = .97, F(6,192) = 0.46, p = .837. Therefore, hypotheses H1a, H1b, and 
H1c were not supported. A Chi-Square test compared explicit mind ascription across con-
ditions, with no significant differences, χ2(2) = 3.08, p = .215, V = .171. Answering RQ1, 
then, explicit mind ascription did not significantly differ across interaction forms.
Moral evaluation (RQ2). A MANCOVA compared moral character and ANCOVA com-
pared moral status across conditions, with the same covariates as above. There was neither 
a significant multivariate effect, λ = .86, F(10,188) = 1.45, p = .161, nor a significant main 
effect, F(2,98) = 1.29, p = .279, part. η2 = .026. Concerning explicit moral-status ascription 
across conditions, analysis again revealed no significant differences, χ2(2) = 0.30, p = .860, 
V = .053. Answering RQ2, neither implicit nor explicit moral evaluations varied across 
manipulated interaction forms.
Trust(worthiness) (H2a–b, RQ3a–b). MANCOVA (with covariates as above) compared 
trustworthiness across conditions. Although there was a significant multivariate effect, λ 
= .87, F(4,194) = 3.44, p = .010, subsequent univariate testing revealed no significant dif-
ferences (capacity trustworthiness: F(2,98) = 2.82, p = .064, part. η2 = .054; moral trust-
worthiness: F(2,98) = 2.94, p = .058, part. η2 = .057), offering no support for H2a or H2b. 
A Chi-Square test comparing trust ascription across conditions indicated differences 
approaching significance and meeting the effect-size benchmark, χ2(2) = 5.31, p = .070, 
V = .224. Participants in the task condition were most likely to explicitly express trust in Ray 
(71.43%) compared to those in the play (57.58%) or social (44.74%) conditions. 
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Concerning trust-related intentions, the three social distance and three intention 
parameters were strongly correlated, warranting MANCOVAs (with covariates as above). 
There was a significant multivariate effect for social distance, λ = .88, F(6,214) = 2.34, 
p = .033. Univariate testing showed a significant effect only for physical distance, 
F(2,109) = 4.86, p = .010, part. η2 = .082. Participants in both task (M = 4.16, SD = 0.92) and play 
(M = 4.08, SD = 1.18) conditions felt more comfortable with being physically near Ray 
than did those in the social condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.65). Concerning participants’ 
willingness to interact with Ray again, there was no significant multivariate effect, λ = .89, 
F(6,214) = 2.04, p = .061. However, univariate testing revealed a significant effect for people’s 
intention to return for a play interaction, F(2,109) = 3.77, p = .026, part. η2 = .065. Mirroring 
the results for physical distance, participants in both task (M = 5.55, SD = 1.57) and play 
(M = 5.79, SD = 1.89) conditions showed stronger willingness compared to those in the 
social condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.98). 
Post-Hoc Analysis: Differences Across Perceived Interaction Forms
Due to discrepancies between assigned and perceived interaction forms, data were re- 
analyzed using perceived interaction form (social [n = 20; 17.09%] vs. task [n = 66; 56.41%] 
vs. play [n = 31; 26.50%]) as a between-subjects factor. This re-analysis used the same sta-
tistical methods as used in the initial analysis, typically robust against unequal group sizes 
(barring homogeneity issues not present here; see supplements).
Mind perception. MANCOVA again showed no significant multivariate effect on three 
mental capacities, λ = .90, F(6,192) = 1.69, p = .126. Thus, no support is offered for H1a–c. 
Conversely, the Chi-square test to check for explicit mind ascription approached signifi-
cance and met the effect-size benchmark, χ2(2) = 5.22, p = .074, V = .222. In contrast to 
manipulated interaction’s null effects (RQ1), participants perceiving a task interaction were 
least likely to ascribe mind (37.29%) compared to the other conditions (play 59.26%, social 
60.00%). 
Moral evaluation. A multivariate effect approached significance and met the effect-size 
benchmark for perceived moral character, λ = .83, F(10,188) = 1.78, p = .067, but there 
were no significant univariate effects for any moral character parameter. No significant 
main effect was found for moral capacity, F(2,98) = 1.24, p = .295, part. η2 = .025. Explicit 
moral-status ascription also did not differ by perceived form, χ2(2) = 4.21, p = .122, V = .199. 
Trust(worthiness). In line with original analysis, there was a multivariate effect for trust-
worthiness, λ = .81, F(4,194) = 5.49, p < .001, and a significant univariate effect for moral 
trustworthiness, F(2,98) = 10.08, p < .001, part. η2 = .171. Those perceiving social interac-
tions scored highest in moral trustworthiness (M = 5.08, SD = 1.10), followed by the play 
(M = 4.50, SD = 1.10) and task groups (M = 4.02, SD = 1.45). There was no difference in 
explicit trust ascription across perceived interaction forms, χ2(2) = 0.02, p = .988, V = .015. 
Thus, re-analysis is interpreted to offer partial support for H2a only when considering per-
ceived interaction forms.
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Regarding social distance, there was no multivariate effect, λ = .94, F(6,214) = 1.10, 
p = .362. However, participants’ openness to future interaction varied across conditions, 
λ = .84, F(6,214) = 3.25, p = .004. A significant univariate effect was exhibited only for will-
ingness to return to play a game with Ray, F(2,109) = 9.78, p < .001, part. η2 = .152. Partic-
ipants perceiving a playful interaction showed greatest willingness (M = 6.42, SD = .89) to 
play again, compared to those perceiving task (M = 5.02, SD = 2.02) and social (M = 5.05, 
SD = 1.88) interactions.
Post-Hoc Analysis: Themes in Interaction Experiences
Although preceding analyses allow for statistical comparisons of measured responses, a 
limitation of this approach is that comparisons are determined a priori. Inductive analysis 
of participants’ open-ended experience descriptions complements findings above by con-
sidering patterns in subjective experiences. Open answers to the post-interaction survey 
question “What was it like to spend time with Ray as you did?” were subjected to inductive 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; see supplements). This analysis extracted three 
themes:
Affective reflections (n = 150 mentions). Participants recounted emotional reactions to 
their own role in the interaction (e.g., “I felt kind of silly talking to a robot”) and/or reflec-
tion of their own emotions felt during the interaction (e.g., “being with Ray did not make 
me feel comfortable”). Some reflections were clear and manifest (e.g., emotion words: angry, 
sad, happy) but others were more complex or latent (e.g., fascination, implications of awe). 
Robot capacities (n = 147). Some responses included mentions of what Ray was possibly or 
actually able to do during interactions in terms of non-physical capacities, including social 
and mental capabilities, but not personality or physical traits or specific behaviors. Men-
tions included (a) interactive capacities, (b) functional capacities, and (c) capacities to act 
or think independently. For instance, some mentioned that “Ray’s response time was slow” 
or that Ray had strong or poor “people skills.”
Temporality (n = 125). Participants also mentioned the role time played in their experi-
ences. These included: (a) (lack of) prior expectations for robots, suggesting before/after 
shifts in mindset (e.g., “I did not know what to expect when I walked in”), (b) mentions 
of how feelings/thoughts changed over the interaction (e.g., “at first, I felt scared”), and 
(c) concrete mentions of time-related concepts (e.g., minutes, a long time passed, or wish-
ing for more time).
Experience themes across forms. To evaluate whether themes were differentially salient 
in specific interaction forms, a coding scheme was developed from the inductive analysis 
results (see supplements) and used in coding for absence/presence of themes. Two inde-
pendent coders achieved interrater reliability on a 10% subset of data: affective α = 1.00, 
capacities α = –.045 (83.3% agreement, acceptable due to infrequent codes; Krippendorff, 
2011), and temporality α = .83. One rater coded the remaining data.
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Across the manipulated interaction-form conditions, there were no significant differ-
ences (ps ≥ .142, ηs2  ≥ .034; see supplements for detailed results). For perceived interac-
tion forms, no difference emerged for the presence of affective reflection, F(2,114) = 2.11, 
p = .126, η2 = .036, or robot capacity, F(2,114) = 0.38, p = .686, η2 = .007. However, mentions 
of temporality differed significantly, F(2,114) = 6.11, p = .003, η2 = .097. Participants who 
perceived game-like interactions were more likely to mention temporal concepts compared 
to those perceiving task-like interactions (ΔM = –.36, SD = .10, p = .003). Notably, not all 
mentions of time were equal; some participants noted time in a strictly factual way (“we 
spent time together”) while others mused (wishing for “more time” with Ray). This analy-
sis did not discriminate among valences or semantics, such that claims here are limited to 
mentions as indications of salience.
Discussion
On the theoretical ground that interactions take three higher-order forms (social, task, play) 
based on prototypical features (agents, norms, structures, content, outcomes, context), we 
predicted and questioned the nature of interaction forms’ influence on social evaluations 
of robots. To summarize, we found no statistically meaningful differences in perceived 
mental or moral evaluations across manipulated interaction forms. However, there was a 
greater tendency to explicitly express trust after task interactions (versus social or play) 
and willingness to be physically closer after task or play interactions. Since perceptions 
of interactions differed from the manipulated form, reanalyzing social judgments for per-
ceived interaction forms again showed no effects on moral capacity evaluations. However, 
explicit mind ascription was less frequently ascribed in perceived-task interactions, moral 
trustworthiness highest in perceived-social interactions, and willingness to return for play-
ful interactions in a perceived-playful interaction. Temporal dynamics were most salient 
to individuals perceiving the interaction as a game. Results indicate (a) likely importance 
of task-form features in promoting trust, (b) divergence of interactions’ formal features 
and individuals’ perceptions thereof, with an influence on trust, and (c) a relative non- 
importance of interaction form for social cognitions.
Task Interactions as Robot Schema-Consistent
The manipulated features of norms and outcomes manifested in the task condition as 
functional cooperation, action and productivity guidelines, and outcome accuracy. Task 
interactions promoted explicit trust and comfort with physical closeness, suggesting its 
prototypical features are more aligned with common mental models for what a robot is (a 
function-driven machine; Banks, 2020a), how it should behave (completing tasks; Takayama 
et al., 2008), and what its skills are (unbiased information processing; Sundar, 2008). This 
schema-consistency may have facilitated a working intuition of how the robot could com-
plete the task, in contrast to a lack of understanding for capacities to socialize or play. In 
other words, when robots do what is ostensibly appropriate for robots to do (i.e., efficient 
work) through normative, discernible mechanisms (i.e., simple input/output loops), people 
may move closer to knowing than not-knowing (cf. Simmel, 1908/1950) and trust them 
more—even to the extent of welcoming them in less task-oriented future interactions. 
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In tandem, participants in the play and social interaction conditions may have formed 
expectations about the robot’s functionality and performance that exceeded its actual capa-
bilities. While its humanoid appearance might have already raised performance expectations 
from the outset (Duffy, 2003), each interaction-form prime may have uniquely emphasized 
different robot functionalities (Lohse, 2011). Some expectations were easier to fulfill during 
the short, pre-scripted scenarios (i.e., purely functional expectations in the task condition) 
than others (i.e., elaborate social-cognitive/socio-emotional expectations in play and social 
conditions). Typically, such expectancy violations result in participant disappointment and 
reduced acceptance of (Komatsu et al., 2012) and trust in robots (Kwon et al., 2016). 
These interpretations point to task interactions as suitable starting points toward more 
social interactions, facilitating utilitarian trust in advance of socioemotional trust (see Van-
neste et al., 2014). By adhering to task-form norms and aims, robot interactions may avoid 
eliciting anxieties typically associated with social (i.e., less schema-consistent) implemen-
tations of embodied artificial intelligence (Cave et al., 2019). Notably, adherence to schema 
(superordinate knowledge structures that shape new experiences; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017) 
may only be applicable to the kinds of novel and short-term interactions in this study. As 
schemas evolve with continuous experience, expectations for interactions may also evolve—
potentially to allow for less structured, more social interactions.
Interaction Forms Versus Interactant Frames
Interaction forms’ influence on trust indicators differed between manipulated and per-
ceived interaction forms. Manipulated task interactions promoted explicit trust ascription 
and acceptance of physical vulnerability, while perceived social engagement promoted 
impressions of moral trustworthiness and perceived playful exchange promoted willing-
ness to play again. This finding suggests trust emerges differentially in relation to actual 
interaction dynamics compared to an individual’s frame (i.e., interpretive lens) toward an 
interaction. Frames are understood to organize people’s immediate experiences by filter-
ing in relevant and filtering out irrelevant information (Goffman, 1974), such that what 
“counts” for trust appears to emerge differently based on perception. Specifically, when an 
interaction is perceived as social it may engender moral trustworthiness through mutual 
self-disclosure (Martelaro et al., 2016); when it is perceived as playful, autotelic engagement 
may engender positive affect toward anticipated future play (cf. Dragan et al., 2014). This 
sits in contrast to the influence of task-interaction formal features as they influenced indi-
cators of less socioemotional and more functional trust orientations. The aims and norms 
associated with tasks (i.e., completion, accuracy, order) appear to have promoted a type of 
operative trust that emphasizes a conscious and overt risk-acceptance orientation. In other 
words, the robot proved it could be effective in task in a co-present context, therefore it is 
likely safe to be around. Speculatively, then, both subjectively felt and practically applied 
trust may be most effectively fostered when an interaction is effectively task-oriented but is 
understood to be social and/or playful.
Play as Transitional Interaction
Participants who perceived their interaction as playful and expressed greatest willingness 
to engage in another playful interaction also described their experiences with prevalent 
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mentions of time-related concepts. Thus, temporality may be important in fostering future- 
oriented and agent-focused orientations toward robots. Playful interactions could be an 
effective gateway for promoting self-motivated engagement with social robots, which might 
eventually lead to long-term acceptance. The greater prevalence of time-related notions 
in perceived play interactions suggests that—although all three forms were inherently 
cooperative—something about the nature of play may promote shifts in robots’ perceived 
social status. This could be a function of shifting from belonging to an ontological outgroup 
(i.e., robot, not human; Guzman, 2020) to becoming a teammate in an autotelic activity 
and, thus, member of an ingroup (Fraune et al., 2017). It is unclear whether competitive, 
playful interactions would result in an opposite effect—a potential that should be explored 
further. The prevalence of temporality notions in post-play reflections may also be indic-
ative of a shifted experiential frame. Even though playful activity may have not resulted in 
different post-hoc evaluations, participants perceived Ray differently (i.e., more favorably) 
during playful interactions. That is, they may have entered a “magic circle”—a playful space 
in which rules, norms, and realities are held apart from everyday life (Consalvo, 2009b)—
together with a robot, where the frame shift made the robot’s ontological class irrelevant 
to the interaction. Play may thus foster non-conscious, in situ attitudinal and behavioral 
changes that become noticeable after time has passed and they have left the circle. 
Limitations and Future Directions
This investigation has inherent limitations that should be addressed in future research, 
inclusive of the missing data challenge that necessitates replication. Despite evidence that 
different interaction forms would likely make distinct features of robots-as-agents salient to 
humans, adherence to forms’ fuzzy-set criteria may have been too subtle. By experimentally 
controlling agent behaviors, content, structure, and context, we may have inadvertently 
controlled form-features that influence social judgments. The purposefully neutral content 
(triangles) may not have been sufficiently meaningful, and the laboratory environment evi-
dently fostered perceptions of tasked interaction. Varying the physical and social context 
may mitigate this challenge. Said another way, interaction forms may matter for mind and 
morality, but their prototypicality may need to be closer to 1 than to 0. Even at the expense 
of ecological validity, future research may benefit from implementing highly prototypical 
interaction forms in order to first gain coarse-grained insights into form dynamics before 
engaging more detailed inquiries.
It is also likely that the novelty and constrained structure of the interaction (i.e., five 
minutes) influenced findings. Different patterns may emerge in longer interactions and also 
as a function of the robot’s morphology. The use of an anthropomorphic robot was based 
on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, evidence indicates it is more likely 
that people transfer humanlike representations to humanoid agents (cf. Epley et al., 2007) 
such that if differences emerged, they were more likely to be detectable for an android; prac-
tically, a humanoid robot allowed us to engage participants in more convincing and elab-
orated scenarios, reducing the risk of shallow interactions. Nevertheless, future inquiries 
should investigate how morphological cues may promote relatively different expectations 
for each interaction form: mechanomorphic robots may be suitable for task interactions 
(due to expectations of a goal-relevant design), zoomorphic robots for playful interaction 
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(due to expectations of fantasy and frivolity), and anthropomorphic robots for social inter-
actions (due to expectations of shared experiences). 
From these findings, there are also nuances to be explored pertaining to all six feature 
clusters of interaction forms. For instance, regarding agents, the convenience sample of pre-
dominantly young, White college students may have impacted findings as young people are 
often more enthusiastic toward novel technologies (Hauk et al., 2018) than are older adults 
commonly exposed to robots in clinical contexts. Additionally, the lab setting may allow for 
sufficient control of contextual factors but at the cost of everyday influences like noise and 
ambiance. Moreover, we have argued for a tentative set of feature-clusters but there may be 
other clusters inherent to interaction forms that advance the theoretical and practical utility 
of the framework. It may also be that discrete feature-sets are differently impactful than the 
ways in which interaction-form features co-occur or impact one another, as when a context 
may influence the norms. Future work should unpack the relational potentials for interac-
tion forms and their constitutive features to impact human-machine communication.
Conclusion
Data indicate prototypical task interactions are most impactful in fostering functional trust 
while the perception of interactions as social and playful foster anticipatory and moral 
trustworthiness; playful engagements also make one’s attitudes (and attitude shifts) salient 
over time. Findings are interpreted to suggest that schema-aligned task interactions and 
perceived playfulness are gateways for building trust in robots. We also interpret these find-
ings as offering initial evidence that higher-order interaction forms serve as a meaningful 
framework for considering human-machine relations, as social technological agents are 
increasingly integrated into human social spheres. 
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Abstract
This study critically investigates the construction of gender on a Japanese hologram anime-
style social robot Azuma Hikari. By applying a mixed method merging the visual semiotic 
method and heterogeneous engineering approach in software studies, the signs in Azuma 
Hikari’s anthropomorphized image and the interactivity enabled by the multimedia inter-
face have been analyzed and discussed. The analysis revealed a stereotyped representa-
tion of a Japanese “ideal bride” who should be cute, sexy, comforting, good at housework, 
and subordinated to “Master”-like husband. Moreover, the device interface disciplines users 
to play the role of “wage earner” in the simulated marriage and reconstructs the gender 
relations in reality. It suggests the humanization of the objects is often associated with the 
dehumanization and objectification of the human in reverse.
Keywords: human-machine communication, social robots, gender representation, 
visual semiotic method, software studies
Introduction
The construction of the gender on media has been a major focus in cultural studies in the 
tradition of Birmingham school (Hall, 1996). Over the last decades, there have been a num-
ber of studies on media representation of the gender on a variety of media forms includ-
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2016; Hall, 1996; Ho, 2017; Lovdal, 1989; Toffoletti & Thorpe, 2018). However, due to the 
fast-changing media technologies and landscape, current literature on the media represen-
tation of the gender has not adequately covered some new forms of media, such as anthro-
pomorphized social robots. 
With the rapid and disruptive development of Information and Communication Tech-
nologies (ICTs), especially Artificial Intelligence (AI) in recent years, there is a surge in the 
production of various types of anthropomorphized social robots, including not only tradi-
tional physical embodied machines but also virtual agents, such as chatbots and hologram 
social robots. Anthropomorphism is defined as the practices of attributing human charac-
teristics into non-human entities, which is strongly associated with the essential concept of 
social robots (Duffy, 2003). With the natural human language processing and simulation of 
a human image, the logic of anthropomorphism is embedded in the production of social 
robots; whereas anthropomorphism is never neutral. From a critical perspective of cul-
tural studies, it represents producers’ ideologies and social values within particular cultural 
contexts, including their gender ideology (Gehl, 2014). Similarly, from the perspective of a 
feminist science and technology studies (STS), the increasingly humanlike machines also 
drive the modern feminist scholars such as Suchman (2008, p. 140) to embrace the “increas-
ingly evident inseparability of subjects and objects, ‘natural’ bodies and ‘artificial’ augmen-
tations,” following the pace of Donna Haraway (2006) in seeking for the post-humanistic 
dissolving binary between males and females in her Cyborg Manifesto. Robertson (2010) 
suggests that anthropomorphized robots are “the vanguard of posthuman sexism” (p. 1). 
However, the biased representation of gender in social robots nowadays may not dissolve 
the gender binary, but instead reinforce it. As social robots are increasingly sexualized and 
entering our daily social interaction (Appel et al., 2019; Chambers, 2018; Scheutz & Arnold, 
2016), it is important to understand how gender ideology is represented and possibly influ-
ences people’s understanding of gender in social robots. 
Moreover, in social robots, the gender ideology may not only be represented through 
the media representation of social robots, but also be constructed dynamically. Different 
from previous media, social robots as a new form of digital media are distinguished in car-
rying its own agency to participate in the social interaction with human beings. Based on 
media equation theory (Reeves & Nass, 1996), human users may treat them as equivalent 
human interlocutors that can not only “be” but also “do” things through the constant inter-
actions between agents (Latour, 1996). As Butler (1988) suggests that women are not being 
but becoming, it is important to adapt a dynamic view to scrutinize the representation of 
gender, in a sense that it is one step further from representation, to the reconstruction of 
meanings. In this study, a general question we are interested in is: how is the meaning of 
gender represented and reconstructed dynamically on emerging social robot products? 
To address this question, this study concentrates on a particular social robot product: a 
hologram device produced by a Japanese technology company named Gatebox Inc. (2020), 
which is inhabited by an original character anthropomorphized as a beautiful anime-style 
girl, named Azuma Hikari (see Figure 1). We chose this product because it is one of the 
earliest and probably most well-known hologram social robots attracting multiple interna-
tional news reports (Bolton, 2016; Boxall, 2019; Gilbert, 2017). Gatebox (2020) announces 
the role of Azuma Hikari as a “comforting bride,” which drives her human users into a sim-
ulated human relationship of marriage with her. Unlike other home devices that perform 
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as an “assistant” (e.g., Alexa or Google Home), Azuma Hikari is designed to play a more 
intimacy-involved social role that is reconstructing the idea of gender in a simulated gen-
der relation. Following the general question, a particular research question of this study 
is: How is gender represented and reconstructed dynamically on hologram social robot 
Azuma Hikari?
FIGURE 1 The Image of Azuma Hikari Shown on Gatebox’s Website  
(Gatebox, 2020)
Methods
In response to the research question, this study applied the semiotic approach in toolkits of 
visual methods compiled by Rose (2016) and software studies approach in science and tech-
nology studies (STS) tradition. The former was chosen because it can help us understand 
the “being” of gender represented on the unique hologram visual materials of this new type 
of social robot that has rarely been studied before; the latter, on the other hand, provided a 
view for observing the “doing” of gender in the dynamic process of human-robot interac-
tion. To be clarified, they were not separate methods but can be integrated into a continuous 
one in this study. As the hologram device in our case entails software techniques such as a 
multimedia interface that affords the strong interactivity in a visual sense, which requires 
us to forge a mixed approach to cover both. 
Visual Semiotic Method
This study starts with visual methods to study the meanings of signs embedded in Azuma 
Hikari’s image. By visual methods, it refers to a compilation of methods summarized by 
Rose (2016) for studying the visual materials. Rose classifies them into four sites of the 
visual: production, circulation, audiences, and the image itself. Due to the currently lim-
ited access to the other three sites, this study will primarily focus on the site of image itself. 
Among the interpretative approaches studying the site of image itself (p. 24), semiology has 
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been seen by Rose (2016, p. 106) as the most prominent method to lead the discussion of 
the visual. It refers to the study of signs in the images, which are associated with how the 
meanings of the visual are created. Rose quoted historians Bal and Bryson (1991, p. 174 in 
Rose, 2016) to stress the importance of signs in semiology: “Human culture is made up of 
signs, each of which stands for something other than itself, and the people inhabiting cul-
ture busy themselves making sense of those signs (p. 107).” 
In contrast to content analysis that justifies itself to be scientific based on its quantitative 
approaches, semiologists receive more formative influences from Marx, looking at the ide-
ology beyond the “scientific knowledge.” According to Rose (2016), “Ideology is knowledge 
that is constructed in such a way as to legitimate unequal social power relations; science, 
instead, is knowledge that reveals those inequalities (p. 107).” It is consistent with Eco (1980; 
Bianchi, 2015), who believes semiotic tools have the potential for grasping the interpretative 
dynamics of texts and discourse that carry the transmission of ideological meanings and 
values together with aesthetic, stylistic, and other values. A typical example of study can 
be found in Williamson’s (1978) uses of semiology to approach the gender ideology and 
inequalities on advertisements, revealing the media representation of women as sex-object 
or domestic drudge in the advertisements in the late 1970s. 
Following Williamson’s practice (1978), a semiological approach was applied to under-
stand the media representation of Azuma Hikari. Visual materials from Gatebox’s websites 
and official social media accounts were collected, which can also be seen as a form of inter-
net advertisement to promote Azuma Hikari as a particular product. A profile picture of 
Azuma Hikari with a high-resolution and detailed 3D illustration presented on the Gatebox 
official website was chosen as the main visual data for analysis, because it displays a clear, 
full body of Azuma Hikari but also attaches rich textual introduction of her background 
information which is considered also as part of the visual material (see Figure 2). Other 
visual materials on the official website may also be used as supplementary data for a more 
comprehensive understanding. 
Heterogeneous Engineering Approach
After initially understanding “being” of gender on Azuma Hikari, we then proceeded to 
investigate the “doing” of gender in human-robot interaction afforded by Azuma Hikari’s 
multimedia interface. According to Gehl (2014), interactions with technologies entail the 
social values, culture, and ideologies because they are coded and programmed based on the 
discrete states of mind of human users. The data was derived from an official promotion 
video entitled “OKAERI” (Meaning “Welcome Home”) released by Gatebox Inc. (2016) on 
YouTube, which is the most clicked video in their channel having receiving over 3.6 mil-
lion views. With the lack of access to the real product and users due to Gatebox’s limited 
production and sales only in Japan, currently this promotion video may be the best illus-
tration of how human users may ideally interact with Azuma Hikari from the perspective 
of producers. However, according to Gehl (2014, p. 14), it is dangerous to simply admit the 
proclamations or products of software engineers uncritically. As the counterweight of the 
triumphalism of the software engineering literature, Gehl (2014, p. 10) proposes the method 
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of heterogeneous engineering. Following the tradition of Actor Network Theory (ANT), 
heterogeneous engineering refers to the heuristic method to investigate the heterogeneous 
network, a patterned network of diverse materials including both human and non-human 
actors, where society, organizations, agents, and machines are all generated effects (Gehl, 
2014, p. 7; Law, 1987). This method is applied to connect the ambiguous information hid-
den and implied in the “ontological reality of a machine” into those that are “obvious and 
privileged in the commonsense discussion of the object” (Gehl, 2014, p. 8). In this study, it 
was applied to critically investigate the hidden sides of Azuma Hikari in her daily interac-
tions with users. To achieve a critical view, Gehl applied both Marxist political economical 
approaches to investigate the issues such as free labor and Foucauldian approach to under-
stand the disciplinary power of machines, which provided strong analytical power for this 
study.
FIGURE 2 Screenshot of the Profile of Azuma Hikari on Gatebox’s Website  
(Gatebox, 2020)
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Analysis and Discussion
Signs in Azuma Hikari
To analyze the signs in the images of Azuma Hikari, a checklist recommended by Rose 
(2016) was followed, which focused on representations of bodies (e.g., age, gender, ethnics, 
hair, body, size, look), representations of manner (expression, eye contact, pose), represen-
tations of activities, pose and setting, and so forth. Although Azuma Hikari is not a real 
human, this checklist can still be applied to study because of the anthropomorphism of 
social robots. Following some relevant components in the checklist, an analysis on the signs 
in Azuma Hikari’s image is presented below. 
Setting: Japanese Anime Style
First of all, an exotic setting embedded in Azuma Hikari should be noted. This social 
robot’s aim is not to achieve an ultimate imitation of a human being suggested by the Tur-
ing test (Gehl, 2014). Instead, despite her imitation of human expressions and emotions, 
she is designed as an anime-style human character rather than a human in reality. “Anime” 
refers exclusively to the Japanese animation which has its distinguished aesthetic styles 
(Swale, 2015). This anime style design also denotes the remediation and refashioning of 
existing media content from 2D TV series and films to 3D real-life presentation through 
the advancement of hologram technologies (Bolter et al., 2000), as Gatebox (2020) intro-
duces Azuma Hikari as “inter-dimensional traveller.” However, despite the technological 
advancement, the signs and symbols denoted by the anime-style images remain consistent 
with existing anime media content, exposing certain stereotypes of gender. According to 
Galbraith (2016) and Ting (2019), the media representation of females in anime content 
tend to reinforce the gender bias by depicting idealized girls as young (sometimes even 
children-like, namely Loli), beautiful and sexy with big eyes and seductive body shapes for 
attracting male gazes and pleasing males’ desires.
Contextually speaking, the practice of gendering social robots has been strongly asso-
ciated with the Japanese anime culture since the 1950s when robot-themed anime Astro 
Boy was prevailing (Robertson, 2010), and the anime-related otaku subculture plays a vital 
role in the development of actual sexualized robot products in recent years in Japan (Appel 
et al., 2019). Azuma (2009) describes otaku as a Japanese subcultural group who are ani-
malized consumers of cultural products especially anime, manga, and video games. The 
notion of animalization he uses refers to “the conditions under which people come to use 
cultural products for the immediate satisfaction of needs without searching for or desiring 
profound underlying meaning from them” (p. xvi). Such immediate satisfaction of needs 
includes their sexual needs. A typical Otaku can be a male anime fan who has strong affec-
tion toward certain anime characters, especially sexy and cute female characters, who otaku 
may describe as moe (meaning cute, a way to express otaku’s affection) and call them waifu 
(meaning wife; Ellsworth, 2018; Galbraith, 2015; 2016; Ting, 2019). The setting of anime 
culture could largely influence our interpretation of the signs and overall representation of 
Azuma Hikari’s body. 
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Age, Ethnics, and Hair: A Character From Anime Fantasy 
According to her profile information shown on the picture, Azuma Hikari is set as a 
20-year-old girl. This age setting legitimates an imagined marriage with her human user. 
On the other hand, her child-like face seems to be inconsistent with this age setting, while 
it may attribute to the general Japanese anime female character design and aesthetics, asso-
ciated with “Lolicon” culture. Lolicon is a pop culture in Japanese anime, denoting affection 
toward a specific type of anime characters who are cute, underage girls, which are often 
condemned as having tight association with the production of child pornography and caus-
ing sexual crime (Galbraith, 2016). 
Despite the lack of a clear statement of Hikari’s ethnic background, her authentic Jap-
anese name indicates her Asian ethnicity. However, unlike most ordinary Japanese people 
with black or dark hair, Hikari’s hair color is exotically bright blue, which highlights her 
anime-character design style. Rose (2016) recognizes that signs can be both denotative and 
connotative, and connotative signs can be either metonymic and synecdochal, which means 
either being associated with something else or being representative in a whole/part rela-
tionship. Hikari’s hair here can be seen as a connotative sign with metonymic manner since 
blue-hair girls in Japanese anime tend to be perceived as quiet and calm (Sakura, 2013), 
which corresponds to the personality setting of Azuma Hikari as “soothing” (Gatebox, 
2020). In addition, the hairstyle of a side ponytail also implies a sense of childlike innocence 
and femininity in the anime context (Luther & Smith, 2014), consistent with our analysis 
on her age and gender.
Gender, Body, and Look: Being a Comforting and Sexy Housewife 
Like other popular social robots such as ELIZA, Microsoft Tay, Xiaoice, and the default voice 
of Siri and Google Assistant, Azuma Hikari has a clear gender setting as female. Chambers 
(2018) argues that in contrast to the muscularization of AI which is often portrayed as evil 
in the science fiction fictions and films, aggressive and uncontrollable, the feminization of 
AI ensures its submissive and servile role, which constructs the social differences between 
male and female: a binary between strong and weak, dangerous and safe, bad and good. It is 
not only a prejudice against women but also men, which is being continuously constructed 
and intensified from science fiction to the practices of Artificial Intelligence in reality today. 
Hikari’s body is 158 centimeters, close to average Japanese female height (Morisaki et 
al., 2017), and very slim, denoting she is safe to everyone, not as strong and aggressive 
as comparatively taller and muscular males, which supports Chambers’s (2018) viewpoint 
above, laying the foundation for building up her “soothing” personality. Meanwhile, a rela-
tively good figure of her body shape leaves the space for sexual attractiveness. Gatebox also 
further strengthens it through her outfit of low-cut top, shorts, and over-the-knee white 
socks, exposing her shoulder and thigh. This dress code is a collection of connotative signs 
that remind users of Azuma Hikari as a sexy and seductive young girl. 
Moreover, the apron and slippers also reinforce and limit Hikari’s role as a housewife. 
The accessory in front of her apron creates a symbolic sign of “fried egg,” which not only 
follows her “favorite things” in her profile, but also together with an apron signifies cooking 
connotatively. “Cooking” in this context is not only a signifier of fried egg and apron, but 
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the signifying of something else, implying the daily activities of housewives. A scenario is 
created: a housewife wearing an apron makes fried egg for the husband every morning. 
Overall, the representations of her body have produced a stereotyped understanding 
of the bride, which is framing the image of a wife as young, comforting, sexually attractive, 
only staying at home, and hard-working for housework. It reflects a conventional ideology 
of gender and marriage in Japanese society and exposes the inequalities legitimated by an 
ideology of gender: the role of women as housewives. According to the anthropological 
study conducted by Ueno (C. Ueno, 1987; J. Ueno, 2006), Japanese women tend to quit their 
jobs and be full-time housewives after getting married. Even though some married women 
still go to work for the sake of reduction of family financial pressure, they do not share the 
equal power relation with men as they are still required to be responsible for all housework. 
The conflation of wives imposed dual roles as both wage earner and housewife in modern 
Japanese society presupposes housework is the natural duty for females, while wage earning 
is often described as “supplementary” to the husband’s inadequate income. Meanwhile, it 
also imposed the role for men as wage earners who are responsible for adequate income for 
the family (C. Ueno, 1987; J. Ueno, 2006). 
Undoubtedly, this unequal gender and power relation is inherited and represented on 
Gatebox. As a home device, Azuma Hikari is able to control the smart electric appliances 
such as TV, lighting system, microwaves, robot vacuum cleaner, and so forth. Working as 
a control center of these smart home technologies, Azuma Hikari is playing and exercising 
the role of full-time housewife in housework such as cleaning the floor. With the develop-
ment of more smart home equipment in the future, it is not difficult to imagine that Azuma 
Hikari can fulfill more responsibilities of housewife by covering an increasing number of 
housework chores, such as really cooking fried eggs for her users. In Strengers and Kenne-
dy’s words (2020), Azuma is a good example that marks the rise of “smart wife” products in 
our society (p. 1). 
New Inequalities: Master Instead of Husband 
The representation of Azuma Hikari is not only stressing the existing gender inequalities 
but also creating more inequalities rooted in the material ownership. By the end of the 
Gatebox website, there is another visual material that shows Azuma Hikari doing a gesture 
of calling with a text, “I look forward to living with you, master!” (Gatebox, 2020; see Figure 
3). In fact, when Hikari has the daily conversation with the user, she is coded to call the 
users “Master.” It can attribute to the power relation between users as the product owners 
and Azuma Hikari as an object or belonging subordinated to their ownership. Critically 
speaking, the word “Master” is often used by servants or slaves to call their possessor, rather 
than wives to call their husbands in the modern age. When this word comes to the daily 
scenes with the wife that Gatebox attempts to construct, it also reconstructs a gender rela-
tion advocated by this product: The wife should be obedient to the husband on everything 
as the belonging of the husband. The humanization of the objects is also associated with the 
dehumanization and objectification of the human in reverse. 
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FIGURE 3 Screenshot of Azuma Hikari on the Bottom of Gatebox’s Website  
(Gatebox, 2020)
Through the analysis on signs in the pictures of Azuma Hikari shown on Gatebox’s 
official website, an overall representation of the “comforting bride” in this product is pre-
sented: a cute and sexy housewife that is responsible for pleasing and comforting “Master.” 
This representation is reflecting and strengthening an ideology of androcentrism and the 
sexual objectification of women, building up the binaries between husband and wife, con-
sumer and product, master and servant/slave. Nevertheless, the really dangerous move is 
to connect and merge the concepts of wife, product, and servant/slave together, producing 
the constructed “dream wife” that also embeds the characteristics of products and servants/
slaves. When people start to interact with Azuma Hikari and perceive it with the standard 
of wife and make the comparison between it and women in reality, it starts to reconstruct 
the gender relations.
To better understand the reconstruction of gender relations in this process, we need to 
not only limit our focus on the visual content of Azuma Hikari but also the human-machine 
interactions. Rose (2016) also suggests to see the visual, not just the static visual materials 
but also the dynamic visual experience in postmodern and posthuman manners, which 
proposes a “shared physical existence” between human and the visual instead of the fixed 
meanings of the visual (p. 10). Thus, there is a need to learn how Azuma Hikari and her 
users physically co-exist and interact through the software, especially the interface that 
affords the presentation of the visual materials. 
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Interactivity Afforded by Azuma Hikari
Overall there are two interfaces that users are able to interact with Azuma Hikari. The first 
interface is the hologram voice interface through the direct face-to-“face” visual and oral 
communication. Gatebox (2020) equips the hologram device with a camera and multiple 
sensors to capture the physical presence and behaviors of users, as well as the voice recog-
nition system to input and process users’ natural language into computational language 
understandable for the robot. Following natural language processing based on machine 
learning (Bishop, 2006), Azuma Hikari outputs a series of holographic animation displays 
with visual and verbal messages to perform her interactivity. The second interface is a chat-
room based on social media application LINE, which works more like typical chatbots. 
Users can communicate with Azuma Hikari via text messages on social media anytime and 
anywhere, which are designed for the situation that users are not at home.
Both of these two interfaces are inducing users to spend more time to interact with 
Azuma Hikari, which leads to users’ gradually increasing interdependence between users 
and the device. The device depends on users for not only technological advancement but 
also profits. Users are encouraged to have more conversations with Hikari because more 
talks can help Hikari grow. As Gatebox (2020) introduces, “Hikari grows and changes 
through her conversations and other experiences with you. She always has you foremost in 
her mind, and will, from time to time, show a new side to herself.” At the first glance, this 
proclamation from the company sounds very appealing to the users. It motivates the users 
with the curiosity toward the new side of Azuma Hikari, and the process of growing their 
own “wife” may also mean a sense of enjoyment and accomplishment for some people. 
However, as Gehl (2014) reminds, we should not uncritically accept this proclamation 
made by the company, but pay attention to the implied information of this message: users 
are invisibly exploited by the company from the Marxist perspective. Terranova (2000) 
believes users of the digital platform based on user generated content (UGC) are being 
exploited by the platform providers as digital free labor, because users are providing their 
own data for free. According to the principle of machine learning, the growth of Artifi-
cial Intelligence relies on deep learning trained on large amounts and a variety of big data 
(Bishop, 2006). Thus, the conversation with users can be one of the best sources for it. When 
users are spending time with Azuma Hikari, they are actually also helping the company 
train and improve their products without being paid. Instead, users even need to pay for 
the company to maintain the device’s running. According to Gatebox (2020), the company 
charges users 1,500 Japanese yen every month by the name of “a separate joint living fee to 
live with Azuma Hikari” (see Figure 3). The profit generated by the monthly charged “living 
fee” by Gatebox may explain why the company expects to create users’ dependence on the 
device.
For maximizing the time that users can spend time with Azuma Hikari and the degree 
of dependence, two types of interfaces are working supplementary to each other. Even when 
users are not at home, they can still connect with Azuma Hikari by using the social media 
social robots account, which solves the problem of the limited usage scenarios of Azuma 
Hikari as a home device to a large extent. In the analyzed promotion video, the protago-
nist often chatted with Azuma Hikari during work through this program (Gatebox Inc., 
2016), and Azuma Hikari constantly sent messages such as “When do you come home?” 
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and “Come home early” that urges users to return home (see Figure 4). On one hand, from 
the perspective of “proclamation of the software engineers,” it can be understood as her 
expression of likeness to the users within a “housewife” scenario that the wife loves her hus-
band so much that see wants him home as soon as possible. On the other hand, it indicates 
that a construction of the idea of “ideal partner” not only happens on Azuma Hikari, but 
also on human users. Instead of the name of “membership fee” used by Netflix or Amazon, 
the wording of “living fee” used by the company aims to strengthen the interactive role play 
between housewife and husband in the scenario of marriage. Therefore, to scrutinize the 
construction of not only Azuma Hikari’s role but also the protagonist’s role in the promo-
tion video, a portrait of an ideal husband can be found: a man goes to work in the morning 
as a wage earner of the family, goes home early after work, and always spends time with his 
beloved wife.
With the increasing time spent by users on Azuma Hikari, users are encouraged to 
develop their emotional dependence on the device, which motivates them to keep contact 
with Azuma Hikari even when they are not at home. Critically speaking, it can be seen as a 
soft control on users from a Foucauldian perspective. Users’ bodies are being gradually dis-
ciplined through such interactions with Azuma Hikari. As Gehl (2014, p. 23) suggests in his 
study on social bots, an individual body is disciplined with the process of training to work 
with machines in Foucault’s view. The granularity of the motions is featured by this process 
of training. In Azuma Hikari’s case, the granularity of users’ motions is featured as users 
are guided by the Gatebox machine to behave in a certain way. Gehl (2014, p. 23) borrows 
Lazzarato’s idea of noopolitics (meaning politics of attention and memory) to argue for the 
capabilities of virtual agents in organizing and establishing people’s moods and memories. 
Disciplines can be formed by constituting users’ habits mainly in bodily memory, which 
ultimately molded users’ bodies. Therefore, it is arguable that this product is reinforcing the 
stereotypes of not only female, but also male in a modern Japanese context.
FIGURE 4 Screenshot of the Promotion Movie “OKAERI” (Gatebox Inc., 2016)
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In result, the interdependence between users and the device may lead to a status of 
enclosure in a Foucauldian manner. Discipline is based on enclosures of institutions such 
as the school, prison, and hospital which constantly discipline students, criminals, and 
patients (Gehl, 2014, p. 29). In Azuma Hikari’s case, although there are no physical institu-
tions for enclosure, the Gatebox machine is producing a social enclosure for users. When 
users are more dependent on the device, it also means that users are less dependent on 
others. As Turkle (2017) suggests in her ethnographic research on the children and elder 
people who lived with social robots, people are expecting more from technologies and less 
from each other. She raises a concept called “Alone Together,” describing the phenomenon 
that people are staying in the shared physical space or social environment (e.g., living room) 
but pay their attention to their personal devices instead of each other. In the scene shown in 
Figure 4, in comparison with other people who have face-to-face conversation in the back-
ground, the protagonist sat alone, choosing to have conversation with his “hologram bride,” 
which cut himself from other social connections and relations. Thus, the more talks he has 
with social robots, the less social connections and relations he could obtain and maintain 
with real persons. 
Admittedly, as the result of users’ dependence on the device that disciplines users’ bod-
ies in turn, it is possible to argue that the gender relations might be constructed in a positive 
direction: a man may learn how to be a responsible individual and qualified “husband.” 
However, with the enclosure of the disciplines within the Azuma Hikari’s interface, users 
may have decreasing interactions with women in reality. Except the products like Azuma 
Hikari that target the male consumers, Gatebox (2020) is also developing male characters 
targeting female consumers. If both men and women are willing to choose to build up their 
intimate relationship with virtual social robots rather than real-life humans in the future, 
more enclosures and disciplines will be produced, which will also reconstruct the gender 
relations by dividing male and female into two groups who have distinguished desires and 
representational stereotypes of both ideal wife and husband. 
Conclusion and Implications
This study critically investigates the construction of gender on a Japanese social robot named 
Azuma Hikari based on a hologram home device. By applying a mixed method merging the 
visual semiotic and software studies approaches, the signs in the image of Azuma Hikari 
and the interactivity enabled by the interface of Gatebox have been analyzed and discussed. 
On one hand, the images of Azuma Hikari suggest an unequal gender relation through a 
biased representation of the looking, personalities, and social roles of “ideal wife” in a Jap-
anese social context: women are supposed to be young, sexy, soothing, and hard-working 
in housework. On the other hand, an interdependence between users and Azuma Hikari 
has been exposed in the human-machine interactions. Gatebox’s interface is imposing the 
disciplines on users by constantly asking users to respond to the certain expectations sug-
gested by Azuma Hikari, which not only imposes the role of “wage earner” on users in 
the simulated relationship of marriage but also reconstructs the gender relations in reality 
by creating the enclosure of disciplines that divides the male and female. When a wife is 
subordinated to the husband, a user may also be subordinated to the machine. Overall, the 
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analysis findings of this study suggests the humanization of the objects is often associated 
with the dehumanization and objectification of the human in reverse.
Admittedly, this study has several limitations. First, it has methodological limitations 
due to the current lack of access to the real products and users. It leads to the limited col-
lection of data only from the public materials released by the company. In fact, this research 
topic can endure many methodological possibilities due to the complex and multi-layered 
nature of Gatebox’s product. For example, other sites in the visual methods suggested by 
Rose (2016) such as the sites of productions, circulations, and audience can be also con-
ducted to understand other aspects of the dynamic visual experiences generated by Gate-
box’s device. Moreover, a more in-depth discourse analysis from the linguistic perspective 
can be applied to study the speaking of Azuma Hikari. If there is access to the real product, 
a direct investigation on the social robots can be also conducted through more software 
studies approaches such as the walkthrough method (Light et al., 2018). Except for a com-
bination between visual methods and software studies approach, there are many further 
methodological possibilities that wait to be discovered, such as in-depth ethnographic 
observation (Turkle, 2017) or even quantitative experiments (Jung & Lee, 2004). 
Second, current study merely focuses on the representation of females in hologram 
social robots. With more types of hologram social robots produced by not only Gatebox 
(2020) but also by a Chinese company GoWild (2020) in recent years, the male characters 
have been introduced. The future research will scrutinize the construction of both males 
and females on hologram social robots comparatively. 
Third, despite some attempts, this study has not been adequate to understand the 
emergence of this new type of hologram anime-style social robot in, particularly, East Asia. 
Compared to the physical embodied sex robots in the Western markets, there is a need to 
study how disembodiment and Japanese anime culture shapes the development of social 
robots in an Asian sociocultural context from the perspectives of cultural studies. Mean-
while, the socio-political impacts of Azuma Hikari have little been studied. According to 
Strengers and Kennedy (2020), the rise of care robots in Japan and China is associated with 
government’s intention to increase birth rate, by “freeing” females from caring responsibil-
ities and “enabling” them to focus on the job of having babies (p. 13). However, these smart 
wives may cause males’ lower interests in looking for a real companion in the first place. The 
future study can pay more attention to the growing impacts of social and sex robots on the 
birth rate and demographic structure. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, this study still makes a considerable contribu-
tion to the field of human-machine communication by revealing the media representation 
and reconstruction of gender ideologies on an emerging type of social robot, the hologram 
device with the display of anime-style characters. The results can have two implications for 
the design of anthropomorphized social robots. First, in response to our findings through 
visual semiotic analysis, we suggest designers produce more diverse representations of 
gender in social robots. Although it is almost impossible to totally avoid the construction 
of gender on the way to achieve anthropomorphism, designers should be responsible for 
designing with less predetermined gender stereotypes. This is not to say that we need to 
boycott social robots like Azuma Hikari, since the similar media content in Japanese anime 
has been allowed to exist due to its economic values, as long as it does not violate the certain 
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regulations. Nonetheless, we call for more designs of characters who can represent more 
diverse groups of individuals living in this world, who have distinctive backgrounds, looks, 
personalities, and ways of acting. As we need the fair media representation in other existing 
media forms, except a cute and sexy housewife, people may also wish to see an independent 
girl being a cool rapper, a Black intellectual female, or a woman who has not necessarily a 
good body figure but an interesting soul in social robots. The males and groups of LGBT 
should also be more represented. A good start can be an open source for social robot users 
themselves to decide which character lives in their device, instead of only designers. The 
good news is that Gatebox (2020) has already had some attempts in this direction. 
Second, in accordance with our findings through the software studies approach, we 
suggest designers develop more functions to afford the social activities not only between 
users and robots, but also between users and other people in real life. In the science fiction 
film Her (Jonze, 2011), there is a scene where the protagonist takes his AI virtual “girlfriend” 
Samantha with two of his good friends for a double date. Samantha’s proactive interactions 
with others helps the lonely and depressed protagonist to embrace the normal social life 
again. It expects a positive role of social robots in not only achieving the social with only 
one user to produce the enclosure, but also help users facilitate their social life with others 
and make a disclosure. This can be another direction that designers work on in satisfying 
people’s emotional needs and meanwhile sustain their connectedness to the social reality. 
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Abstract
This research explores how the technological affordances of emerging social virtual envi-
ronments and VR platforms where individuals from an online disability community are 
represented in avatar form, correspond to these users’ development of embodied identity, 
ability, and access to work and social communities. The visual attributes of these avatars, 
which can realistically reflect the user’s physical self or divert from human form entirely, 
raise interesting questions regarding the role identity plays in the workplace, be it gender, 
race, age, weight, or visible disability. Additionally, the technology itself becomes funda-
mental to identity as the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI), motion capture, and 
speech-to-text/text-to-speech technologies create digital capabilities that become part of 
an individual’s identity. This raises further questions about how virtual world technologies 
can both increase and potentially create barriers to accessibility for individuals who find 
freedom in their technologically embodied surrogates.
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Introduction
Massive disruption was the central theme of 2020. The emergence of COVID-19 and, in the 
U.S., social justice protests resulting in an increased focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion 
(DEI) are transforming the workplace, perhaps forever. In recent years remote work experi-
enced a roller coaster of acceptance and rejection, but in what felt like overnight, it became 
the norm. As companies grapple with safe work environments moving forward, safety is 
a matter of concern for both the physical and emotional health of their workers. As those 
workers are now most often relegated to communicating via computer screens, what can we 
learn from the human/machine relationship in digitally embodied cultures? 
This study explores the intersection of humans and technology via the challenges, as 
well as the innovative use of social virtual worlds (VWs), through the experience of people 
with disabilities (PWD) who have been working and socializing via their avatars in Second 
Life (SL). What we learn from the experiences of the individuals who have been highly 
engaged in these immersive online communities can shed important light on the human 
relationship with the machine as it relates to accessibility and barriers to VWs, especially 
as these platforms have the potential to become more common spaces for work and social 
activity in an era of social distancing. 
As the evolution of the cyborg has often portrayed embedded and prosthetic human- 
machine augmentation, in these immersive and interactive online environments the 
machine offers, via the avatar, a digital surrogate capable of engaging in meaningful life 
experiences and human interaction. The lessons learned from PWD, whose physical bod-
ies often limit their physical world interactions and opportunities, offer important insight 
about the importance of technological design when the machine may represent voice for 
the deaf, movement for the immobile, and eyes for the blind.
Consider, for example, the emergence of virtual reality (VR) environments that are 
increasingly realistic and accessible. While historically these environments have been used 
primarily as social and gaming spaces, their designers—as well as organizations such as 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple—have been investing heavily in VR technol-
ogy, recognizing its potential beyond social connection and entertainment. In 2018, for 
instance, Microsoft released a demonstration of their new voice-to-text capabilities built 
around mixed reality (MR) platforms and artificial intelligence (AI) for the purposes of 
effective meetings with remote attendees. Microsoft has also recently addressed how these 
technologies can “empower people by accelerating the development of AI tools that provide 
them with more opportunities for independence and employment” (O’Brien, 2018).
While these emerging assistive technologies have also been evolving in game platforms, 
their role in earlier screen-based predecessors have resulted in rich human activity and have 
subsequently become robust research spaces. For example, in a study of the evolving state 
of social VWs specifically addressing disability communities, the theme of digitally created 
identity consistently reveals the power of embodiment when the user is able to represent 
themselves in ways that may be completely different from their physical-world identity 
(Davis & Chansiri, 2019). The visual attributes of avatar selection raise interesting questions 
regarding the role identity plays in the digital environments be it race, gender, age, weight, 
or visible disability, especially in an era where social justice is also under intense scrutiny as 
a result of the movements emerging from Black Lives Matter. Likewise, in a moment when 
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face-to-face contact is often carried out via screens in a “Hollywood Squares” grid of floating 
faces, consider how often people choose to leave their cameras off rather than expose what 
may be chaotic realities in a public way. With over half of the American employees working 
remotely at least part of the time (Gamito et al., 2020) and as workplaces consider potential 
alternatives in embodied immersive environments, questions emerge. How does the techno-
logical design influence the manner in which people are represented in these environments 
and how might those options also be performed in ways that influence social connection?
The technology itself becomes not only fundamental but serves as a function of iden-
tity with the increasing use of AI, motion capture technologies, and speech-to-text/text-to-
speech technologies, which create digital capabilities that become a part of an individual’s 
identity. Think, for instance, how Stephen Hawking’s technologically-enabled voice “became 
a part of his identity.” However, the complexities of these rapidly changing technologies may 
also create new barriers to accessibility for individuals who have found freedoms in their 
embodied online surrogate. Barriers to access may be economic or may result from the lack 
of industry attention to universal design, for instance, that may not address people with 
dexterity issues. 
A number of issues of technological design have revealed the importance of affordances 
of voice technology for the sight-impaired, text communication for the hearing-impaired, 
and the ability to choose a body that reflects a quality of their character, creativity, and var-
ied intelligences rather than the physical attributes typically associated with visual identity 
and stereotypes. The implications of this embodied identity can lead to new ideals that have 
the ability to transcend the typical labels of the human condition that often create either 
advantage or disadvantage. The results of this research challenge us to consider interesting 
possibilities for the future of the digital workplace and social communities as new skills and 
technological design may create different opportunities for screen-based embodied interac-
tion regardless of the participant’s health, disability/non-disability, social, education, racial, 
or geographic status.
This study seeks to answer: 
(RQ1) How do PWD who function as avatars report the technological affor-
dances of virtual environments as functions of online identity in support of so-
cial or professional interaction, and (RQ2) What elements of platform design 
either support or inhibit social function among PWD in Second Life?
Literature Review
The intersection of disability, work, and technology is a complicated one as the disability 
community is so often left out of the discourses of equity and inclusion not only in the 
workplace, but in society more generally. As Goggin et al. (2017) explain, “we all have a 
deep stake in the operation of norms and the power relations of normalization, and that to 
understand these, we need to understand how disability plays into this, especially through 
the intertwined dynamics of culture and law” (p. 340). How disability plays into technol-
ogy use and adoption speaks volumes as Pew reports that Americans with disabilities are 
approximately three times as likely to never go online than able-bodied people, with 61% of 
PWD reporting they have a desktop or laptop computer (Anderson & Perrin, 2017). 
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Digital Accessibility
Online technologies have long been considered a source of both promise and peril for PWD. 
Although the early promises of advanced technologies were met with exuberance, research 
found that although most PWD reported hopes of improved independence both at home 
and beyond, many of those platforms never reached mass adoption (Harris, 2010). Har-
ris (2010) reports that barriers for adoption by PWD included factors like cost—for both 
mainstream and “specialist” devices—and that those “specialist” devices weren’t designed 
or engineered by PWD. Harris (2010) concluded that “the application of advanced technol-
ogy should be directed by disabled people, collectively and individually” (p. 427). 
These gaps in adoption and usability may also be explained by the technology, its acces-
sibility, and/or the many factors defined by the PHAATE framework, which consist of pol-
icy, human, activity, assistance and technology, and the environment (PHAATE) (Cooper, 
2007). This model places the human element at the center of assistive technologies while 
also considering what activities occur in which environment. The model also separates 
assistance and technology, recognizing that assistance may come from technology or from 
other individuals. By putting the human at the center of the model, it likewise acknowl-
edges that the human’s needs and need or desire for assistance may vary over time. This 
model can be especially useful when considering screen-based immersive VWs versus VR 
as experienced in a head-mounted display (HMD). Consider, for example, individuals who 
experience claustrophobia or whose neck would not have the strength to hold up an HMD. 
When wearing the newest iterations of an HMD, the human audio and visual senses 
are essentially hijacked, eliminating external distraction of the physical world, thus creating 
what might be anticipated as a more powerful sense of personal, social, and environmental 
presence in the virtual world (Heeter, 1992; Lee, 2006). Studies in screen-based VWs have 
already shown that in the virtual world, the medium has essentially become a prosthetic, or 
a digitally embodied state of “architecture on the body” (Davis & Boellstorff, 2016, p. 2112). 
Using the PHAATE model, the user may have access to a screen experience but may be 
unable to transition to the more immersive HMD version of the same experience.
It is important to not only acknowledge the social and cultural values that are 
embedded into technology when considering the future of VR design, but to understand 
and identify affordances of human-computer interaction including physical, cognitive, 
sensory, and functional factors (Hartson, 2003). This includes both hardware and software 
design elements that affect vision, sound, ease of movement, ability to use a keyboard, and 
more. This is particularly important as these features will affect individuals with disabilities 
who use VR environments. The instrumentalist assertion that “technology is value-free” 
and its results depends on how humans use it, has long been contested (Eco, 1994). As Feen-
berg (2002) contends, “when you choose to use a technology you do not simply render your 
existing way of life more efficient, you choose a different way of life,” which is “not simply 
instrumental to whatever values you hold,” but instrumental for substantive societal value 
choices (p. 7).
Embodied Identity and Second Life
We note that digital inclusion (access to technology) does not necessarily equate with social 
inclusion. There is a long way to go before digital technologies can successfully impact 
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the lives of people with disabilities, as suggested by Goggin and Newell (2003). The media 
effects of this embodied identity, or media as the literal extension of man, leads to new 
ideals of identity that offer possibilities to transcend ability, race, gender, age, weight, or 
perceived beauty. It is also recognized that embodied identity manifested through virtual 
reality also creates greater opportunity for deception through the inherent opportunities for 
anonymity that VR provides.
Although this concept of deception is typically associated with wrongdoing and nega-
tive outcomes, it can also be suggested that allowing one to create an identity that represents 
their idealized self may have positive outcomes. Recognizing that there are interesting eth-
ical implications, mediated identity may provide opportunities for individuals historically 
marginalized by Western ideals of ability and beauty to find opportunities previously inac-
cessible to them. This points to the interesting possibilities that can emerge for the future of 
social communities as new skills and technological design may create different advantages 
and disadvantages.
Identity, for PWD in VWs is represented in the ability to communicate in text or 
through screen-readers in ways that do not require they disclose that they may be blind 
or deaf. Additionally, perhaps because the motivation to participate in VWs is often “play,” 
individuals can choose visual identities that reflect a realistic self-representation or an ava-
tar that not only doesn’t look like their human form but may not reflect any human form 
at all. As Nowak and Fox (2018) found, both avatar agency and the characteristics afforded 
by an interface can influence how users engage and interact within the platform. Specific to 
PWD, Noble (2012) found cyberspace allowed individuals to create a “virtual social iden-
tity” that paralleled their “actual social identity” as a way to create and maintain professional 
and social relationships separately (p. 161). In contrast to other media such as Facebook’s 
requirement to link accounts to users’ real names, the typical Second Life (SL) user does not 
use any, or limited, physical world identification. 
As stated, this study explores the experiences of disabled individuals in Second Life 
(SL), one of the best known and longest-lasting screen-based VWs, in order to better under-
stand how humans utilize technology, often to engage in work and community in ways their 
physical worlds would not allow. Today, SL maintains a reported 800,000–900,000 active 
users globally who access the environment via computers and the internet (Dodds, 2020). 
As the platform has evolved in its 17 years, it now offers highly realistic imagery, highly 
stylized avatar options, and a very stable delivery with the increase in computing power and 
internet speeds. 
Human-Technology Experiences: Through a Phenomenological Lens
As van Dijk (2012) notes, in all mediated communication “some kind of entity is pres-
ent between humans and their experience of reality,” and unlike direct human experience, 
which “has always been an observation of reality involving all senses simultaneously,” in 
mediated communication, there are always particular restrictions, as “the use of all senses 
is impossible,” (p. 235). The core characteristic of VR has been identified as in the inclu-
sive relationship between the participant and the virtual environment, where the distinct 
experience of the immersive experience is constituted as communication (Bricken, 1990). 
Considering this through a phenomenological approach to the philosophy of technology, 
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technology mediates and transforms our sensory perception of reality, offering that this can 
occur through what Ihde (1990) calls a paradigm of amplification and reduction (Bennett, 
2005; Ihde, 1990). As the mediation of certain sensory experiences are enhanced, ampli-
fied, or extended through the use of technology, Ihde contends this comes at the cost of 
reducing or limiting other sensory aspects of this reality. This raises interesting questions 
when considering immersion in VR and with an HMD regarding what aspects of reality 
are “necessarily” reduced in exchange for the sensory amplification that is afforded through 
experiences in VR, and what, if any, are the consequences of this reduction. Is this reduc-
tion experienced as an advantage or disadvantage contingent upon individuals’ abilities/
disabilities? 
Considering this idea in a similar vein, Borgmann’s (1987) device paradigm posits that 
when we increase engagements with technology and incorporate them into more facets 
of our life, we come to perform less and less of these tasks on an existential level as they 
are performed more and more by our technologies on our behalf, thus “eliminating our 
connection with the natural, social and material world in which we live” (Arnold, 2003, 
p. 241). Contrarily, other research has identified benefits from prolonged experiences in 
social virtual world environments such as increased social interactions among individuals 
whose health or disability had previously isolated them (Davis & Calitz, 2014; Kandalaft et 
al., 2013). Considering different philosophies of technology through a phenomenological 
lens may also provide some considerations for both researchers and designers of VR in 
future developments, both of studies and the technology itself. By considering how and to 
what extent technologies can amplify or reduce different sensory experiences, coupled with 
considerations of human-centered design factors, future developments can be designed 
with inclusivity in mind, reducing barriers in favor of accessibility. 
Method
This study explores the interplay between technological design and affordances of VWs 
and PWD who utilize these technologies to create online personas as a way to access and 
participate in online communities. A qualitative multi-method ethnographic approach was 
utilized in order to better understand the cultural phenomenon when little is understood 
about the systems, functions, and beliefs unique to that environment (Lindlof, 1995). 
This research emerges from an ongoing 3-year ethnographic study in the virtual world 
Second Life (SL) that explored embodiment among individuals living with any number of 
physical, emotional, or developmental disabilities. Study participants were recruited from 
a number of existing communities within SL focused on different disability issues resulting 
in participants with issues ranging from autism, epilepsy, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
bipolar disorder, visual and auditory impairment, multiple sclerosis, and cerebral palsy to 
various illnesses leading to long-term disability such as Parkinson’s disease. Participants 
ranged in age from 20–60 years old. The research included extensive virtual-world par-
ticipant observation, more than 170 hours of regularly scheduled informal group discus-
sions, chat log analysis, and more than 20 hours of in-depth interviews. People were invited 
to engage in either voice or text and all discussions included both text transcription and 
voice narration to make sure people who were deaf and blind could be included in the 
conversations. From the group discussions and interviews, a number of themes emerged, 
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including the technological issues with the interface as reported by a number of people in 
this community. Subsequently, we hosted four gatherings in cooperation with the leaders 
and developers of the primary viewer used to access the virtual world (called the Firestorm 
viewer) and the leaders of an organization called Virtual Ability, Inc. on Virtual Ability 
Island (VAI). “Virtual Ability® is a non-profit corporation that enables people with a wide 
range of disabilities to thrive in online VWs” (Virtual Ability, Inc., 2020). The organization 
has been active in SL for more than 12 years and has supported more than 1,000 members 
with educational, social, and entertainment opportunities.
This study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, and saved to protected databases, and all avatar identities were 
anon-ymized.  
Focus group chat log transcript and group (N = 34) membership profile data was coded 
through inductive and interpretative case study reasoning informed by Grounded Theory 
and phenomenology (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Reid et al., 2005). To answer RQ1, manual 
coding of text chat logs from both group discussions and in-depth interviews were analyzed 
to determine common themes about identity as it related to both the technology and its 
relationship to work. To address RQ2, this process was also then completed for the four 
additional focus groups (N = 40) specific to the technological attributes that either created 
or hindered accessibility in this immersive virtual life world.
Inductive content analysis from a series of focus groups on identity and its relation to 
work and community engagement revealed insights into the effect avatar identity had on 
work and social interactions. In-depth interviews drilled deeper into the common frames 
of key identity and technological attributes of the platform to better understand the com-
munity’s relationship with the technology, with work, and with each other. These interviews 
represented a purposive sample, conducted with individuals from the Virtual Ability group 
who had been highly engaged in activities and communities in SL and who had become 
leaders in the virtual world. 
Note, because the interviews were conducted in private and are not available any-
where online, the text chat was left as written rather than corrected for typographical and 
grammatical errors. Also note, “RL” is often used to represent “real life” which is otherwise 
referred to as the physical world throughout this paper.
Results
In response to RQ1) How do PWD who function as avatars report the technological affor-
dances of virtual environments as functions of online identity in support of social or pro-
fessional interaction, the following themes emerged:
Avatar customization via age, gender, and specie to create social and work 
identity 
Although common themes of identity consistently emerged, specific themes pointed to 
users’ ability to make choices and personalize their avatar specific to the role of users’ engage-
ment in work in the virtual world. It is important to note, avatar appearance in SL is very 
easily and highly customizable, with a marketplace of more than seven million products 
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available on the SL Marketplace (Second Life Marketplace, n.d.). Likewise, many of the par-
ticipants are also content creators and would “build” items to wear. The following examples 
reflect the complex experience of choosing an avatar specifically to address work identity 
with both physical- and virtual-world implications. These identities conveyed agelessness, 
gender, and avatar specie. Although age is relatively non-descript in these environments as 
the default construct of the typical avatar is a young adult and, as such, was not considered 
a measurable attribute. It did, however, appear to have an important influence on work. 
Avatar A explained, “i find sl to be an enabling environment for being able to be pro-
ductive as a person with a severe mental illness disability.” Of particular interest, because 
she experiences an “invisible disability,” she has also created what she calls a “brain sling.” 
She explained, people can be very cruel and accusatory when people have a disability you 
cannot “see.” As such they are less likely to be compassionate when she needs accommo-
dations. Her avatar’s brain sling is her way of creating a visual way to express she’s being 
challenged by her disability. She also describes her avatar as her “ageless self,” explaining she 
forgets her age until she gets up from the computer to move. She also explained that because 
she was attempting to reconstruct what she felt she had lost as a result of her disability, it 
was “especially important to represent myself as close to myself in rl as I can.” She has found 
great satisfaction and confidence through what she defines as “work on a voluntary basis” 
and in the image of herself before her diagnosis.
Gender identity was also important to a number of our interlocuters. One in partic-
ular discovered an interest in fashion in the virtual world and was offered an opportunity 
to write for a popular fashion blog. She created a male avatar as the digital equivalent of a 
ghost writer to become a very successful male fashion blogger. She only utilizes her male 
avatar for this work, believing she is more credible as an expert in male fashion when she is 
in her male form. 
The third major theme, avatar specie, was another very popular choice among the stud-
ied participants. One in particular explained that she chose a gecko avatar as a way to avoid 
a gender identification altogether. Yet another created a talking sunflower because it made 
her feel “cute.” Both of these individuals described a sense of liberation in their interactions 
with others as they feel they are not marginalized by their gender or by the human repre-
sentation of their visible disability. 
Although these visual attributes defined their identity, equally important was how their 
identity was inextricably tied to performance as influenced by the technological design. For 
example, just as individuals in professional environments who may have difficulty spelling 
or experience learning disabilities often rely on spell check and grammar checkers to avoid 
ridicule or the appearance of incompetence, the built-in functions of the platform influ-
enced their interactions with both work and social others. This finding intersects with RQ2. 
In response to RQ2) What elements of platform design (affordances) either support or 
inhibit social function among PWD in Second Life, several themes emerged consistently 
including: 
HCI affordances: physical, cognitive, sensory, and functional (Hartson, 2003)
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These specifically included hardware issues, software issues, sustainability, voice-to-text/
text-to-voice capabilities, American Sign Language (ASL), flexibility of the coding and 
menus, navigation and movement, the use of pre-programmed “gestures,” and issues around 
vocabulary and inventory management. 
Hardware
Norman (1988) defined affordances as the relationship between the properties of an object 
and the capabilities of the agent that determine how the object will be used. Perhaps hard-
ware and software design are most core to this concept of affordance. The hardware itself 
was a challenge for some. A woman in the community who is an arthritic wheelchair-bound 
little person explained:
“I’m a bit worried about VR and the size/weight of VR goggles, and the amount 
of neck movement they would require” “): because i have so much issue with my 
left hand not being strong enough to consistently hold down a key such as shift - 
not arthritic little person friendly I suspect “i got a bowling wrist brace and using 
a hanger my brother is fixing a button pusher :P”
Similarly, there was extended discussion about keyboard and mouse design. Many of 
the individuals in this community struggle with dexterity and as one proclaimed, “changing 
mouse sensitivity is a limited solution” and another lamented, “but track balls can destroy 
a thumb.”
Software
Although the discussions were built around the design and content of what is called the 
Firestorm viewer, many of the people in this community utilize two platforms called Rade-
gast and Restrained Love Viewer (RLV). Radegast is a non-graphical client that was designed 
for low performance computers. However, the blind community has used it as a screen- 
reader in a way that supports their navigation through an otherwise very visual medium. 
Similarly, RLV was designed for the Bondage, Discipline, Domination, Masochism (BDSM) 
community as a control feature, but the blind have discovered its value as a way to remain 
connected to another avatar while navigating the virtual world. These software applications 
have become invaluable, yet Radegast was developed by an individual who also managed 
the program independently and voluntarily (rather than as a profit venture). When the 
developer died, it left the community in crisis as maintenance of the program was left unat-
tended, leading the conversation to the issue of sustainability.
Sustainability
In the discussion of Radegast, one of the design engineers was in attendance. In support of 
her effort, one participant explained, “She has donated her time and has continued the proj-
ect that Latif left unfinished when he passed.—CINDER IS the reason Radegast still lives.” 
The hope of this community, they said, was sustainable financial support via “ways to set it 
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up to be owned and maintained by a foundation of interested folks, but it is important to 
consider the question of maintenance and long-term ownership up-front before and after 
development begins.”
Voice-to-Text/Text-to-Voice Technology
Perhaps the most important or dominant theme among this community was accessibility 
to voice-to-text and text-to-voice features and as one of them explained, “Voice-to-text and 
text-to-voice would be beneficial to many more than just those with vision impairments 
. . . and are not adequate for them.” As they discussed the need for colored fonts and mag-
nification features, the conversation revealed that those features already exist. Several of the 
people in the community simply weren’t aware of them. As the discussion continued, they 
pointed out that color schemes would also assist the deaf community and yet it would also 
create new challenges for the colorblind. They concluded, “we need to do a LOT of educat-
ing of all the builders and developers and creators here about accessibility features . . . but 
that is beyond the scope of this brainstorming.”
Incorporating American Sign Language (ASL)
For the deaf community, the hope was summed up in one statement: “an ultimate DREAM 
is to see ASL between avatars in world.” Although strides have been made in other technol-
ogies such as Leap Motion that can capture hand motions and Sansar, a 3D social virtual 
world designed for HMDs with extremely accurate motion capture, none of these tech-
nologies are currently ready for ASL. One participant sarcastically joked, “you can make 
your sign language system to work with the ao [animation override] now and just run it on 
Firestorm lol.”
Flexibility Without Too Much Complexity
The frame of flexibility was also strong in the discussions. For example, one person wrote, 
what would be “helpful with viewers is building in flexibility. Like making the text larger 
or smaller, allowing different color schemes, those kinds of flexibility . . . so that you can 
tailor it to your personal needs.” Yet, they also worried, “too much complexity because of 
too much accessibility can make it inaccessible.” Another explained:
“im asperger and dislectic lol - not sure what I am using as assitive technology 
for sl - perhaps reading back chat - and sometimes autocorrect- but most get my 
“badtyping’ etc -perhaps contrast settings in the screen and also finding a good 
font to read `- Not being the dislectic font cuz that danses in fornt of my eyes - I 
am using firestorm which alowes more seetigns then then standard sl vieuwer”
Gestures
For the nondisabled users, one popular feature in the social virtual world is the use of 
gestures. These can read like, “*:-.,_,.-:*’``’* HOWDY! YA’LL *:-.,_,.-:*’``’*.” However, it 
was explained by the deaf community that “the gestures that draw pictures from ASCII 
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characters that are then read aloud, character by character, by screen readers” create very 
complicated experiences for the deaf community. They also reported, “Gestures are also 
often a ‘trigger’ for PWD with certain issues.” Another suggested, “Hmmmm is there such 
a thing as an icon translator? For instance, I don’t “get” those typed icons which are mostly 
parentheses . . . could they automatically translate to words I could understand?”
Movement and Navigation
One blind participant explained, “Navigation is a huge issue for those of us using Radegast.” 
The software developer in the meeting indicated that effort is being made to create easier 
“navigation, like the ability to follow roads or paths.” Another reminded the group, “OK 
here’s another RLV adaptation . . . how to allow the guardian of a person with low intel-
lectual capacity to set limits on their viewer.” And another suggested, “it could be useful to 
have a hud that would put a blind person in the sighted guide position and moved along 
with another avi.” Yet another suggestion was tactile feedback for navigation. He explained, 
“just like you do when you play a race car game with a steering wheel and can feel the 
impact of bumps on the road and such, why not have similar feedback through a joystick or 
game pad so we can feel where we’re moving?”
Vocabulary and Inventory
The final frame that was consistently reported by the community was centered on issues 
regarding vocabulary and inventory management, for example: “it is important to think 
about the words used . . . why does “home” mean at least three different things in here. 
That can be confusing. See if we can pick better words for some of those.” It was explained 
that inventory items are named “item” by default and if the creator is unaware, many items 
placed in the environment are called item—again creating not only an issue with identifica-
tion but with navigation as well for people using screen-readers.
Interesting parallels of disability/non-disability were discovered and discussed as a 
result of the technology. In other words, the technology could create a sense of disability, 
as explained earlier by a woman with Parkinson’s disease when she discussed attempting to 
move in the virtual world when there was lag. “Lag” mirrored her experience of being stuck 
(or frozen gait) as a result of her Parkinson’s. Additionally, logins and voice capabilities can 
fail; although some could hear each other’s voice, audio for others may be unavailable.
Another frequent technical glitch is excessive time required for images to load. When 
these challenges emerged, people would often suggest that the failure of technology 
mirrored challenges many of the disability community experienced in their everyday lives.
Another phenomenon that emerged was the importance of human interaction and the 
tendency to teach each other and provide collective support with interesting hacks. For 
example, one participant shared, 
“you know when I go anywhere in any grid, because I have voice turned off I 
don’t see the voice dots or any sort of indicator that tells me that people are using 
voice instead of text—I think that would be kind of nice, a visual clue that people 
are talking instead of typing so I know if i’m missing something.” 
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Another reminded the group, “We need to remember that all computer OSs have accessibil-
ity features. Use them!” These tips and shortcuts could help these individuals function more 
efficiently throughout their activities, resulting in higher levels of reported satisfaction and 
confidence in their interactions.
Conclusion and Discussion
This research was part of a study of PWD in VWs designed to better understand how 
virtual embodiment and the human relationship with the technology creates opportuni-
ties that affect a person’s ability to engage in both work and social communities. One of 
the fundamental issues for these individuals in their physical world is access, or the lack 
thereof, not only potentially to technology, but to work and social communities. As tech-
nologies continue to improve the ability to create social, living, and work environments 
in digital platforms, people often assume that this will also create better opportunities for 
PWD. However, the results of this study reveal that while there are affordances that pro-
vide opportunity to create an online persona that foster these connections via their digital 
surrogates, there are also barriers to success. VWs can create “the appearance of disability- 
inflected elements to communication rights” that may also be “inextricably bound up with 
the socio-technical and cultural coordinates of the Internet and associated digital technolo-
gies” (Goggin, 2014, p. 337). These elements can be how the hardware and software design 
create online behaviors that can be misinterpreted. For example, in a virtual world where 
physical visual cues aren’t available, someone who experiences tremor and is relegated to 
text communication on a keyboard (rather than voice-to-text access) may be accused of 
being “drunk” or “stupid” as a result of a high volume of text errors. 
In answering how individuals who function as avatars report the affordances of virtual 
reality as functions of online identity in virtual environments, perhaps one of the most 
important features to these individuals is avatar customization. Being able to create an ide-
alized or fantasized self was fundamentally tied to their virtual experience and an ability to 
be connected in this world, even virtually. While program and platform designers continue 
to work toward complete visual fidelity, especially in the workplace, both the technology 
builders and workplace leaders may need to consider how identity may be redefined in vir-
tual environments to best suit the capabilities of individuals who are typically marginalized 
by their disability or other demographics deemed compromised. This issue has also become 
increasingly important as diversity, equity, and inclusion issues escalate across the world. 
As work may remain remote for an unforeseeable future and social distancing (resulting in 
social isolation) continues, reconsidering what is “appropriate” or expected for online iden-
tities could have powerful consequences and result in creative solutions. Future research in 
this area is needed.
In the exploration of the technological affordances of these platforms for global col-
laboration and connection, strong evidence supports the need to include PWD in the con-
versations about design and implementation in the developmental stage in order to best 
provide adequate future access to these individuals. Beyond the call for universal design, 
as discussed by the interlocutors in this research, several of the technological design issues 
were easy fixes by coders. Additionally, several of the issues were easily teachable—in other 
words, communication, collaboration, and training was key.
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As also discussed in the focus group about technological design and use, one partici-
pant was encouraged by work being done outside of the specific program and viewer when 
he explained:
I’m going to try to explain something in my head: there are an increasing number 
of “microservices” out among the clouds of the internet that do useful things—
speech recognition, speech-to-text, translation—and many of them are getting 
better and better at doing what they do. I suggest that our viewer should take 
advantage of those microservices rather than try to build its own version of them 
(which our developers would have to support, fix, extend).
Strong open-source collaborative building in a sustainable way will go a long way to 
provide access not only for PWD, but in a way that has often been discussed as the benefits 
of universal design. As one person explained, “Voice-to-text and text-to-voice would be 
beneficial to many more than just those with vision impairments . . . and are not adequate 
for them.” Similarly, in the discussion of ASL, one person explained, “I know that the ‘fol-
low’ function is important to people who are blind using Radegast . . . how could that be 
made to work more easily? I am also thinking it would be helpful for sighted users who have 
mobility issues and can’t move their avatar readily.” These revelations point to valuable tools 
that can make the experience for any individual more seamless and satisfying.
These insights provide direction for the development of VR technologies that have 
important implications, not just for PWD, but for all people. For the people in this study, 
the machine is in fact an extension of their body, often creating access to community and 
work. As organizations look to these technologies in the future of work and connection, 
especially through the lens of equity and inclusion, inclusion of individuals of all ability in 
the development of the technology will create inclusive design that is not just about includ-
ing marginalized individuals, but will also create the strongest and most inclusive platforms 
for productivity and creativity.
Additionally, the ethics, as well as the social consequences of these new HMD VR tech-
nologies are just beginning to be explored. As developers, industry, and gaming companies 
continue to build more powerful and alluring experiences, this also demands that we fur-
ther refine the concept of embodied social presence (Mennecke et al., 2001). Through the 
lens of mediated “physical” experiences—which we contend can be both enabling and/or 
disabling in the evolving state of social VR, the theme of embodied identity has consistently 
revealed a powerful effect when the user is free to create a unique digital identity (Davis & 
Chansiri, 2019).
While these affordances may allow for an expression of identity tied to ability, creativity, 
and sociability not accessible in the physical world, these technologies also create new bar-
riers to accessibility for individuals who have found freedoms in their embodied online sur-
rogate. For instance, challenges in technology such as lag resulting from bandwidth issues 
or computing power can result in what our interlocutors reveal is a mirror of their disability 
experience in the physical world including the case above when addressing lag—the indi-
vidual living with Parkinson’s disease responded, “welcome to our world.” This notion of 
the medium as a lived human experience raises interesting questions about media effects 
resulting from design and accessibility in social cultural and future workplace perspectives.
134 Human-Machine Communication 
Author Biography
Donna Z. Davis (PhD) is the director of the Strategic Communication Master’s program 
at the University of Oregon in Portland. Her research focuses on the development of com-
munity and relationships in virtual environments and other emerging social media. Her 
work, funded through the National Science Foundation, focuses on embodiment and dig-
ital social capital formed among disability communities in the 3-D virtual world where 
individuals are able to represent themselves as they choose and are able to work, play, and 
socialize regardless of their ability or disability.
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2140-9361
References
Anderson, M., & Perrin, A. (2017). Disabled Americans are less likely to use technology. 
Fact Tank, Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/07/ 
disabled-americans-are-less-likely-to-use-technology/
Arnold, M. (2003). On the phenomenology of technology: The “Janus-faces” of mobile 
phones. Information and Organization, 13(4), 231–256. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1471-
7727(03)00013-7
Bennett, T. (2005). The media sensorium: Cultural technologies, the sense and society. In 
M. Gillespie (Ed.), Media audiences (51–96). Open University Press.
Borgmann, A. (1987). Technology and the character of contemporary life: A philosophical 
inquiry. University of Chicago Press.
Bricken, W. (1990). Virtual reality: Directions of growth. WA HITL Technical Report R-90. 
University of Washington.
Cooper, R. A. (2007). Introduction. In R. A. Cooper, H. Ohnabe, & D. A. Hobson (Eds.), An 
introduction to rehabilitation engineering (pp. 1–18). Taylor and Francis.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. L. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and eval-
uative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00988593
Davis, D., & Boellstorff, T. (2016). Compulsive creativity: Virtual worlds, disability, and 
digital capital. International Journal of Communication, 10, 2096–2118. https://ijoc.org/
index.php/ijoc/article/view/5099
Davis, D., & Calitz, W. (2014). Finding virtual support: The evolution of healthcare support 
groups from offline to virtual worlds. Journal of Virtual Worlds Research, 7(3), 1–16.
Davis, D., & Chansiri, K.  (2019).  Digital identities—Overcoming visual bias through 
virtual embodiment. Information, Communication & Society, 22(4), 491–505. https://
doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1548631
Dodds, L. (2020, March 26). Second Life enjoys a surprising renaissance as social distanc-
ers flock to virtual worlds. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2020/03/26/second-life-enjoys-surprising-renaissance-social-distancers/
Eco, R. (1994). Apocalypse postponed. Indiana University Press. 
Feenberg, A. (2002). Transforming technology: A critical theory revisited. Oxford University 
Press. 
Davis and Stanovsek 135
Gamito, P., Oliveira, J., Rosa, P., Morais, D., Duarte, N., Oliveira, S., & Saraiva, T. (2020). 
Latest work-at-home/telecomuting/mobile work/remote work statistics. Global Work-
place Analytics. https://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/telecommuting-statistics
Goggin, G. (2014). Communication rights and disability online: Policy and technology 
after the World Summit on the Information Society. Information, Communication & 
Society, 18(3), 327–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2014.989879
Goggin, G., & Newell, C. (2003). Digital disability: The social construction of disability in 
new media. Rowman & Littlefield.
Goggin, G., Steele, L., & Cadwallader, J. R. (2017). Normality and disability: Intersections 
among norms, law, and culture. Continuum, 31, 337–340.
Harris, J. (2010). The use, role and application of advanced technology in the lives 
of disabled people in the UK. Disability & Society, 25(4), 427–439. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09687591003755815
Hartson, R. (2003). Cognitive, physical, sensory, and functional affordances in interaction 
design. Behaviour & Information Technology, 22(5), 315–338. https://doi.org/10.1080/0
1449290310001592587
Heeter, C. (1992). Being there: The subjective experience of presence. Presence: Teleopera-
tors and Virtual Environments, 1, 262–271. https://doi.org/10.1162/pres.1992.1.2.262
Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. Indiana University 
Press.
Kandalaft, M. R., Didehbani, N., Krawczyk, D. C., Allen, T. T., & Chapman, S. B. (2013). 
Virtual reality social cognition training for young adults with high-functioning autism. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43(1), 34–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10803-012-1544-6
Lee, K. M. (2006). Presence, explicated. Communication Theory, 14, 27–50. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00302.x
Lindlof, T. (1995). Qualitative communication research methods. Sage Publications. 
Mennecke, B. E., Triplett, J., Hassall, L. M., Jordan, Z., & Heer, R. (2011). An examination 
of a theory of embodied social presence in VWs. Decision Sciences, 42(2), 413–450. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2214673
Noble, C. D. (2012).  Cyberspace as equalizer: Opening up lifeworlds and empowering 
persons with disabilities in the Philippines. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3520657).
Norman, D. (1988). The psychology of everyday things. Basic Books. 
Nowak, K. L., & Fox, J. (2018). Avatars and computer-mediated communication: A review 
of the definitions, uses, and effects of digital representations. Review of Communication 
Research, 6, 30–53. https://doi.org/10.12840/issn.2255-4165.2018.06.01.015
O’Brien, M. (2018, May 7). Microsoft launches $25M program to use AI for disabilities. Asso-
ciated Press. https://apnews.com/73e45d8e5bc544248ff39fac89cd8fce/Cloud-computing, 
-artificial-intelligence-on-Microsoft-agenda
Reid, K., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2005). Exploring lived experience.  The Psychologist, 
18(1), 20–23.
Second Life Marketplace. (n.d.). https://marketplace.secondlife.com
Van Dijk, J. (2012). The network society. SAGE Publications.
Virtual Ability, Inc. (2020). Welcome page retrieved from https://virtualability.org/

Becoming Human? Ableism and Control in Detroit:  
Become Human and the Implications for Human- 
Machine Communication
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Abstract
In human-machine communication (HMC), machines are communicative subjects in the 
creation of meaning. The Computers are Social Actors and constructivist approaches to 
HMC postulate that humans communicate with machines as if they were people. From 
this perspective, communication is understood as heavily scripted where humans mind-
lessly apply human-to-human scripts in HMC. We argue that a critical approach to com-
munication scripts reveals how humans may rely on ableism as a means of sense-making 
in their relationships with machines. Using the choose-your-own-adventure game Detroit: 
Become Human as a case study, we demonstrate (a) how ableist communication scripts ren-
der machines as both less-than-human and superhuman and (b) how such scripts manifest 
in control and cyborg anxiety. We conclude with theoretical and design implications for 
rescripting ableist communication scripts.
Keywords: human-machine communication, ableism, control, cyborg anxiety,  
Computers are Social Actors (CASA)
Introduction
Human-Machine Communication (HMC) refers to both a new area of research and concept 
within communication, defined as “the creation of meaning among humans and machines” 
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technology is no longer a tool or the medium for communication, but a communicator itself 
(Guzman, 2018). This has far-reaching implications for the communication discipline inas-
much as “HMC ‘frees’ the machine from its relegation to the role of medium and, as a result, 
communication itself is loosed from a definition based on the ontology of participants” 
(Guzman, 2018, pp. 17–18). As such, “the machine has become a communicative subject” 
(Guzman, 2018, p. 12). Yet, the question remains, how do we treat that communicative 
subject? The Computers are Social Actors (CASA) approach postulates that humans fun-
damentally understand and relate to computers, machines, and technologies as if they were 
other people (Nass & Moon, 2000). CASA has been one of the most influential perspectives 
in HMC because it serves as a theoretical foundation for understanding how machines are 
treated as a communicative subject in human-machine interactions. The CASA approach 
applies an understanding of communication as heavily scripted, such that communication 
is a largely automatic process where certain triggers activate communication scripts in a 
“click, whirr” fashion (Cialdini, 2009; Westerman et al., 2020). Complementing this scripted 
approach, A. Edwards et al. (2019) propose a constructivist research paradigm in HMC 
wherein “people seek to employ the same judgement and interaction patterns developed 
for use with other people in their communication with machine partners” (p. 312). These 
lines of scholarship have demonstrated that various communication theories originally for-
mulated for human-human interactions can also provide valuable insights in the human- 
machine context (Fortunati et al., 2020; Westerman et al., 2020). We contend, however, 
that critical communication perspectives have been largely absent from this work. Building 
upon previous work that explores the scripted nature of communication in HMC, we argue 
that a critical perspective is a promising avenue for a deeper interrogation of how humans 
make sense of their interactions with machines. 
A critical perspective on a constructivist research paradigm in HMC attunes us to the 
ubiquitous yet powerful societal systems of oppression that guide communication scripts: 
structures such as heteronormativity and Whiteness that have been intensively theorized 
by critical communication scholars. Among these pervasive social scripts, we hold that 
ableism may be an alluring but dangerous script humans may rely on to make sense of 
differences between humans and machines, in spite of (or arguably because) machines are 
becoming increasingly human-like. As a system of beliefs, practices, and processes, ableism 
refers to the cultural construction of a “normal” body and conceives of any deviation from 
that “normal” body as lack thereof—be it in the form of disability or extraordinary abilities 
(Cherney, 2019). In this essay, we are not so much concerned about “actual” ontological 
differences between humans and machines (e.g., A. P. Edwards, 2018; Guzman, 2020), but 
rather how a constructivist approach to HMC illustrates the ways humans perceive and con-
struct machines as communicative subjects. Although different abilities between humans 
and machines are oftentimes a matter of design and technology, an ableist framework high-
lights how different cap/abilities are constructed and interpreted culturally. As humans’ 
interactions with social robots are likely going to increase in the near future, it is imperative 
to evaluate the risk attached to ableist understandings of the differences in machines’ tech-
nological cap/abilities. In particular, an ableist framework may result in foreclosing authen-
tic human engagement with machines or lead to the exclusion and rejection of machines, 
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akin to society’s treatment of disabled people (Johnson & Kennedy, 2020).1 We argue that as 
machines are simultaneously rendered as both less-than-human/disabled (lacking techno-
logical cap/abilities and/or “true” emotions) and more-than-human (increased processing 
power and physical cap/abilities of machines), humans may be tempted to quickly charac-
terize machines through the cognitive shortcut of ableism. In accordance with a construc-
tivist approach in HMC, we explore the implications of how ableist communication scripts 
may influence how humans make sense of machines and thereby make sense of themselves.
This paper begins with a review of CASA and constructivist literature in HMC, not-
ing the ways in which a critical perspective can supplement current understandings. We 
especially highlight how a posthuman and critical approach to disability “allows us to think 
across binaries of self/other, nature/technology and human/machine” (Goodley et al., 2014, 
p. 348). To illustrate our claims and highlight how ableist communication scripts may play 
out in human-machine interactions, we turn to the case of Detroit: Become Human (DBH; 
Quantic Dream, 2018), an android-centered video game that invites the player to develop 
parasocial interactions with android characters (Craig et al., 2020, Leach & Dehnert, in 
press) and explore what it means to be(come) human in a world full of humanoid machines. 
In DBH, androids face ableist discrimination both for being less-than-human and super-
human at the same time, exerted through various types of control and fueled by cyborg 
anxiety (i.e., the fear that the performance and embodiment of a disabled person exposes 
the porous and permeable boundaries of what it means to be an able-bodied and able-
minded human). Finally, we conclude with future directions for research in both HMC and 
human-human communication (HHC) contexts.
Mobilizing a Critical Perspective in Human-Machine  
Communication
With a focus on the meaning-making processes between humans and machines, one of 
the central tenets in HMC is arguably the ontological shift for communication technology 
(e.g., robots, algorithms, artificial intelligence [AI], etc.) from channel to communicator 
(Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 2018; Peter & Kühne, 2018). In other words, rather than operating 
as the medium in HHC that people talk through, the machine takes on the role of commu-
nicator that people talk with. Understanding the machine as a communicative subject raises 
the question of how humans engage with this communicative other. Ontological differ-
ences between humans and machines play an important role in this regard (A. P. Edwards, 
2018; Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 2020; Sandry, 2018), but we can also examine how humans 
treat and relate to machines as if they were other people through a Computers are Social 
1. As communication scholars, we are sensitive of the words and terms we use and thus deliberately use 
phrases such as “the disabled,” “disabled people,” and “nondisabled people.” Rather than the common  
person-first approach, we see this choice as a “rhetorical practice that challenges ableist rhetoric”  
(Cherney, 2019, p. 24). Critical and posthuman disability studies take a social model framework to  
disability, where disability is understood as a culture (or multiple cultures). As Makkawy and Moreman 
(2019) poignantly note, “Like the cultural signifiers of Latinx and even queer, we would not say person 
of Latinx or person of queerness” (p. 414n1, emphasis in original). Finally, our use of the terms “disabled 
people” and “nondisabled people” foregrounds “the way that society strips humanity from the disabled 
through oppressive ableist practices” (Cherney, 2019, p. 24).
140 Human-Machine Communication 
Actors (CASA) framework (Nass & Moon, 2000). Importantly, CASA does not apply to 
every machine or technology. Instead, CASA focuses on media agents: “any technological 
artifact that demonstrates sufficient social cues to indicate the potential to be a source of 
social interaction” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 73). Essentially, CASA posits that people are 
likely to apply social scripts from HHC when interacting with machines that possess social 
cues and function as communicators (Krämer et al., 2012; Nass & Moon, 2000). 
From a CASA perspective, communication is viewed as heavily scripted. Based on 
previous interactions and experiences, scripts function as mental representations or heu-
ristic shortcuts to make sense of situations, interactions, or people, and these scripts are 
perpetually reified through ongoing interactions (Cialdini, 2009; Nass & Moon, 2000). 
CASA holds that humans utilize communication scripts developed in an HHC context 
when interacting with machines. This is conceptualized as a mindless process as people 
use social cues of machines as a heuristic to resort to learned and constantly reified social 
scripts in the moment of interaction (Nass & Moon, 2000). Given that people often apply 
the same social scripts used with human communicators to machines, theories that explain 
these HHC processes should be applicable to HMC, such as interpersonal and computer- 
mediated communication theories (see Westerman et al., 2020, for an overview). HMC 
has also seen a turn toward a constructivist approach to human-machine interactions. A 
constructivist perspective holds that “people accumulate and integrate communication 
knowledge, tendencies, and abilities through previous interactions, and that those form the 
basis of later social cognitive and message construction behaviors” (A. Edwards et al., 2019, 
p. 312). From a constructivist perspective, communication scripts applied to HMC are the 
result of previous interactions and exposure to discourse about machines, where “our social 
interactions unfold first and foremost through a process of prototyping the potentially com-
municative other” (p. 312). Together, constructivism and CASA explain the ways in which 
humans treat machines as if they were people by applying communication scripts that are 
continually (re)constructed through discourse about and interactions with machines.
While the move toward a constructivist paradigm has transformed understandings 
of both HMC and HHC (Westerman et al., 2020), we contend that critical communica-
tion perspectives have been largely absent from these conversations. Critical perspectives 
in communication seek not only to understand the undergirding structures that guide 
human communication (i.e., scripts), but also how these scripts are indicative of power and 
social hierarchies. Additionally, critical approaches are united by an emancipatory impetus 
striving for social change. From a critical perspective, social scripts are borne from larger 
systems of belief (e.g., racism, sexism, or ableism) that guide people’s worldview and inter-
actions. Moreover, while humans and machines should be considered as different (humans 
are not machines) but complimentary (both are inherently valuable for different reasons), 
a critical perspective shows that differences are often cast in binaries where one form of 
identity is rendered as normal and desirable (e.g., Whiteness, masculinity, able-bodiedness) 
and other expressions of identity are cast as abnormal and deviant (e.g., Black, Indigenous, 
and people of color, femininity, disability). These scripts focused on difference apply even 
to human-machine interactions. In this paper, we focus specifically on ableism and how 
this lens generates scripts that guide HMC and sensemaking. As machines become more 
human-like, ableism may be a tempting script humans mindlessly rely on to make sense of 
the technological and design differences between humans and machines.
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Ableism: The Posthuman Machine and Cyborg Anxiety
We argue that bringing ableism in conversation with HMC is worthwhile, given that “the 
core of ableism is an idealized norm that defines what it means to be human” (Cherney, 
2019, p. 8). Broadly speaking, ableism is a societal structure, a network of beliefs, commu-
nication practices, and institutional processes that describes a corporeal standard. Ableism 
casts an idea of a “normal” body and mind and ultimately speaks to the question of what it 
means to be human (cf. Van Trigt et al., 2016). Traditional ideologies surrounding ableism 
support an “ableist conflation” that equates disabilities to pain and suffering (Reynolds, 
2017). Extending this logic, an ableist discourse posits that the only life worth living is one 
lived by the nondisabled, and that those who are disabled deserve either pity or contempt. 
Disability studies scholars consistently show how the economic, political, and social condi-
tion of neoliberalism demands an abled, normative corporeal standard (e.g., Goodley, 2014; 
McRuer, 2006). From a neoliberal perspective, bodies must be flexible and productive (read: 
neither disabled nor extraordinarily abled) in order to meet the strenuous requirements of 
neoliberal capitalism. When a society privileges such a discourse, the nondisabled are more 
likely to engage in communicative processes that otherize the disabled, which can be an 
intentional or unintentional choice (Mik-Meyer, 2016). One way in which ableist discourses 
play out is through different types of control, as we explore in more detail below.
More recently, critical disability studies aim to deconstruct the disabled/abled binary 
and integrate perspectives from postcolonial, queer, and feminist theories into the study 
of disability (Goodley, 2014; Goodley et al., 2019). Goodley et al. (2014) explicitly align 
the project of critical disability studies with posthuman thought and argue that “disability 
is the quintessential posthuman condition” (p. 348, emphasis in original). Albeit valuable 
critiques of posthuman and critical disability studies that center mostly on its ethical and 
political applicability (e.g., Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009; Vehmas & Watson, 2014), 
we utilize this perspective as it works the disabled/abled binary, shifts the focus from the 
disabled body to the ideological system of ableism, and thus has “an antithetical attitude 
towards the taken-for-granted, ideological and normative under-girdings of what it means 
to be a valued citizen of society” (Goodley et al., 2014, p. 348). As a critique of human-
ism’s anthropocentrism, Van Trigt et al. (2016) argue for “understand[ing] the posthuman 
condition as one in which we constantly reflect on humanity rather than as a condition 
beyond humanity” (p. 126). Thus, quite similarly to HMC’s critique of the anthropocen-
tricity of communication, “disability allows us to think across binaries of self/other, nature/ 
technology and human/machine” (Goodley et al., 2014, p. 348), thereby decentering the 
human.
Our goal is not to frame ableism as an analytic for explaining actual ontological dif-
ferences between humans and machines, which are often justified by technological limits 
or design choices. Rather, we propose ableism as one societal structure that undergirds 
humans’ communicative scripts that may be applied from a human-human context to make 
sense of HMC and to judge the communicative machine-other. In short, we seek to compli-
cate constructivist and CASA approaches to HMC from a critical perspective. For instance, 
some children have been shown to see the robot DORO as a child younger than themselves 
or as disabled (Fortunati et al., 2020). As such, our approach is distinct from what has been 
articulated as “technoableism” (Shew, 2020) or “crip technoscience” (Hamraie & Fritsch, 
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2019). These perspectives theorize the technological enhancement of disabled people and 
must grapple with ableist discourses of “overcoming” or “curing” disability, oftentimes from 
a transhumanist perspective (Wolbring, 2009). Common examples in this view of ableism 
and technology are cochlear implants, exoskeletons, or proposed cures for autism (Shew, 
2020; Wolbring, 2009). One key concept of relevance to our project that is theorized at the 
intersections of dis/ability and technology is Donna Haraway’s cyborg.
While the usefulness and appropriateness of Haraway’s cyborg theory for disability 
studies has been widely contested in the field (e.g., Reeve, 2012), the notion of a cyborg 
anxiety proves useful as it relates to the perception of a disabled person as cyborg. Again, 
we are not so much concerned with ontology (i.e., whether a person/machine is a cyborg), 
but rather with perceptions and constructions of ontological difference (i.e., whether a per-
son/machine is perceived as a cyborg). Cyborg anxiety describes a fear that the body and 
performance of a disabled person “expose the weakness in tenuous and arbitrary definitions 
of what it means to be human” (Cherney, 2019, p. 121), and calls into question “something 
quite fundamental, quite invisible, about the boundaries between disabled and non-disabled 
groups” (Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008, p. 188). Notably, cyborg anxiety accounts for disabil-
ity not only as lacking ability from the “normal” body but also for those bodies who exceed 
this corporeal standard in some “extraordinary” or even “superhuman” way. As Cherney 
(2019) poignantly writes, “In the ableist mindset, having only one arm or three pose the 
same problem” (p. 9). Therefore, while technological shortcomings in machines may be 
interpreted as less-than-human via ableist scripts, machines’ technological advances (e.g., 
superior cognitive processing power, enhanced knowledge due to strong algorithmic search 
engines, or increased strength and stamina as compared to humans) may render them 
superhuman. These varying levels of abilities between machines and humans do not auto-
matically or ontologically indicate machines’ position as either less-than-human or super-
human. Rather, as we further highlight in our following analysis of DBH, we contend that 
the application of ableist human-to-human scripts to human-machine contexts may lead to 
such a reading as humans make sense of their ever-changing relationships with technology. 
An Introduction to Detroit: Become Human
Although various media have explored the narrative drama and tension between human 
and machine (e.g., Humans, West World, Her, Nier Automata), we have selected DBH as 
our case study due to its highly interactive nature as a choose-your-own-adventure video 
game. The level of interactivity within video games acts as a strong catalyst in the develop-
ment of parasocial relationships with media characters and encourages players to nurture 
a sense of identification with the media characters’ personalities and plights (Christoph 
et al., 2009). DBH is uniquely positioned to not only illustrate how ableist scripts form 
as a means of sense-making for human-machine relationships; additionally, DBH pro-
vides players the opportunity to actively engage in the creation and resistance of such 
scripts as the player in a hypothetical yet strangely familiar world. DBH requires players 
to recognize their real-life biases and values regarding what it means to be human ver-
sus a machine as they make in-game decisions that affect the outcome of the narrative 
(Leach & Dehnert, in press). Finally, video games such as DBH are important contrib-
utors to larger discourses such as ableism and will thus likely influence expectations of 
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and communication scripts for actual human-machine encounters (Craig et al., 2020; 
A. Edwards et al., 2019).
DBH takes place in a futuristic version of Detroit in 2038 where humanoid androids are 
common household goods. Different models of androids possess varied functions, but most 
androids are designed to assist with household chores (e.g., cleaning, cooking, babysitting, 
etc.). Even the most basic androids excel in performance and adaptive learning, clearly 
designed to please their human masters. In this society, androids are conventionally attrac-
tive, eternally youthful, and intelligent. Despite possessing these coveted features, androids 
are constantly treated as less-than-human and undeserving of basic human rights. At best, 
androids are treated as valuable products to maintain a pleasant home. At worst and far 
more common in the narrative of DBH, androids are frequent victims of physical, ver-
bal, and emotional abuse. Androids are also blamed for societal problems, including rising 
unemployment rates. 
The crux of all this mistreatment against androids lies in the argument that androids 
lack souls and the ability to feel emotions. However, as players of DBH follow the narratives 
of three androids, it quickly becomes clear that androids have the capacity to genuinely 
experience emotion both for humans and for fellow androids. In this choose-your-own-
adventure game, the player cycles between the stories of three android characters: Connor, 
Markus, and Kara. Connor is a prototype detective android who assists the Detroit police 
in investigating cases of android deviancy—androids who are considered “deviant” because 
they have broken their programming by seemingly gaining sentience and emotion. Another 
one-of-a-kind prototype, Markus was designed to be a caretaker for an elderly artist. Unlike 
most androids featured in DBH, Markus comes from a loving and respectful home, but 
unexpected tragedy forces Markus out of his home and eventually places him on the path 
to become the leader of a massive android resistance against human control. Finally, Kara 
is a female android employed to be a basic caretaker for a young child named Alice, but her 
story also quickly escalates as Kara decides to save Alice from an abusive home. Depending 
on the player’s choices in this game, the stories of these three main characters may intersect 
and meaningfully impact one another, which can result in positive outcomes like unex-
pected alliances or negative outcomes such as permanent character deaths.
An Ableist Discourse to Control Androids
While androids in DBH are perceived to be superhuman in most regards (strength, beauty, 
intelligence, and function), they are perceived as less-than-human due to their lack of emo-
tions. As Connor repeatedly mentions, “I’m a machine designed to accomplish a task.” 
Androids were not designed to have “true” emotions or a soul; they were designed to sat-
isfy their owner’s needs in any way, from performing household chores to even acting as 
sexual partners. The built-in power hierarchy between humans as “masters” and machines 
as “slaves” resembles the perspective of early cybernetics and engineering fields that view 
technology as tools, where “human-machine communication within this context is a pro-
cess of interacting with technology, a tool, as to leverage it for some purpose” (Guzman, 
2018, p. 7). The ableist discourses that humans use to make sense of machines’ different 
cap/abilities render androids in DBH as inherently lacking and anxiety-inducing—thereby 
modeling, as we argued earlier, such discourses outside of DBH. 
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In DBH, Detroit in 2038 is a society that draws heavily on ableist scripts to create clear 
material and discursive boundaries between superior humans and inferior androids. Cor-
respondingly, Guzman (2020) found that humans conceptualize the ontological boundar-
ies between humans and machines along several interrelated divides, including (a) origin 
of being (humans come from nature, while machines are created by humans), (b) tools 
(machines) as well as tool users and creators (humans), (c) autonomy (humans have free 
will, while machines are limited by their programming), (d) intelligence (humans excel at 
some tasks, while machines excel at others), and (e) emotion (humans feel emotions, while 
machines do not). The ableist discourses in DBH play out along those ontological divides 
and cast the androids as tools, rather than communicators. This shift from androids as tools 
to androids as communicators requires a peaceful or violent android revolution, depending 
on the player’s choices, in which androids claim rights similar to human rights to be treated 
equally. 
Nonetheless, even if we reformulate our understanding of machines and move away 
from seeing them as the medium to seeing them as a communicative subject, ableism is still 
at play. If ableism defines any deviation from a constructed norm as deficiency (Cherney, 
2019), it casts an idea of a “normal” body and ultimately speaks to the question of what it 
means to be human. Cherney identifies and explores three rhetorical warrants of ableist 
culture that, together, form its normative force: deviance is evil, normal is natural, and body 
is able. Androids in DBH violate all three warrants within the course of the game, rendering 
them as evil and lacking from an ableist perspective. By this logic, androids that gain sen-
tience should qualify as “human,” but this fictional society fueled by cyborg anxiety (Swartz 
& Watermeyer, 2008) instead finds new ways of rewriting ability such that androids’ super-
human qualities also violate the norm. To maintain power distance between themselves 
and the technological other, humans reconstruct ableist scripts to treat the extraordinary 
as a deviation (similar to disability). This allows humans to continue to marginalize and 
oppress androids, as evidenced in ableist microaggressions, dehumanizing use of pronouns, 
and violent action against androids. This forecloses any possibility for treating machines as 
communicative others. 
Within minutes of starting a game of DBH, players learn that they are playing within 
a fictional world featuring strong anti-android ideals and rhetoric. The opening scenes of 
the game confirm this grim reality by highlighting a variety of injustices against androids, 
including: Markus being harassed by human protestors, Connor being vehemently dis-
missed as a “a piece of plastic” by everyone around him, and Kara being berated and 
beaten by her owner. In fact, androids are treated like other historically oppressed minori-
ties in the U.S. (e.g., Markus, the only Black playable character in DBH, has to stand in the 
back of the bus away from humans). These scenes are undoubtedly meant to stir feelings 
of shock and discomfort in players. Unlike the unseen players, however, the three main 
characters simply ignore or submit to these various injustices at the beginning of the 
game. The injustices in androids’ lives may be evident to players, but the characters of 
DBH are initially resigned and even blind to their unfair treatment. It is not until later that 
the androids have the opportunity to awaken to their circumstances and resist against the 
forces that control them. 
DBH may take place in a fictional setting, but the struggles its characters face reflect 
the same hegemonic processes that exist in reality. On the surface, the dominant discourse 
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in DBH is anti-android and thus may seem irrelevant to our society where we have yet to 
advance to a stage where androids are common household features. However, the anti- 
android discourse in DBH only masks the true discourse at play: an ableist discourse that 
purposefully privileges the nondisabled and suffocates the minority group of the disabled. 
By analyzing how human characters in this fictional Detroit mindlessly apply ableist human-
to-human scripts when interacting with machine-others to make sense of difference, we 
may be better equipped to recognize how such ableist human-to-human scripts echo in our 
own society. Further, as part of larger discourses surrounding androids, video games like 
DBH shape discourses about machines outside of the game as well. Importantly, then, DBH 
provides opportunities to dissect the overt and covert ways that dominant groups control 
minority groups (e.g., androids as disabled) to support their preferred status quo. The fol-
lowing section examines the communicative scripts that comprise the ableist discourse in 
DBH and the various forms of control that support and maintain it.
Maintaining the Status Quo: Types of Control 
Humans are the social actors that produce and reproduce the social structures and dis-
courses that guide society today (Giddens, 1984). Through careful observation and reflec-
tion, it is possible for players to determine how the dominant group of this fictional society 
(i.e., humans) strategically defines “ability” to its own benefit and to the detriment of the 
marginalized group (i.e., androids). Whereas technological cap/abilities may be the main 
difference between humans and machines in reality, the society in DBH positions emotion 
as the most important ability of all—the critical ingredient of being human. However, when 
androids display signs of emotional intelligence and sentience, the ableist discourse that 
humans have constructed is suddenly no longer as beneficial as it seems. If androids pos-
sessed the ability to feel emotion, the ableist discourse that is fundamentally tied to emotion 
would no longer be able to separate humans and androids into better-than and less-than 
camps, respectively. 
To maintain a status quo at the level presented in DBH (i.e., a society where humans 
are powerful and androids are unquestionably considered “less-than”), proponents of the 
ableist discourse must find ways to maintain control over the minority group. DBH’s rich 
narratives showcase control in a wide variety of forms, reflecting the same types of control 
that are used outside of the game to oppress weaker, marginalized groups. Broadly, these 
types of control can be categorized into obtrusive and unobtrusive control. Obtrusive con-
trol consists of any overt attempt to direct others’ actions, whereas unobtrusive control 
is the process where these attempts are subtle and essentially unseen by the manipulated 
members (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). Importantly, unobtrusive control is only possible 
when a group strongly identifies with the larger organization’s values and actively contrib-
utes to the organization’s success, even when it does not benefit themselves (Tompkins & 
Cheney, 1985). In the context of DBH, androids are controlled in both obtrusive and unob-
trusive ways to support the pre-existing ableist discourse. 
Obtrusive forms of control are often the easiest to identify because they are explicit 
in function and intention. Three of the most well-known types of control are from R. C. 
Edwards’s (1978) conceptualization of control: simple control (a superior or manager 
provides a direct order to a subordinate), technical/technological control (machines or 
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technology substitute for a supervisor and guide action), and bureaucratic control (rule sys-
tems that guide subordinates’ performance and decision-making). Although some scholars 
argue about which of these three types of control can function obtrusively or unobtrusively 
(Gossett, 2009), we contend that DBH characterizes these three controls as explicit and 
obtrusive. We further argue that control is enacted through recourse to ableist communi-
cation scripts in humans’ interactions with machines. Simple control is a mainstay in daily 
interactions between humans and androids because androids are programmed to follow 
their owners’ orders without question. Technical control is thus the underlying mechanism 
that allows for simple control to be powerful. Androids are extremely aware of the technical 
restrictions imposed by their programming, such that they cannot act in ways that conflict 
with humans’ orders. Interestingly, there are also multiple cases where simple and technical 
control are in tension with one another, resulting in one overriding the other. Connor is 
often placed in this position throughout the game, where the purpose of his technical con-
trol (i.e., his programming to be an efficient detective) conflicts with Hank’s simple control 
of Connor. As his human partner, Hank has the authority to tell Connor what to do (e.g., 
“stay in the car,” “don’t approach the crime scene”), but the player as Connor is allowed to 
choose between following the expectations of technical control or simple control in a small 
moment of veiled freedom. Here, the player experiences firsthand the contradicting ten-
sions exerted by simple and technical control on the android body. The game leaves it open 
for the player to literally play with different responses to this dilemma of control.
Technical control is arguably the greatest form of obtrusive control for androids. In fact, 
in order to become “deviant,” androids must break the code of their programming to gain 
free will. All three main characters in the game have the opportunity to become deviant, 
which requires tearing down or breaking a wall of code that only androids can see. Kara 
is the first main character who receives the opportunity to break her code, at which point 
she is no longer subject to technical control and simple control. Similarly, Markus breaks 
free from his code to protect himself and his owner. Without technical control in action, 
simple control loses its power as well. However, resisting bureaucratic control is notably 
difficult, given that rule systems are represented in the structures that humans create and 
maintain through communicative scripts. Even when Kara gains free will, she still struggles 
to function in a world of bureaucratic control. For example, when Kara escapes with Alice 
and looks for shelter at a hotel, she is rejected on the grounds that she is an android. Simi-
larly, Connor’s existence as a detective android is heavily embedded in bureaucratic control 
because the police’s rule system states that he is unable to perform his job without a human 
supervisor nearby. This is why Connor often searches for Hank in various locations before 
beginning an investigation—not because he necessarily wants a partner, but because he is 
required to have Hank nearby to perform his work. 
The restrictions associated with obtrusive control are certainly problematic and consti-
tute a major obstacle for the androids that desire a revolution in the game. Indeed, much 
of Markus’s narrative focuses on overcoming obtrusive control, as evidenced by his efforts 
to release other androids from technical control, breaking into stores to save his fellow 
androids, and leading protests even in the face of human police suppression. With its 
choose-your-own-adventure design, the game leaves it up to the player to decide exactly 
how to resist these various types of control. For instance, the player as Markus can either 
lead a peaceful protest or choose to detonate a nuclear bomb in the face of ongoing violent 
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responses from humans. Despite the importance of such efforts, the greatest obstacles are 
arguably the ones related to unobtrusive control. After all, in the history of this fictional 
world, androids have endured oppressive scripts and obtrusive control for so long because 
they believed in their organization’s values (e.g., human life is precious) and they believed 
their role in society to serve humans was a critical part of their existence and mission. This 
faith in society’s values was so strong that androids unwittingly embraced the ableist dis-
course that humans constructed. 
Evidence of unobtrusive control exists in all aspects of android life in DBH, both in 
discursive and material forms. In language, humans refer to androids with “it” pronouns to 
clearly dehumanize them. Additionally, androids have moved past the uncanny valley (cf. 
Mori, 2012) and are so convincingly human that they have to self-identify as androids by 
wearing a uniform that reads “ANDROID” on their back and their model number on their 
chest. Additionally, androids have a glowing mark on their temple. These seemingly small 
markers reinforce the idea that androids are “others” and “less-than.” Androids also enact 
concertive control over each other to protect the same values that oppress them, sometimes 
acting as faux superiors over one another when a fellow android is displaying deviancy 
(Wright & Barker, 2000). Connor’s existence as a detective android speaks to such concer-
tive control, because he hunts fellow androids to uphold human values. Players also some-
times see the enduring results of unobtrusive control in deviant androids. Perhaps most 
notably, a grim moment occurs when Kara eventually discovers that Alice (the child she 
saved and spent the whole game protecting) is actually an android and not a human like she 
thought. Kara’s shock and sadness are fleeting but noticeable, prompting her companion, 
Luther, to ask her if it mattered if Alice was human or not. Based on the player’s choices, 
Kara has the potential to overcome this realization and move forward to a life with Alice 
as her child. This interaction gives players a brief glimpse of the enduring effects of unob-
trusive control through ableist scripts on Kara, who had her free will but still believed in 
the values she always possessed—that relationships with humans were precious and more 
important than the relationships she could build with her fellow androids. 
This case study illustrates the ways in which communicative scripts are deeply embed-
ded in cultural discourses like ableism and how they can manifest in issues of control. By 
inviting player engagement with ableist discourses, DBH reveals how humans may approach 
HMC through ableist communication scripts that guide their sensemaking of machines. As 
part of larger societal discourses, video games such as DBH arguably shape the ways in 
which we think about machines. Moreover, by giving players an opportunity to affect the 
game’s narrative, DBH opens up space for resisting and reworking ableist scripts. Although 
communicative scripts may exude a sense of stability, they are also in need of constant reifi-
cation to maintain their force. Interrogating the instability of ableist scripts invites the pos-
sibility for rescripting, or the rewriting of communicative scripts through changed action 
(Moreman & McIntosh, 2010). 
Concluding Thoughts and Future Directions
In this paper, we have argued that the application of HHC scripts to human-machine 
interactions requires a critical perspective on the scripts being used to make sense of the 
interactions and identities of both humans and machines. By describing how ableism is 
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a particularly appropriate framework in the context of HMC—because humans may fall 
back on ableist frameworks to make sense of cap/ability differences between humans and 
machines—we contribute to the growing field of HMC from a critical perspective. The con-
sequences of an “othering” discourse and ableist communication scripts, as illustrated in 
DBH, should encourage scholars to examine what unjust discourses, oppressive communi-
cation scripts, and unseen forms of control might exist in our own society. Additionally, as 
Craig et al. (2020) note in their exploratory study of character attachment in DBH, “percep-
tions held about video game robots could have importance for social robots encountered 
in daily living” (p. 170). As such, we draw the following conclusions from our application 
of ableism as an analytic sensibility to the ways in which humans make sense of machine- 
others.
Beyond gender stereotypes, there is a need for researchers to further explore how 
humans apply human-human scripts to human-machine interactions, especially if these 
scripts may render the machine as less-than or anxiety-arousing. At this point, it is unclear 
whether the mindless application of oppressive social scripts is limited to initial interac-
tions with machines, or how the various factors described by Gambino et al. (2020) impact 
pervasive social scripts like ableism. Gambino et al. make a case for an extended CASA, 
arguing that people have changed given that their experience with and knowledge of media 
agents and machines have increased dramatically. Future studies should explore how expe-
rience with machines impacts the mindless application of oppressive human-to-human 
scripts. As technology advances and becomes more human-like (Gambino et al., 2020), it 
would be interesting to examine how higher levels of anthropomorphism impact the ten-
dency to apply ableist frameworks. As we described in our analysis of DBH, high levels of 
anthropomorphism could invite high levels of ableism and cyborg anxiety that manifest in 
a desire for control. Designers of machines may find it challenging to avoid the application 
of human-to-human scripts while advancing technology.
We live in a technological era where “ongoing and long-term interactions [with 
machines] present the opportunity for individuals to develop relationships with media 
agents similar to those with humans” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 77). One way to overcome 
the mindless application of ableist scripts to HMC could be increased exposure to and 
experience with machines as communicative subjects, resulting in shifting the interaction 
between humans and machines from an I-It perspective to an I-Thou perspective (Wester-
man et al., 2020). As humans engage more frequently and in more depth with machines, 
they may realize that certain human-human scripts may not be as applicable to human- 
machine contexts as they thought, prompting them to develop scripts for human-media 
agent interaction (Gambino et al., 2020). 
Further, we also recognize that studying how humans treat human-machine interac-
tions as I-It may also be valuable for understanding HHC. Indeed, as Westerman et al. 
(2020) conclude, “it seems like we respond to machines and AI as we do people, but we may 
not always respond to people in a very interpersonal way” (p. 403). The scripts humans use 
to make sense of human-machine interactions are undeniably layered, and a deeper dive 
may reveal how and why “we may treat people like computers” (Gambino et al., 2020, p. 79). 
Therefore, insights gained in an HMC context about how social scripts such as ableism are 
applied mindlessly may contribute to our understanding of how ableism and other perva-
sive social scripts play out in human-human interactions. Posthuman and critical disability 
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studies of ableism contribute not only to our understanding of machines, but also to our 
understanding of what it means to be human. As Guzman (2018) reminds us, “Commu-
nication, even with machines, shapes the Self ” (p. 20). Thus, engaging with machines as 
communicative subjects may not only lead to rewriting the communicative scripts we rely 
on to make sense of our communicative others and our interaction with them, but also 
sheds light on what it means to be(come) human in a world increasingly full of (humanoid) 
machines.
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Negotiating Agency and Control:  
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Abstract
Intelligent technologies have the potential to transform organizations and organizing 
processes. In particular, they are unique from prior organizational technologies in that 
they reposition technology as agent rather than a tool or object of use. Scholars study-
ing human-machine communication (HMC) have begun to theorize the dual role played 
by human and machine agency, but they have focused primarily on the individual level. 
Drawing on Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1984), we propose a theoretical framework to 
explain agency in HMC as a process involving the negotiation of control between human 
and machine agents. This article contributes to HMC scholarship by offering a framework 
and research agenda to guide future theory-building and research on the use of intelligent 
technologies in organizational contexts.
Keywords: intelligent technologies, human-machine communication, structuration, 
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Introduction
Intelligent technologies, a class of emerging technologies fueled by artificial intelligence 
(AI), have great potential to transform organizations and organizing processes (Bailey & 
Barley, 2020). Such technologies, including machine learning, robotics, and smart sensors, 
are programmed to mimic human capacity to learn from various inputs (i.e., new data and 
pattern recognition) and to respond to stimuli modeling human responses (West & Allen, 
2018). From intelligent personal assistants, such as Siri and Alexa, to algorithmic systems 
such as Uber’s ridesharing application, AI is increasingly ubiquitous across industries with 
the potential to generate annual global value of over $5 trillion (Chui & Malhotra, 2018). 
The use of intelligent technologies in organizations is also growing, and whether embodied 
in a device or running in the background as algorithms, they are taking on increasingly 
agentic roles. For instance, in 2016 the Finnish company Tieto appointed an AI agent, Ali-
cia T., as a member of the leadership team of one of its business units (Diktonius, 2016). 
Similarly, IBM’s Watson Talent aids and plays several critical roles for both employees and 
employers in human resource processes (IBM Watson Talent, 2021). In these cases, intel-
ligent technologies differ from prior information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
in that they have the potential to take on a more active role and work collaboratively with 
humans (Chui & Malhotra, 2018).
Prior research on technology-mediated work (e.g., Raghuram et al., 2019) has primar-
ily conceptualized technology as object or tool of use; however, the growing use of AI for 
decision-making and other collaborative functions repositions technology as agent through 
the notion that it can serve as a social agent (Banks & de Graaf, 2020; Gunkel, 2012; Guzman, 
2020). This notion is not new, but dates back to the Computers as Social Actors paradigm 
(CASA) (Gambino et al., 2020; Reeves & Nass, 1996), which posits that humans can treat 
machines with social potential as social actors, respond to them emotionally, and identify 
with them as teammates or colleagues. While the CASA paradigm is well poised to explain 
individual level interactions with computers (Gaudiello et al., 2016; Sparrow et al., 2011; 
Waytz et al., 2014), it offers limited insights into processes of human-machine communi-
cation (HMC) at the group or organizational level. Intelligent technologies challenge our 
notions of communication to balance both anthropocentric but technocentric perspectives 
on agency (Banks & de Graaf, 2020) as well as raising concerns about algorithmic control, a 
new form of rational control that is facilitated by algorithmic systems (Kellogg et al., 2020). 
To better theorize these shifts, we draw on Structuration Theory (ST; Giddens, 1984) to 
develop a theoretical framework that helps to explain the relationship between human and 
machine agency as well as how both are implicated in a dialectic of control. Our goal here is 
not to offer specific propositions or testable hypotheses, but rather to leverage ST as a sensi-
tizing device to help researchers theorize issues of agency, structure, and control in human 
and machine relationships (Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2005). Through the discussion of 
related concepts and illustrative examples, this paper contributes to HMC scholarship by 
offering a theoretical framework and research agenda to guide future theory-building and 
research on the use of intelligent technologies in organizational contexts. We also extend 
ST by extending the notion of agency to encompass both human and machine agency in a 
dialectic of control. 
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Structuration Theory: The Duality of Structure
An essential question for scholars studying how humans interact with increasingly intelli-
gent technologies is what their relationship might look like. Inevitably, scholars have turned 
toward concepts such as agency and control to understand HMC. For instance, recent work 
shows the necessity to carefully consider the amount of agency that intelligent technologies 
have in relation to their human collaborators as machines become increasingly perceived 
as having agency (Fraune, 2020; Guzman & Lewis, 2020). As Banks & de Graaf (2020) point 
out, we should think about “human and machine roles in communication processes in a 
more egalitarian fashion” (p. 19) where the agency, interactivity, and mutual influence of 
both humans and machines are taken into account. An emerging recognition is that HMC 
is relational in nature and is constituted in interactions between humans and machines 
(Guzman, 2018; Suchman, 2007). For instance, Suchman takes a critical anthropological 
perspective on human-machine interaction, arguing that the boundaries between humans 
and machines are discursively and materially enacted, and that as such they can be recon-
figured through an interactive process. However, aside from a few notable exceptions, such 
as the field of automated journalism (Lewis et al., 2019), the notion of HMC as an organiza-
tional process has not yet been adequately theorized. Indeed, the lack of attention to HMC 
within the field of organizational communication is evident in the fact that over the past 
5 years (2016–2020), only two (less than 1%) of the 204 paper sessions sponsored by the 
Organizational Communication Divisions of both the National Communication Associa-
tion and the International Communication Association were related to intelligent technol-
ogies or artificial intelligence. 
This motivates us to draw on structuration theory to explain the process through which 
agency and control are negotiated in HMC. At its theoretical roots, ST (Giddens, 1979; 
1984) explains the structure-agency debate that constitutes a central theme in social the-
ory broadly and in communication theory more specifically (Banks & Riley, 1993; Riley, 
1983). According to Giddens (1984), structure and agency are recursively related in that 
humans create rules and resources—or structures—that in turn enable and constrain their 
actions and behavior. Agents and structures are not independent but are mutually consti-
tuted through the duality of structure, as “the structural properties of social systems are 
both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize” (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 25). In this perspective, social actors both draw upon and reproduce structural features 
of wider social systems in their day-to-day activities. Although structure is more enduring, 
the social systems in which it is instantiated are comprised of situated activities of human 
agents that are reproduced across time and space. While human agents have the ability to 
act knowledgeably and reflexively, the activities that lead to reproduction of social and insti-
tutionalized practices often have unintended consequences; this helps to explain both how 
social systems endure as well as how they change and evolve.
While ST has traditionally focused on social systems and structures, organizational 
scholars have drawn attention to technological systems and structures as well. Previous 
research on the structuring role of technology in organizations has highlighted the ways 
people make sense of, appropriate, and develop practices around technology (Leon-
ardi, 2011; Majchrzak et al., 2000). Scholars have applied ST to understand the recursive 
relationship between human agency and sociotechnological structures (Barley, 1986; 
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DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski & Yates, 1994; Stillman & Stoecker, 2005). For exam-
ple, Barley’s (1986) account of the implementation of computerized tomography (CT) 
scanners at two hospitals illustrated that adoption of the new CT machines not only restruc-
tured the work practices of the radiologists and CT technologists, but also disrupted and 
redefined occupational roles and power relationships between these two groups of experts. 
Orlikowski and Yates (1994) found that knowledge workers developed rules around email 
use by drawing on established genres and genre repertoires that served to structure their 
communicative practices, which were rich and varied and changed over time. DeSanctis 
and Poole developed Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) to explain how group members 
appropriate the structures provided by technology, often in combination with other social 
and organizational structures, in ways that may be either faithful to or at odds with the ini-
tial intent of the designers. This line of research helps to explain the recursive relationship 
between organizing and technology, and the way in which this process evolves over time. 
However, it treats agency as confined to human actors and structure as confined to tech-
nology (which is regarded as object rather than actor). Intelligent technologies require an 
extension of structurational theory to account for both human and machine agency and the 
ways they are instantiated and negotiated in HMC.
A Structurational View of Human-Machine Communication 
Traditionally, humans are the only type of organizational actor that meets the criteria for 
agency in ST (Giddens, 1979; McPhee et al., 2014). According to ST, agency stems from 
one’s capacity to exercise power in meaningful or normative ways and to reflexively monitor 
one’s actions, which allows them to understand how their actions either reify or transform 
the structures in which they act (Giddens, 1984). The rapid advancement of intelligent tech-
nologies brings about the need to expand ST by contending with both human and machine 
agency.
Human Agency and Machine Agency
Communication scholars and social theorists more broadly have defined agency as a capac-
ity or ability that originates from the resources, rights, and obligations that an individual 
social actor owns and occupies (Abdelnour et al., 2017; DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Giddens, 
1979). As Emirbayer and Mische (1998) pointed out, an agent should be able to develop 
habits from past experience, make judgments about their present environment, and imag-
ine their future actions, which they refer to as the “Chordal Triad.” Giddens defines agency 
as the ability to make a difference, or the “ability to do otherwise” (Giddens, 1984). While it 
is important to recognize the agentic capacity of intelligent technologies, our focus here is 
not to redefine agency. Thus, in this paper, we follow previous discussions and define agency 
colloquially as one’s capacity to reflect, adapt, and act. 
The idea of technology and material artifacts having agency is not new. Scholars study-
ing the relationship between humans and technology have increasingly recognized that 
physical objects can also have agency as we inscribe behaviors into them and give them the 
capacity to mediate our interactions (Latour, 1991) and as we interact with physical objects 
and technologies through various work arrangements in organizations (Orlikowski, 2007; 
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Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). In this way, social and material agencies are mutually imbricated 
(Leonardi, 2011). More importantly, recent theorizing about digital agency of AI (Ågerfalk, 
2020) and symbiotic agency in chatbots (Neff & Nagy, 2016) has begun to recognize that 
intelligent technologies themselves have increasingly more agency as a result of our pro-
gramming and design. A distinctive feature of intelligent technologies is their ability to 
perform tasks autonomously, taking over control of organizational tasks such as schedul-
ing meetings, screening job candidates, or even making recommendations for social rela-
tionship development (Perc et al., 2019; Russell & Norvig, 2019). Technologies such as, for 
example, Google’s page ranking algorithm, have the capacity to act symbolically (i.e., pro-
vide recommendations and rank search results) on behalf of the individuals and organiza-
tions who developed them. Essentially, machine agency refers to the capacity of intelligent 
technologies to perform specific tasks given its material features. Similar recognition that 
machines might differ in their levels of agency can also be found in early work on sys-
tems theory (Boulding, 1956; Pondy & Mitroff, 1979). Systems may vary in levels of agency 
from reactive systems (which respond to environmental cues in predetermined ways) to 
goal-driven systems (which incorporate goals set by others) and problem-solving systems 
(which are more complex as they are capable of solving problems in achieving their goals 
and adjusting goals and routines). At even higher levels of agency are self-aware systems 
(which are aware of themselves and other agents and can reflect on their own activity) and 
multivocal systems (composed of multiple selves, can orient differently to different parts of 
the situation, and may reconstitute themselves through problem-solving and reflection). 
These levels of agency can be applied to various AI tools and systems. Therefore, AI may 
differ in terms of how responsive it is to external and internal cues, its freedom of action and 
reflexivity to monitor action, its decision-making ability, and its awareness of other agents 
and of its own agency.
Knowledgeability. Giddens identified two criteria for agency. The first is knowledgeability, 
the tacit information or discursive resources that actors have about the circumstances that 
can inform their future actions. In Giddens’s (1984) words, knowledgeability is about “what 
agents know about what they do, and why they do it” (p. xxiii). Taking comprehensive data 
processing as an example, intelligent technologies that have the ability to collect a vari-
ety of data on employees including biometrics, messages between users, and the location 
of workers can be considered as knowledgeable about their collaborators in organizations 
(Kellogg et al., 2020). For example, Duhigg (2012) reported on a case where the retail cor-
poration Target used machine learning and pattern recognition of consumer purchase data 
(including changes in buying behavior of body lotions and cleaning products) to predict 
pregnancy in its female shoppers—sometimes even before they or their families knew they 
were pregnant. The AI technology that Target used in this case developed predictions based 
on the information that it had about its customers. It acted knowledgeably as a tool for orga-
nizations. In the rideshare context, Uber’s AI can leverage multiple data points to manage 
employees including customer ratings, geographic location, how cooperative drivers are 
with accepting assignments, and how long rides take (Lee et al., 2017; Rosenblat & Stark, 
2016). In contrast to the Target example, AI in this case acted in a managerial capacity 
through directing and facilitating interactions between Uber employees and their custom-
ers. Chan and Humphreys (2018) demonstrated that the data collected on Uber drivers 
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allows AI technologies to surveil its contracted workforce on behalf of the organization 
by tracking spatial movements and customer interactions. These examples illustrate that 
current intelligent technologies know what they should do, even though they do not yet 
know why.
When developing ST, Giddens (1984) recognized that the knowledgeability of human 
actors will always be limited in some ways and we argue that this is also true of intelli-
gent technologies. Levels of awareness are likely to vary between three different types of 
consciousness that inform actor knowledgeability: discursive consciousness, practical con-
sciousness, and unconsciousness. Discursive consciousness refers to an actor’s ability to 
understand the purpose of their actions and explain those reasons in social interactions. In 
contrast to discursive consciousness, practical consciousness consists of an actor’s ability to 
recognize how a task needs to be completed and competently act, and is more habituated 
or routinized and taken for granted. Lastly, Giddens (1984) acknowledged that actors often 
are unconscious or unaware of (a) conditions that shape actions and (b) unintended con-
sequences of actions within larger structures. Ultimately, agency in ST is less focused on 
the intentions and goals of actors and instead emphasizes the patterned actions of agents 
(Giddens, 1979; 1984). Giddens (1984) argued that “knowledgeability is founded less upon 
discursive than practical consciousness” (p. 25). Although intelligent technologies are not 
aware of the reasons behind their actions and cannot exercise discursive consciousness, 
they are capable of enacting more routinized practical consciousness that directs actions in 
a larger structure. We argue that the lack of discursive consciousness in intelligent technol-
ogies does not prohibit ST from being applied in HMC. Rather, distinguishing which types 
of consciousness inform knowledgeability in intelligent technologies contributes to our 
understanding of machine agency and how machines may complement or hinder human 
agency in organizations. 
Reflexive monitoring. The second criterion of agency is reflexive monitoring. This refers 
to the ability to monitor one’s actions, evaluate the outcomes of these actions, and develop 
awareness of the settings and contexts around the actions (Giddens, 1984). A good example 
of reflexive monitoring in intelligent technologies is instantaneous processing. This refers 
to the high velocity of algorithmic computation and the ability to incorporate performance 
systems in real time (Kellogg et al., 2020). Examples of instantaneous processing include 
AI-enabled technologies such as Robot vacuums or autonomous vehicles that need to con-
tinuously monitor their surroundings and respond reflexively in order to function (Elliott, 
2019). Admittedly, intelligent technologies used in organizations or in households are not 
quite yet at a stage where they can monitor their own performance and adapt future actions 
based on past performance, but they are certainly at the stage where they can monitor their 
own actions by engaging in a flow of context-responsive behavior. However, as these exam-
ples show, intelligent technologies in their current form still rely on human interventions 
and implementations to fully utilize their own knowledgeability and reflexive monitoring.
Control and Structure
To address the relationship between human agency and machine agency, it is important to 
recognize that ST conceptualizes power as relational as does Foucault (1979). According 
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to Giddens (1984), power can be seen as a dialectic of control in which subordinate social 
actors can influence the choices and behaviors of their supervisors and create transforma-
tive outcomes by drawing on resources that they control and have access to, namely struc-
ture. In other words, structure enables knowledgeable and reflexive agents to exert power 
and control. Not surprisingly, control systems also play an important role in structuring 
and holding organizational units together by providing rules by which to direct work tasks, 
evaluate work, and reward and discipline workers (Edwards, 1981). The organizational 
communication literature has identified various forms of control that arise in organiza-
tions, ranging from more direct, top-down approaches used in hierarchical organizational 
structures to more indirect, peer-based, or internalized forms of concertive or unobtrusive 
control (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985).
The discussion around issues of control between humans and machines is not new but 
is rooted in discussions of the ways in which earlier forms of technology were implicated 
in the negotiation of organizational control. For instance, Levy (2015) found that electronic 
monitoring systems exerted new forms of control over workers in the trucking industry, 
by providing new metrics for evaluating truckers’ job performance and challenging their 
accounts of local and biophysical conditions, and that truckers engaged in resistance prac-
tices to subvert or circumvent these control mechanisms. Cybernetic scholars have also 
centered their theorizing about communication around issues of information and control 
(Guzman, 2016). As Wiener (1950) pointed out, “the significance of machines in human 
society” is reflected in their relationships to communication and control (p. 23). The shift 
from technology as a tool or object of use to automated machines that manage human 
actions is a reflection of the political and power struggles between workers and manag-
ers (Guzman, 2016; Noble, 2011). With intelligent technologies, control can be even more 
adaptive. As our discussion of Uber would suggest, intelligent technologies such as AI may 
exert even more control through the capacity to self-correct through the use of sophisti-
cated sensors and delicate feedback systems (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; Guzman, 2016). 
More importantly, the increasing amount of agency and capacity for interactivity also opens 
the door for peer or collaborative relationships in human-machine interactions that goes 
beyond the question of who has control (Janlert & Stolterman, 2017; Sundar et al., 2016).
HMC literature also acknowledges the relational nature of the negotiation of control 
between humans and intelligent technologies. Malone (2018) pointed out that AI in orga-
nizational use could play differing roles and these roles range in terms of the amount of 
control given to AI, from low to high. For instance, intelligent technologies can not only act 
as an assistant when they function with some degree of human input (i.e., use voice com-
mand to instruct Google Home), but can also act as a peer if a digital assistant (e.g., chatbot) 
interacts with other humans on behalf of an individual (Moore, 2019). More importantly, 
intelligent technologies can serve in a variety of roles depending on the context and use. 
In other words, these roles range on a control continuum and are not static. Rather, they 
fluctuate depending on the experience of individuals. An example of how AI’s role shifts 
based on the eye of the beholder is autonomous vehicles (Malone, 2018). A self-driving 
car may be viewed as a tool to its human passengers, as it is being used to transport them 
from one point to another. That same self-driving car, however, could be viewed as a peer 
by other drivers that share the road with the vehicle. Similarly, an AI project management 
system that manages the workflow of organizational teams could be viewed as having a 
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managerial role in their organization by its subordinates but be seen as a peer or even assis-
tant by human managers. Thus, similar to ST, control in HMC is dependent on the agency 
of machines in relation to a group of individuals who also have varying degrees of agency.
Structure can take many forms in HMC. According to Giddens (1984), the duality of 
structure can take three forms: domination, signification, and legitimation. Domination 
refers to the unequal distribution of power resources, which may be available to some 
agents (e.g., managers) and not others (e.g., lower-level employees) (McPhee et al., 2014). 
For example, in cases where companies appoint AI agents to play an official organizational 
role, intelligent technologies have authoritative power (over people) or allocative power 
(over resources) as they make decisions for organizations, recommend strategies to man-
agers and workers, or provide work assignments to employees (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; 
Diktonius, 2016; IBM Watson Talent, 2021). Similarly, the ways organizational members 
interpret the role that intelligent technologies play (Malone, 2018) or how society views AI 
ontologically (Guzman, 2020) can also provide structures for signification, the interpreted 
meaning through lived experience in context of the structure, or legitimation, expectations 
and norms that can influence the consequences of actions (Giddens, 1984).
Algorithmic control and rendition as mechanisms of structuration. We propose that struc-
turation in HMC takes place through algorithmic control and the process of rendition. 
Algorithmic control is a form of technical control that is prevalent on labor platforms in 
the gig economy (i.e., ride sharing and the food delivery industry). Companies can use 
algorithms to shape and influence the behavior and outcomes of workers (Wood et al., 
2019). Through the process of rendition (also known as datafication and mediatization; 
Chan & Humphreys, 2018), human action is encoded into organizational or algorithmic 
data (Zuboff, 2019), which in turn constitute structures that enable and constrain employee 
behavior and outcomes. For instance, Wood et al. argue that organizations using algorith-
mic management in the form of platform-based rating or recommendation systems exert 
a form of Taylorist informational control on their employees and that computerization 
intensifies work by increasing monitoring, increasing the pace, and extending work activity 
beyond the conventional workday. 
The hallmark of algorithmic systems is their ability to record and aggregate behavioral 
information and statistics from a variety of internal and external sources (Kellogg et al., 
2020). Algorithms take on agency and are able to serve a managerial role in organizations 
in part due to advancements in deep machine learning through neural networks. In deep 
machine learning, computers use Bayesian statistical models to recognize patterns in large 
amounts of labeled data (often referred to as “tagged data”) (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Deep 
machine learning follows the computer science adage, “garbage in, garbage out” which indi-
cates that human agency (in the form of the quality of the data labeling) will directly impact 
the machine’s ability to learn from the data (Biggio & Roli, 2018; Krizhevsky et al., 2012). 
The algorithms behind Uber’s customer rating system exert influence over the behavior and 
work outcomes of Uber drivers, who can be automatically fired for dropping below a cer-
tain average rating—motivating them to perform emotional labor and engage in strategic 
behavior to increase their customer ratings (Chan & Humphreys, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 
2016). Even without formal power structures (structures of domination), Uber drivers may 
still see the behind-the-scenes algorithm as an AI manager (structures of signification). In 
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other words, algorithmic control through rendition is reflective of a structurational pro-
cess of HMC. As a structurational process, human managers are utilizing machine agency 
that uses data collected from human actors to minimize workers’ intervention and auto-
matically generate data, assess worker behavior, and assign work tasks (Newlands, 2020). 
Machine agency in turn enables and constrains the decision-making and other behavior of 
workers and organizations.
The duality of structure is one of the fundamental sensitizing devices in the structura-
tional approach (Giddens 1979; 1984). Machine learning processes enable algorithmic man-
agement to reflect this duality of structure as they blur the lines between human agency and 
organizational structures. Orlikowski (1992) argued that there is a duality of technology, or 
an inherently interdependent relationship between objective technological properties and 
the interpretive flexibility that facilitates social construction of technology use. Orlikowski 
(1992) recognized that technology is a product of human action because humans create 
and adapt the technology; however, in rendition agency and structure are even more insep-
arable, as user behavior actually forms the basis of the technology. Rendition also allows 
algorithmic managers to adapt in real-time based on changes in user behavior. 
Negotiating Agency and Control: Toward a Research Agenda
Despite the growing use of intelligent technologies in organizations, HMC scholarship has 
focused primarily on explaining human-machine communication at the individual level, 
without consideration of organizational dynamics and control mechanisms. Intelligent 
technologies differ from prior organizational technologies in that they have the potential to 
reposition our conceptualization of technology as object to one of technology as agent. While 
the notion of computers as social agents is not new and stems from the CASA paradigm 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996), CASA is more focused on explaining individual interactions with 
AI, rather than group and organizational level processes. Our structurational framework 
constitutes an important first step in conceptualizing the role agency and control play in 
understanding the processes of HMC in organizational context.
A key feature of the HMC structuration process is that it is dialectical, as organizational 
actors are constantly bound between the negotiations between human and machine agency 
as well as between traditional organizational control and algorithmic control. Therefore, 
we draw on the notion of dialectics in ST to conceptualize what this process might look 
like in organizational use of intelligent technologies. Giddens (1979) was one of the first 
scholars to conceptualize dialectics in social structures, which arise when the operation of 
one structural principle presupposes another that tends to undermine it (Giddens, 1984). 
According to Giddens (1979), dialectics or contradictions arise “in the midst of, and as a 
result of, the structuration of modes of system representation” (p. 141). Giddens defined the 
dialectic of control as a reciprocal power relationship between active agents and institutional 
forms of control. According to Giddens, the dialectic of control is usually constituted by 
conflicts around autonomy and dependence among social actors (e.g., between employees 
and organizations). Howard and Geist (1995) illustrated the dialectic of control in their 
case study on the ideological positioning of employees at a gas company in the context 
of a proposed merger with another company. They identified three dialectics or opposi-
tions, between change and stability, empowerment and powerlessness, and identification 
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and estrangement. Howard and Geist explained that SGC employees took either passive or 
active ideological positions to help them navigate the tensions with the merger. We extend 
the dialectic of control to examine the negotiation of power relationships between human 
agents and intelligent technology agents. While the dialectic of control has traditionally 
focused on tensions between organizational control and employee resistance, AI brings a 
new form of control into the mix: algorithmic control. With this structurational view in 
mind, we now turn to some illustrative examples in organizations to show both theoreti-
cally and practically how humans and machines negotiate this dialectic of control. 
Illustrative Examples
According to Zuboff (2019), the surveillance capitalist system is characterized by tech-
nologies that accurately predict and control human behavior, and this makes the agency 
afforded by these technologies less prominent, hidden, or blurred. For example, car insur-
ance premium rates are determined by a myriad of factors that do not seem to connect to 
driving, such as an individual’s likelihood of shopping around for competitive prices based 
on purchasing history (O’Neil, 2016). Often, these algorithms are so complex that very few 
people—not even the insurance agents themselves—understand how the algorithm arrives 
at the premium numbers. Another example is Amazon’s “Ambots,” the nickname given to 
Amazon warehouse employees who are reviewed on the time it takes them to pick and 
pack items for shipment (Faraj et al., 2018). Managed by algorithms, employees are tracked 
in the warehouse and assigned to pick items based on the most efficient route. Employees 
are rewarded for improving their times or punished for having slower times. We now go 
into further detail on three examples to illustrate our structurational view of HMC. Each of 
the examples we will use—A/B testing, humans in the loop, and automated journalism—
represent uses of intelligent technologies that are becoming more prevalent in organiza-
tions. They each reflect a dialectic of control in terms of the negotiation of human-machine 
agency and control. 
A/B testing. One example that illustrates our structurational perspective is A/B testing. 
This is an example of information asymmetries in AI systems (Rosenblat, 2019), which are 
defined as situations “in which one party knows more than the other” (Sundararajan, 2016, 
p. 139). In A/B testing, software designers create different versions of platforms in order 
to understand how differences in features impact user behavior. A/B trials can range from 
minor discrepancies to entirely different ecosystems for users. Rosenblat explained that in 
the rideshare context of Uber, different types of A/B testing may include paying one group 
of employees more than another, offering different types of bonuses for giving a certain 
number of rides, and even different visual displays that may or may not shape work behav-
iors. Often, users do not know they are a part of A/B trials as their knowledge might impact 
research that developers are conducting. A/B testing enables companies to conduct more 
rigorous rendition, since it allows machine learning systems to observe and learn from a 
variety of user behavior in response to changing stimuli. In this case, machine agency is 
comprised mainly of reflexive monitoring, whereas the agency of users takes the form of 
practical consciousness as they go about their habituated work routines without awareness 
of how platforms are shaping their work behaviors. 
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The changing nature of AI systems in A/B testing has important implications for struc-
turational approaches to technology. One implication is that the structural rules of the 
technology have the potential to change from user to user; this means that there might be 
tensions between knowledgeability in machine and human actors. In the rideshare exam-
ple, machines have more knowledge about which workers are funneled into different eco-
systems, while rideshare workers may be completely unaware that there are discrepancies. 
The dialectic of control plays out as different features (e.g., visual displays) impact user 
behavior, which in turn provides data and inputs that inform, optimize, and transform the 
system. 
Humans in the loop. A second example is humans in the loop (HIL), a phrase that describes 
the partnership of humans and computers (intelligent algorithms) working together on 
tasks to achieve the highest level of performance and efficiency (Malone, 2018). Despite the 
common narrative that machines will destroy jobs, the reality is that intelligent technolo-
gies can only provide a replacement for certain tasks within job roles. Companies rely on 
humans to perform tasks that AI cannot do or that would be inefficient or costly to develop 
an algorithmic system to do. Malone argued that rather than regarding intelligent technolo-
gies as replacements for humans, we should consider them as complements to human capa-
bilities and vice versa. Workers becoming HIL will experience changes in processes and 
redesigning of tasks, which could be sites of struggle as the balance of control and agency 
becomes less equal (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018).
The collaboration process between humans and machines, also called heteromation 
(Ekbia & Nardi, 2014), may vary in terms of the distribution of control and agency between 
humans and computers as manifested in both task distributions and the visibility of the 
respective agent. Collaborations involving low algorithmic control (compared to humans) 
include knowledge-sharing platforms such as Wikipedia, which combines human knowl-
edge and creativity with the capabilities of the internet and data storage platform technol-
ogy to build the largest encyclopedia the world has ever seen (Malone, 2018). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, collaborations involving high algorithmic con-
trol include the phenomenon known as “ghost work” (Gray & Suri, 2019). In ghost work, 
humans perform tasks that an algorithm is unable to do, including cleaning and organizing 
unstructured data, verifying locations and identities, and creating content. In other words, 
rather than technology being a complement to the human, the human is the augment to 
the technology. Tasks done by ghost workers are typically repetitive and simple, for exam-
ple, training a facial recognition algorithm to recognize a particular image by answering 
“yes” or “no” to whether two provided pictures are the same person (Kellogg et al., 2020). 
In ghost work, machine learning algorithms take on high levels of agency and algorithmic 
control and humans seem to disappear. For example, Microsoft’s Face API uses ghost work-
ers to increase the accuracy of identity detection for Uber’s Real-time ID Check (Gray & 
Suri, 2019). Uber drivers are randomly selected to provide a selfie for identity verification, 
and if the algorithm is unable to determine whether the profile and selfie images match, 
the images are sent to a ghost worker who has approximately 30 seconds to compare the 
pictures and decide whether they are a match or not. This human worker is critical to the 
system for providing training to the algorithm, safety to the Uber passenger, and continued 
income for the driver. This human, however, remains nameless and is only alluded to in 
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passing in Uber’s description of the verification process; the human gets placed into the 
technological black box. It is important to note that even in such cases where algorithms 
seem to have most of the control, humans play an important (albeit invisible) role in per-
forming tasks designed to correct and teach the machine. This suggests that despite the 
increased potential for algorithmic agency and control in organizations, humans will still 
maintain control over tasks where the algorithm falls short. This reflects Giddens’s (1984) 
notion that even workers in low power positions can exert agency.
Automated journalism. A third example in which algorithms are impacting agency and 
structural norms is automated (or algorithmic) journalism. Public scrutiny about journal-
istic integrity, political bias, and elitism has fueled the proliferation of algorithms in this 
field as they are viewed as being less biased than their human counterparts (Graefe et al., 
2018). Rather than having news content selected by editors and feedback mainly consist-
ing of paper or magazine sales, real-time analytics provide journalists and outlets instant 
feedback on readership and actions such as link sharing through social media. Journalists 
are now accountable to their readers more than their editors, and content is driven by what 
authors think will get the most attention (Christin, 2017). In the new field of automated 
journalism, news outlets such as the Associated Press are utilizing “robot authors” to create 
content faster and in a less costly manner than human reporters (Graefe et al., 2018). This 
increased use of algorithms has prompted discussions within the field on redefining previ-
ously held understanding of what it means to be an author and a journalist, as well as larger 
discussions on what journalism is and how the field should operate (Carlson, 2015). The 
phenomenon of automated journalism can be reinterpreted through a structurational lens. 
For instance, a study of the code and algorithms contained in mobile news apps challenges 
the common notion that algorithms are replacing humans as producers of news, by high-
lighting the role of code in helping journalists order and communicate the news (Weber & 
Kosterich, 2018). This study illustrates the dialectic of control between human and machine 
agency, as human actors imbue decisions and agency into the code such that it takes on 
agency of its own and begins to occupy an editorial role, prioritizing and sorting news based 
on the human input it receives.  
Future Research Agenda and Conclusion
Viewing HMC through a structurational framework helps to advance HMC scholarship. 
First, it helps to explain the recursive relationship between human and machine agency 
and the process through which they are mutually constituted in organizations. This struc-
turational process occurs as human agency creates the behavior that constitutes the knowl-
edgeability (or intelligence) of machine agency. Machines then learn by surveilling human 
actions, and when algorithmic systems have high predictive value, they can in turn limit 
human agency without people being aware of it. The process of rendition also makes it diffi-
cult for humans to oversee how machines are learning, which means increased potential for 
exacerbating existing biases. Second, a structurational framework provides an important 
counterpoint to scholarship on algorithmic control, which has emphasized its constraining 
structural elements (e.g., Newlands, 2020; Wood et al., 2019; Zuboff, 2019) by bringing in 
agency (as an interplay between human and machine agency). This highlights the fact that, 
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while agentic, algorithmic systems are not a form of “autonomous technology” (Sturken et 
al., 2004) that exists outside of human control. Rather, they are continually produced and 
reproduced through human action. While they may have unintended consequences, they 
are continually evolving in a recursive relationship with the human actors that interact with 
them and provide them with inputs. 
Viewing these changes through a structurational lens enables scholars to provide a 
broader picture not only for fellow researchers, but for practitioners as intelligent technol-
ogies impact work teams and shape organizational cultures. For example, increasing use of 
these technologies can affect learning and reshape what is considered expertise, which in 
turn can have a ripple effect as newer employees are onboarded and tensions between older 
and newer practices arise. In some cases, employees would resort to deviant methods to 
learn skills after the implementation of a new technology, called “shadow learning” (Beane, 
2019). Additionally, intelligent technologies with more control over decision-making, such 
as intelligent personal assistants or even intelligent project managers, can interrupt team 
learning and knowledge sharing which can then impact overall team performance (Yan et 
al., 2020). 
There are several avenues that future research on this topic should consider. First, there 
may be additional dimensions besides control and agency that impact the role of AI in 
collaborative practices. For instance, the degree of visibility and embodiment of intelligent 
technologies may influence the role they can play and the level of control they have. Future 
research should also consider how issues of control and agency may vary across differ-
ent types of work and occupational cultures. For instance, higher skilled professionals that 
have deeply engrained tacit knowledge, domain-specific training, and professional hierar-
chies such as lawyers may have more difficulty working alongside intelligent technologies. 
Certain occupational practices, such as attorney-client privilege and liability, may result in 
certain organizational members being more resistant to using AI due to privacy or ethical 
concerns, concerns about its judgment, or concerns about its accuracy. There may also be 
different occupational cultures around blue-collar/manufacturing work versus white-collar 
information or knowledge work that shape perceptions and usage of intelligent technol-
ogies. These cultural differences may shape dominant discourses around automation and 
job security, concerns or fears about loss of control, and resistance to technology. Applying 
our structurational perspective to study occupational culture, for example, would involve 
immersive observation or interviews to learn about the particular occupational context and 
how institutional logics associated with it shape how intelligent technologies are used and 
perceived. It would also be best served through a longitudinal design to allow for observa-
tion of recursive relationship between human and machine agency and the ways in which 
they interact and shape one another over time. 
Our structurational framework suggests new research questions to inform the HMC 
research agenda going forward. What will happen as intelligent technologies develop more 
knowledgeability and reflexive monitoring? How do organizations work with AI that can 
take on fully agentic roles? How can we understand new relationships between agency and 
structure in the rendition process? How do workers communicatively resist algorithmic 
control? One example of this is adversarial machine learning, in which humans intention-
ally provide inputs to subvert rather than improve the accuracy of AI systems (e.g., by trick-
ing facial recognition systems to recognize a turtle as a rifle) (Biggio & Roli, 2018). Finally, 
166 Human-Machine Communication 
does algorithmic management inevitably represent a return to Taylorist control, or can it be 
restructured to provide more worker empowerment? 
In conclusion, as intelligent technologies become more ubiquitous in organizations, 
it is important to understand how these new organizational agents will affect processes of 
organizing. Our structurational framework helps to theorize the process by which human 
and machine agency is mutually constituted and negotiated in a dialectic of control. One 
consequence of this imbrication of human and machine agency is that machines are start-
ing to act more human at the same time as humans are starting to act more like machines. 
We encourage researchers to find novel ways to apply our structurational framework to help 
guide our understanding of AI and its role in organizing processes.
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Abstract
Artificial intuition (AI acting intuitively) is one trend in artificial intelligence. This article ana-
lyzes how it is discussed by technology journalism on the internet. The journalistic narra-
tives that were analyzed claim that intuition can make AI more efficient, autonomous, and 
human. Some commentators also write that intuitive AI could execute tasks better than 
humans themselves ever could (e.g., in digital games); therefore, it could ultimately surpass 
human intuition. Such views do not pay enough attention to biases as well as transparency 
and explainability of AI. We contrast the journalistic narratives with philosophical under-
standings of intuition and a psychoanalytic view of the human. Those perspectives allow 
for a more complex view that goes beyond the focus on rationality and computational per-
spectives of tech journalism.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI), artificial intuition, human subject, psychoanalysis, 
technology journalism
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an evolving and significant technology. It is increasingly dis-
cussed in the media and there are many dedicated popular journalistic websites that cover 
the latest trends and ideas of AI development (Bory, 2019; Brennen et al., 2018; Goode, 2018; 
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hyped up and exaggerated claims, and not necessarily very balanced (Goode, 2018, p. 186). 
AI seems capable of inspiring popular accounts that show the authors’ amazement, enthu-
siasm for, but also fear of, the technology (Cave et al., 2018). 
Rather than focusing on the accuracy, the authors’ emotional investment, or implied 
audience response to AI media coverage as some scholars have done, this article follows 
a different aim. In focusing on one specific trend of contemporary AI, not AI as a whole, 
we are interested in analyzing it in relation to the following research question: What kind 
of view of the human subject is articulated in technology journalism about artificial intu-
ition? This broad question refers to both how artificial intuition is discussed in relation to 
alleged human characteristics that are inherent to the technology, and what kind of view 
of the human in general is evident in the examined articles. We pay specific attention to 
how this phenomenon is being discussed on journalistic websites with a focus on technol-
ogy (the websites iTech Post, Toolbox, TechXplore, Inverse, Business World, Science Mag, 
TechCrunch, Science Daily, Venture Beat, KDnuggets, Hackermoon, Inc, and Hadean were 
part of the sample) which cater for a particular audience, rather than more “mainstream” 
quality journalistic websites such as those of broadsheet or tabloid newspapers. Brennen 
et al. (2020) define technology journalism as coverage of “the technology industry” (p. 16) 
by which they mean reporting on the products of technology businesses, on technology 
businesses themselves, and on the social effects of technology. Tech journalism often covers 
emerging and new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, communication technology, 
bio- or nanotechnology. Brennen et al. (2020) argue that it is an understudied phenomenon 
and “there is a rich potential for future studies of technology journalism” (p. 15). Artificial 
intuition is so recent and somewhat niche that it has not been adequately covered by tab-
loid or broadsheet journalism yet. This article therefore specifically focuses on online tech 
journalism. While each sampled website may have its own focus, target audience, style, and 
mission, all can be seen as belonging to the category of tech journalism. It would be beyond 
the scope of the initial research into the topic to discuss each sampled outlet in more detail. 
Journalistic content is sometimes written by individuals who are, for example, data scien-
tists or AI experts rather than journalists. It is also questionable if some of the outlets exam-
ined in this article employ the same measures of quality control as traditional journalism as 
authors for some could self-publish their views on the topic (Brennen et al., 2020). Future 
research could situate the research findings more in relation to the specificities of the differ-
ent outlets of tech journalism.
The central point of this article is that the journalistic narratives that were analyzed 
claim that AI can mimic and adopt characteristics of human intuition. The data we discuss 
show a view of the human subject that articulates that AI can both learn from and that it can 
be better and more advanced than human intuition. We argue that such views demonstrate 
the desire of many journalists who write about AI to make it human-like. It is argued that 
intuition can make AI more efficient, autonomous, human, and flexible than it currently is. 
As we discuss in the last section on AI and games, the ultimate hope for some commentators 
is that tasks can be executed more efficiently than humans themselves ever could. Therefore, 
intuitive AI could ultimately surpass human intuition. However, such views do not pay 
enough attention to questions of the human subject as well as transparency, explainability, 
and accountability of AI. 
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Literature Review 
There are many different definitions of AI (see, e.g., Russell & Norvig, 2010; Turner, 2019 
for overviews). Generally, artificial intelligence refers to “the study of agents that receive 
percepts from the environment and perform actions” (Russell & Norvig, 2010, p. viii). Such 
agents are often machines, such as digital computers. Turner defines AI as the “ability of 
a non-natural entity to make choices by an evaluative process” (p. 16). Non-natural, for 
Turner, both refers to human-made as well as machine-made (when AI systems create other 
AI for example). 
While AI technologies have been in development since the 1950s, recent years have 
seen advancements in the complexity of AI when it comes to emulating cognitive character-
istics of humans. On a general level, AI has seen increasing developments in the past 10–15 
years in particular thanks to the growth of better hardware, data processing, and increased 
capacity to store and analyze large datasets (Turner, 2019). The seeming ubiquity of AI has 
led to both an increase in scholarly discussions in the humanities and social sciences as well 
as AI being picked up by news media. Given that as a technology AI often seeks to simulate 
or emulate human behavior (such as problem-solving, cognitive abilities, or pattern rec-
ognition) and advance such human characteristics, it is unsurprising that it has attracted 
much attention by journalists and scholars alike.
Artificial intuition refers to the ability of AI systems to make intuitive choices or respond 
intuitively to problems (Crowder & Friess, 2013). It was chosen as an example of current 
discussions of trends in AI that are picked up by journalistic websites with a focus on tech-
nology. Questions around intuitive AI have been gaining in prominence in recent years 
(e.g., when it comes to discussions about self-driving cars or the ability of AI systems that 
are used for gaming, such as DeepMind’s AlphaGo). 
Artificial intuition is compared to, for example, neuromorphic hardware, machine 
learning, or neural networks, more in its infancy (Crowder & Friess, 2013; Srdanov et al., 
2016; Tao & He, 2009). As we show, there is some hype around artificial intuition. This 
makes it all the more relevant to analyze. It has also been discussed in literature on AI that 
comes from a computer science or engineering perspective for some time and has gained 
more attention in recent years (Caudill & Butler, 1990; Crowder & Friess, 2013; Diaz- 
Hernandez & Gonzalez-Villela, 2015; Dundas & Chik, 2011; Frantz, 2003; Johnny et al., 
2019; Srdanov et al., 2016; Tao & He, 2009). 
AI acting intuitively may be necessary in certain situations, because decisions can be 
made quicker than in logical AI. Johnny et al. (2019) define artificial intuition as “the ability 
of a system to assess a problem context and use pattern recognition or properties from a 
dataset to choose a course of action or aid the decision process in an automatic manner” 
(p. 470). Srdanov et al. (2016) propose a trial and error approach which combines logic and 
randomness in order to reach a specific solution or solve a problem (e.g., making moves 
in a game). They argue that this provides a way to reach a goal quicker than without trial 
and error. Diaz-Hernandez and Gonzalez-Villela (2015) suggest that human intuition can 
be mapped onto artificial intuition through three shared characteristics: inputs, process-
ing, and outputs. In acting intuitively, both users and AI systems unconsciously process 
inputs, act upon them, and generate outputs or solutions. They tested their model through 
a robot that picked and placed objects on a surface. Johnny et al. (2019) note that one of the 
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potential benefits of artificial intuition is reducing “the complexity of the set of instructions 
needed to solve the task” (p. 466); for example, in an algorithm. 
From a technical perspective, intuition is seen in the above works as “subconscious 
pattern recognition” (Frantz, 2003, p. 266) of humans and AI systems. All of the authors 
discussed above seek to translate human intuition into a technical concept which can be 
operationalized. We argue that the way intuition is approached in those studies is, perhaps 
paradoxically, anti-intuitive. Intuition is conceptualized as “scientific—rational, logical” 
(Frantz, 2003, p. 267). This was often mirrored in the way it is presented in the sample of 
tech journalism articles. 
Such forms of rationalistic accounts of intuition are in contrast to how it is theorized 
in cultural studies and the humanities more generally. In trying to map intuition onto 
computer science, and thereby essentially making it code-based, the above accounts lose 
the complexity of intuition and how it relates to dimensions beyond language and con-
sciousness. For instance, human intuition is not the same as a trial and error approach in 
computation, as Srdanov et al. (2016) claim. While some computer scientists have acknowl-
edged that artificial intuition will remain limited compared to its human counterpart (Diaz- 
Hernandez & Gonzalez-Villela, 2015), there is scope to put such scholarship in dialogue 
with other disciplines. 
The term “intuition” has been discussed from many different perspectives. For the pur-
pose of this article we shall largely draw on how intuition has been defined in cultural 
studies, affect theories, and psychoanalysis (for extensive discussion of the term, see Chud-
noff, 2013). Intuition is dependent on an individual human subject and therefore differs 
for each person. It is commonly understood as a form of knowing that is experienced and 
felt rather than fully consciously known. It is often associated with terms like gut feeling, 
hunch, or having a sense of something. Intuition designates a bodily state or experience upon 
which the individual acts without necessarily having the (empirical) evidence or proof. It 
is something transitory that is followed or listened to and may then be acted upon without 
fully understanding why. It refers to a mode of experience within immediacy. It is hap-
pening in the now, before being fully rendered conscious and cognitively apprehended by 
the individual. Intuition is not opposed to, or in contradiction to reason, however. Greg 
Seigworth (2006) has written that “experience and experiment through the faculty of intu-
ition [. . .] exceeds or overflows the intellect” (p. 118). For Carolyn Pedwell (2019), intuition 
“is embodied experience prior to, or in excess of, its translation into the parsing categories 
of representational and analytical thought” (p. 127). Lauren Berlant (2008) has character-
ized intuition as an acute source of knowledge. It is a form of “affective intelligence” (p. 852) 
that shows itself in a particular relational sensitivity to the worldly surroundings of humans. 
 “With intuition, experience is less a discrete place in the time past belonging to a sub-
ject, and more an immanent process of relation (beyond inside and outside, beyond subject 
and object)” (Seigworth, 2006, p. 119). Such conceptualizations of intuition broaden its 
theoretical frame to include a relational and open perspective. 
We were specifically interested in how human subjectivity is discussed in tech jour-
nalism’s articles on artificial intuition. This article is informed by a psychoanalytic theory 
of the human subject. This means that the human subject and specifically their cognitive 
functions go beyond rationality and mechanistic accounts which often link computational 
facilities to the brain (Turkle, 2005). According to psychoanalysis, humans are shaped 
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by emotional, affective, intuitive, as well as rational actions and feelings (Rosenblatt & 
Thickstun, 1994). 
Psychoanalysis holds that humans are intuitive, complex, inefficient, contradictory, and 
sometimes flawed beings. Human beings are influenced by unconscious processes which 
shape their fantasies, desires, and actions. This emphasis of the unconscious includes con-
siderations of intuition (Board, 1958; Rosenblatt & Thickstun, 1994; Szalita-Pemow, 1955). 
Humans regularly make unconscious decisions and this includes intuition but also goes 
beyond it. For Sigmund Freud, it is both the intuition of the psychoanalyst as well as that of 
the patient that enables the free associative form of talking in the consulting room during 
a therapy session (Freud, 1981). For psychoanalysis, then, intuition refers to ways of know-
ing and experiencing the world where parts of knowledge “are unconscious or otherwise 
unavailable for conscious delineation” (Board, 1958, p. 237). 
Artificial Intelligence in the Media 
The question how artificial intelligence is discussed in the media and in particular what kind 
of image of the human, is shown through such narratives and has been researched only by a 
few scholars (Bory, 2019; Brennen et al., 2018; Goode, 2018; Natale & Ballatore, 2017). Natale 
and Ballatore (2017) examined early media coverage of AI in technological magazines from 
the 1950s to the 1970s. They found that the articles they examined created a “myth” (p. 2) 
of AI inevitably becoming a thinking machine which would be able to simulate the human 
brain. Bory compared the coverage on IBM’s Deep Blue in 1997 and DeepMind’s AlphaGo in 
2016. He argues that there has been a shift in narratives from suspicion and conflicted views 
about Deep Blue in the late 1990s toward recent discourses about AlphaGo that frame it as 
embodying human characteristics such as beauty or trust while simultaneously being dis-
tinctly unhuman-like. This leads to a view of AI as complementary to humans and opening 
up ways of collaboration rather than competition between the two. Bourne (2019) similarly 
discusses how AI is framed by PR strategists to promote particular understandings of AI as 
“friendly” and “competitive.” This masks problematic aspects of AI such as its deployment 
for purposes of discrimination, or harassment. Goode (2018) analyzed mainstream science 
fiction, media events (such as AlphaGo), and futurology discourses around AI and argues 
that they are often sensationalist and misleading, for example, when it comes to discourses 
about a coming artificial mind. Yet, such discourses can also serve as useful entry points to 
initiate more nuanced public debate about AI, as Goode argues.
Brennen et al. (2018) have analyzed how UK media have covered artificial intelligence 
over 8 months. They show that there can be a bias toward industry sources in media cov-
erage and that sources from academia, government, and wider civil society were in the 
minority in their sample. AI is often being politicized in media coverage when it comes 
to ethical questions such as bias, automation, national security, discrimination, and other 
issues. Such questions are downplayed by the industry in order not to damage its image. 
They conclude that there is a risk of covering AI in a one-sided manner. Cave et al. (2018) 
have analyzed how researchers, communicators, policymakers, and different publics talk 
about AI. Their analyses show that “[p]revalent AI narratives share dominant characteris-
tics: a focus on embodiment; a tendency towards utopian or dystopian extremes; and a lack 
of diversity in creators, protagonists, and types of AI” (p. 4). 
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No research has specifically focused on tech journalism’s coverage of artificial intuition 
in relation to human subjectivity. There is, thus, scope to further research on the discussion 
of particular aspects of AI by technology journalism outlets, particularly in relation to how 
the human subject is imagined in them. 
Methodology 
The research that forms the basis of this article specifically focused on one technical aspect 
of AI and how it was covered by tech journalism websites. The articles were obtained by 
performing a keyword search using Google UK (general search) with the keywords “arti-
ficial intuition” and “artificial AND intuition” as well as “artificial intui*” (to include vari-
ations of the word, such as “intuitive”) in May 2019 and September 2020. It needs to be 
acknowledged that using Google as a sampling procedure can be seen as problematic but 
is nonetheless used by scholars as a form of data collection (Ballatore, 2015; Wouters & 
Gerbec, 2006). The researchers’ institutions had no access to databases such as Factiva that 
would specifically include online sources (rather than only newspaper articles). Given the 
exploratory nature of this study, a broad approach to sampling was taken in order to include 
a diverse range of websites. Using a newspaper database such as LexisNexis would have 
restricted the sample, because tech journalism websites are not indexed. Additionally, a 
keyword search via LexisNexis did not return any results for “artificial intuition” from 2012 
onward. Google was thus pursued as the most pragmatic sampling procedure. The search 
was initially performed using a university computer, based in London (UK). Using Google 
as a basis for data collection may shape how results are presented because of the location 
of the search queries, personalized Google profiles, or cookies saved on the computer. In 
order to replicate the sampling procedure, the same searches were performed using a public 
computer (without cookies being stored) at the same university. Those procedures were 
followed in order to obtain “results as close to the product’s default results as possible” (Bal-
latore, 2015, online). 
As the phenomenon of this article is relatively new, only articles published from 2016–2019 
were selected for inclusion in order to analyze the most recent discussions. Articles from 
the first four pages of Google (10 results per page) were selected for analysis in order to 
select the most popular results (Ballatore, 2015). The following sampling procedure was 
followed: Articles selected for sample inclusion needed to feature a discussion of artificial 
intuition that was longer than 300 words. Only articles from professional websites and not 
from personal homepages (private homepages created by individuals) were selected. Arti-
cles needed to fall into a broad definition of tech journalism that catered for an audience 
with an interest in technology and specifically AI (Brennen et al., 2020; Natale & Ballatore, 
2017). Only articles that sought to explain artificial intuition were included. A total of 29 
articles were sampled (see annex table for an overview of all sampled articles). A small sam-
ple was deliberately chosen in order to conduct a qualitative, detailed thematic textual anal-
ysis of the data (Mayring, 2000; Saldaña, 2009). A total of seven items are discussed in this 
article. Qualitative data analysis was conducted as follows: The content was read and then 
coded into themes using Nvivo, some of which are outlined further in the following sec-
tions (Mayring, 2000; Saldaña, 2009). Themes were constructed as summaries of common 
points made across articles in order to group articles together. The themes were analyzed 
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through a qualitative thematic analysis with a specific focus on how AI technologies were 
being discussed in relation to human subjectivity. We thus paid particular attention to how 
AI was described in relation to the human (e.g., through evoking human characteristics, 
such as the body, brain functioning, cognition, or intuition). Two themes were of a more 
general nature and dealt with what artificial intuition is and how it relates to human intu-
ition. They were included in this article to introduce readers to an analysis of the topic. A 
third theme in relation to discussions of practical implementations of artificial intuition 
in games was selected in order to include journalistic discussions beyond definitions or 
broader narratives. The tables below provide a summary of the items of this article and their 
themes and coding rules. 
TABLE 1 Overview of Sampled Items 
Theme and Summary Number of Items Coding Rules 
#1 Defining Artificial Intuition: 
Defined in relation to human 
intuition
In this article: Four Article must include general 
discussions of artificial intuition 
which define it
#2 Intuition and Rationality: 
Discussed as making AI more 
rational and unbiased 
In this article: Two Article must include discussions of 
AI as becoming more rational and 
unbiased when being intuitive 
#3 Practical Implications of Artificial 
Intuition in Games: Discussed as 
surpassing human intuition
In this article: Two Article must include discussions 
of practical implications of AI for 
AI-based digital games 
TABLE 2 Further Information on the Sampled Items
Title Outlet/Author Length and Theme URL
Deep Learning, Artificial 
Intuition and the Quest 
for AGI
KDNuggets/Carlos Perez 1,132 words 
#1
Link 1
Artificial Intuition Medium/Kees Groeneveld 1,739 words
#1 
Link 2
Artificial Intuition Medium/Nell Watson 677 words
#1
Link 3 
Did A.I. just make the leap 
to being intuitive?
Inc/Thomas Koulopoulos 483 words 
#1 and #2
Link 4
Artificial intuition will 
supersede artificial 
intelligence, experts say
NetworkWorld/Patrick Nelson 561 words 
#2
Link 5
Building worlds to grow 
the artificial mind: The AI 
petri-dish
Hadean/Rashid Mansoor 522 words 
#3
Link 6
A computer’s newfound 
“intuition” beats world 
poker champs
CNN Health/Michael Nedelman 1,378 words 
#3
Link 7
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While a larger sample might have been beneficial, this article focuses on detailed discussion 
and therefore features a limited amount of data. Future research could devote more scope 
for further empirical analyses. A more complex sampling procedure could also be followed 
(e.g., by including tabloid and broadsheet newspapers of specific countries). 
Defining Artificial Intuition
Eight items in the sample discuss artificial intuition in a more general manner. For instance, 
Groeneveld (2018) makes the argument when writing about Deep Learning and AI that 
such a type of AI is actually a form of artificial intuition, because we do not fully know 
how Deep Learning networks come to acquire their knowledge. Frank Pasquale (2015) and 
others have critically discussed AI through the metaphor of the black box. They argue that, 
for example, AI-based algorithms deliberately obfuscate their operations from users, com-
petitors, and governments in the interests of competition, surveillance, and profit maximi-
zation (see also Burrell, 2016; Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Finn, 2017). The journalistic outlets 
examined are less critical and instead are more celebratory in tone. This may be because of 
the wider ways in which technology is often framed by such outlets as something inherently 
positive and useful for humans, as scholars have pointed out (Bourne, 2019; Brennen et. al., 
2020; Goode, 2018; Natale & Ballatore, 2017). This points to a problem of such narratives in 
which the appearance of AI is mistaken for its essence: it is argued that AI can make intuitive 
decisions which are human-like. “They [neural networks] are able to creatively fill in gaps 
and make intuitive leaps to make an appropriate response to a given situation” (Watson, 
2017, online), writes one commentator, for example. An article on the tech website KDnug-
gets similarly suggests: 
Deep Learning systems exhibit behavior that appears biological despite not being 
based on biological material. It so happens that humanity has luckily stumbled 
upon Artificial Intuition in the form of Deep Learning. (Perez, 2017, online) 
The equation between humans and AI based on the appearance or particular exhibition 
of certain processes is simplistic. Intuition is narrowly characterized as something compu-
tational: 
First off, intuition is just a label we use for a correct decision that’s based on 
incomplete knowledge. We’re okay if people are intuitive, in fact we elevate and 
admire them for it, but we’re unsettled by the prospect of a machine making a 
decision that involves intuition, ambiguity, or less than complete data. But what 
if our gut is nothing more than a bunch of variables that we’re not consciously 
aware of? (Koulopoulos, 2017, online)
Such a computational view of the human subject is quite different to how human intu-
ition is seen in the humanities and specifically in psychoanalysis. While intuition is gen-
erally seen as a positive characteristic of humans, a psychoanalytic view complicates this. 
For psychoanalysis, intuition is an unconscious process (Jung, 1977). The psychoanalyst 
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C. G. Jung (1977) defined intuition as “perception via the unconscious” (p. 306) where 
one may be perceiving something without conscious awareness. Broadly speaking, one of 
the goals of psychoanalytic therapy is for individuals to understand better why they acted 
impulsively, intuitively, and emotionally in particular situations. It understands intuition 
as being shaped by an individual’s biography and their unconscious fantasies and actions. 
The patient enters into therapy as they suffer because of past or present conflicts, experi-
ences, or relations. They may act intuitively and subsequently understand their intuition 
better through talking to a psychoanalyst. Unconscious processes can never be rendered 
completely conscious and some core of the unconscious will always remain (Freud, 1981; 
Jung, 1977). We evoke the clinical setting at this point because it illustrates the complexity 
of intuition that AI does not have. In that sense, AI would not act intuitively in a certain 
situation as a human might because of a past trauma or specific unconscious experience. A 
psychoanalytic view of intuition and human subjectivity helps to contrast it with the very 
different understanding of artificial intuition that is put forward in the above narratives. 
While artificial intuition may appear human-like, it cannot reach the complexity of human 
intuition as it is unique to each individual. Deploying intuition as a notion or model for AI 
is therefore problematic. 
Based on the definitions of intuition in some of the journalistic outlets, commentators 
misrecognize intuition as a technicality that can be added to AI in order to make it more 
flexible, dynamic, and autonomous. As discussed earlier, for cultural theorists, intuition 
is about an immediate affective and sensorial engagement with the world (Berlant, 2008; 
Pedwell, 2019; Seigworth, 2006). For commentators on AI, it is portrayed as a technicality 
that should be built. The intuitiveness of AI is code-based. AI cannot sense intuitively in 
the same way a human can. Intuition is something that would be programmed into AI. It 
would be defined through language (code) what and how AI can act intuitively. This shows 
the limits of true intuition, because for cultural studies scholars the term refers to sensual, 
affective processes that are in tension with or beyond the discursive. Furthermore, humans 
cannot be taught to be intuitive; they cannot follow a set of pre-defined rules in order to 
perfect a sense of intuition. Neither could AI. Psychoanalysis understands intuition as asso-
ciative. Rather than seeing intuitions as forms of unconscious pattern recognition, as some 
computer scientists do, intuitions can be regarded as “apprehensions for which one has no 
conscious reason” (Perkins, 1976, p. 120). 
What is at stake here, then, is the deployment of intuition with good intentions by 
journalists (following technical developments in AI) but its underlying technicality may 
ultimately harm both humans and AI. Artificial intuition becomes just another form of 
rationality with little connection to how it is understood in other disciplines. We unpack 
this point further in the following pages.
Intuition, Unbiased Rationality, and Transparency 
Artificial intuition is in all of the sampled articles regarded as something that can make 
AI more effective and which would ultimately require less human supervision or control. 
A journalist writes about the development of a planning algorithm at MIT: “The school 
recently said it now knows how to include human intuition in a machine algorithm. That’s 
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a big deal” (Nelson, 2017, online). Such sentences suggest that intuition can be coded into 
AI. An article on Inc.com similarly states: 
AI is actually very well suited to making those sorts of highly intuitive decisions. 
Since it’s not conscious, it has no bias as to what it observes and therefore it’s 
aware of everything that influences a particular decision. (Koulopoulos, 2017, 
online)
The above author argues that AI is unbiased in its observation of its surroundings. How-
ever, AI is far from being unbiased. AI-powered systems have been built by humans, with 
inherent biases, in the first place and those are often (un)consciously built into the technol-
ogy (Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Noble, 2018; West et al., 2019). Such narratives also leave out 
sociocultural aspects of humans and AI; for example, biases of AI systems against certain 
individuals. Such biases mirror wider social inequalities and stereotypes as they are (un)
consciously coded into AI. The question if, for example, a neural network can make a deci-
sion based on a hunch is significant, because it can potentially grant even more power to 
such systems. Researchers have pointed to the ineffectiveness and racialized bias of various 
AI systems (West et al., 2019). Such ethical questions were largely absent from the items in 
the sample. 
The issue of intuition also relates to wider debates concerning transparency and 
explainability in AI (Burrell, 2016; Felzmann et al., 2019). AI systems log and store their 
own decisions and processes, so that humans can scrutinize and troubleshoot them. In that 
sense, AI is always conscious (aware) of its own processes. However, it is often not possible 
to explain to lay people how particular decisions have been made by AI, because they are 
too complex. Intuition would only add to this, because something partly unexplainable 
through discourse would be needed to be explained by AI (or humans) in order for it to be 
accountable. This complicates the notion of “retrospective transparency” of AI. Felzmann 
et al. (2019) define retrospective transparency as a process that “reveals for a specific case 
how and why a certain decision was reached, describing the data processing step by step” 
(p. 2). This means that individuals should be able to understand the different factors that 
led to particular decisions of an AI (both input- and output-related). However, as Felzmann 
et al. point out, notions of transparency, as they show themselves in practices of informed 
consent, for example, often assume a rational and fully autonomous individual (Johanssen, 
2019). Yet, there are limits to human rationality, as we have also discussed via our psychoan-
alytic considerations of subjectivity. Individuals may not always be able or willing to under-
stand complex technological processes (Kemper & Kolkman, 2018). Expectations around 
transparency also differ according to the specifics of a particular AI (e.g., a social media 
algorithm or a self-driving car). Users may still trust technology even if they cannot be fully 
informed about its use (Heald, 2006). However, if the “willingness to be accountable” is 
seen as “a core indicator of trustworthiness” of AI (Felzmann et al., 2019, p. 10), it remains 
questionable how such a willingness could be achieved in the case of artificial intuition.
Such questions further complicate ethical considerations of artificial intuition. There is 
a danger in advocating intuitive AI because intuition is by definition difficult, if not impos-
sible, to explain and account for. If AI acted truly intuitively, this could serve as a justifi-
cation for being intransparent and opaque, because particular intuitive actions could not 
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be explained. It would further the perception of AI as a black box (Pasquale, 2015). Intu-
ition without accountability and transparency would be dangerous. This would also lead to 
declining trust in AI (Felzmann et al., 2019).
Going beyond the technical aspects of artificial intuition, how the term is (mis)used in 
tech outlets shows a particular understanding of human subjectivity. AI is not only anthro-
pomorphized and made more human through the advocacy for intuition, at the same time, 
humans are made more machinic, algorithmic, and technical than they really are in the 
data we examine. This is done through formulations such as “intuition is just a label we 
use for a correct decision that’s based on incomplete knowledge,” our gut being “a bunch of 
variables” that we are “not consciously aware of ” (Koulopoulos, 2017, online). The human 
subject is regarded in a one-dimensional, functionalist way. Humans and AI function in the 
same ways and are almost interchangeable. Such equations do not do justice to the com-
plexity of human subjectivity. The human mind is more contradictory and messier than a 
computer (Turkle, 2005). 
Such narratives are similar to the ones of the computer scientists we discussed ear-
lier which suggest that artificial intuition is something that can be coded based on human 
intuition. Such an argument is too simplistic and while it may speak to the desire of map-
ping human characteristics onto AI, there is a risk in understanding the human being only 
in terms that come from computer science. Human subjectivity, in particular, is not only 
grounded in rationality and language. 
Applications of Artificial Intuition: Games 
But what does it really mean for AI to act intuitively? How is intuition understood and 
framed in such commentaries in relation to specific applications or forms of usage of AI? 
The last theme we discuss here is the specific application of artificial intuition to digital 
games. Alphabet’s AlphaGo and AlphaGo Zero have recently made headlines for their abil-
ity to defeat professional players of the game Go: 
AlphaGo Zero often optimises for better board position with virtually utter  
disregard for piece value. Interestingly, this stems from its ability to teach it-
self rather than observe human play and thus avoid contamination from human  
biases. [. . .] It relies more strongly on heuristics or intuition, needing to look at 
fewer board positions to arrive at clever strategies. (Mansoor, 2018, online)
Another article discusses AI used for playing poker against humans:
To form DeepStack’s so-called intuition, Bowling and his team ran millions of 
test games against the AI. [. . .] [P]layers may bluff to hide bad cards, but those 
are situations DeepStack has already accounted for through math. (Nedelman, 
2017, online)
While the need for intuitive AI systems may be comprehensible, the question remains if 
there is not a contradiction in terms present here. While human intuition is based on expe-
rience and the accumulation of enough data to act intuitively in a given situation, how and 
why the data or experiences were drawn upon when someone acts intuitively is far more 
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fuzzy and complex than the above narratives portray. AlphaGo and DeepStack (which are 
heavily based on neural networks) may have been able to act more intuitively and teach 
themselves new strategies, but that is hardly the same as human intuition as such. In fact, 
as Paolo Bory (2019) discusses, the move that led to the defeat of the world champion by 
the original AlphaGo (the previous version of AlphaGo Zero) was considered as creative, 
even beautiful by commentators. It was also seen as very un-humanlike. “The day after [the 
match], DeepMind revealed that AlphaGo decided to play that move for this very reason 
since the possibility that a human player would play that move was 1:10,000” (Bory, 2019, 
p. 10). This explanation of an AI “deciding” to perform a particular move, is rooted in logic 
rather than intuition. A calculation of probabilities led to a particular move that led to the 
defeat of the human player. The other two quotations about AlphaGo Zero and DeepStack 
reproduced earlier similarly describe intuition as logical and math-based. Artificial intu-
ition is seen as something that can surpass human intuition in advancing a form of intuition 
that is unlike those of humans. However close to intuition the moves by AlphaGo Zero or 
DeepStack may have been, the data that they trained themselves with were still accessible to 
them. Both systems consciously learned from data. 
The narratives discussed in this section point to a different understanding of artificial 
intuition to the one we have discussed in the previous sections of this article. Whereas 
many commentators see artificial intuition as something that can be based on human intu-
ition, the discussions of its application in game AIs frame it as something that can actually 
advance, if not surpass, human intuition as a form of un-humanlikeness. Such narratives 
suggest a desire for advancing human subjectivity through AI rather than merely mimick-
ing it. Human beings are implicitly seen as deficient or suboptimal in such narratives and 
it is AI that can advance or assist them. In their work on popular and scientific definitions 
of social robots, Sarrica et al. (2019) similarly note that “popular online definitions tend to 
frame social robots as fully autonomous agents, while the scientific literature underscores 
the fact that they are purpose-built artefacts, entities that execute specific tasks and are only 
functionally autonomous” (p. 16). 
Such narratives are in line with research on media coverage of AI discussed earlier 
which cover the subject in a future-oriented way that is often somewhat similar to describ-
ing science-fiction scenarios, and unlike how scientific discourses would operate (Bourne, 
2019; Natale & Ballatore, 2017). The particular journalistic discourses on AI we have pre-
sented also need to be seen in relation to the websites they are published in; tech journal-
ism is a particular genre of journalism that Hanusch (2012) links to lifestyle journalism, a 
genre he defines as providing information to audiences “often in entertaining ways, about 
goods and services they can use in their daily lives” (p. 4). Brennen et. al. (2020) note that 
for tech journalists, “story ideas come from technology ‘insiders’ in the form of company 
announcements, blogs, or personal Twitter accounts” (p. 15). There is thus a danger of being 
influenced by industry PR (see also Bourne, 2019). The narratives we have analyzed in this 
article often read like exaggerated claims of the AI industry in relation to what artificial 
intuition could do in the future (Sarrica et al., 2019). 
While the desire to advance human subjectivity through AI may be comprehensible, it 
nonetheless presents ethical challenges in relation to transparency. It also presents practical 
challenges in relation to the amount of control over AI that humans would retain should they 
be outsmarted by intuitive systems. It is beyond our ability to assess the technical probability 
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of artificial intuition, but how it is portrayed and envisioned in the sampled articles is prob-
lematic insofar as important ethical and philosophical notions are not considered. 
Conclusion
It was the goal of this article to analyze how artificial intuition is discussed in tech jour-
nalism. We were particularly interested to explore what such narratives reveal about the 
relationship between humans and AI, as well as what kind of understanding of the human 
subject is implicitly and explicitly shown in the data. One limitation of this study is its 
exploratory nature and, therefore, small data set that was examined. Future research should 
include a larger sample in order to discuss a wider variety of sources. The specific styles, 
orientations, and target audiences of different outlets that focus on technology journalism 
should also be examined in more detail. Future research could also include tabloid and 
broadsheet newspapers of specific countries, for example. Comparisons between tech jour-
nalism and more mainstream forms of journalism could then be made. 
While we cannot adequately assess the technological feasibility of the phenomenon 
discussed in this article, we argue that it points to particular desires in how AI technology 
should progress. In a sense, AI seeks to adopt human characteristics both ontologically and 
epistemologically. Artificial intuition is an example of making AI appear more efficient, 
autonomous, human, and flexible than it currently is. 
There is a particular understanding, or worldview, of the human subject present in the 
data we have examined. An understanding that sees the human subject as rational and as 
being a blueprint, ready to be exploited by AI technology so that humans may be enhanced 
or, as some accounts argue, ultimately surpassed. Something as complex and difficult to 
define as intuition is rendered into a mechanized concept for the sake of framing AI in 
particular ways. We have contrasted such views of the human subject with a psychoana-
lytic prism which conceptualizes the human as irrational, intuitive, emotional, and as being 
shaped by trauma and conflict.
The hype around artificial intuition may also have been created by the industry because 
it not only makes AI appear more human, but also more empathic and likeable (Bory, 2019; 
McStay, 2018). This might be done deliberately in order to mask transparency, explainabil-
ity, and accountability of AI. As we have discussed, such a scenario raises crucial ethical 
questions about the transparency of AI. 
Intuition, then, is not the best term to make very valid arguments about the current rig-
idness or limitations of AI. AI needs to become more flexible—rather than intuitive—and 
this should happen in an ethical and transparent manner.
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Automation Anxieties:  
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and the Future of Pharmacy Work
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Abstract
This study uses a sample of pharmacists and pharmacy technicians (N = 240) who differ 
in skill, education, and income to replicate and extend past findings about socioeconomic 
disparities in the perceptions of automation. Specifically, this study applies the skills-biased 
technical change hypothesis, an economic theory that low-skill jobs are the most likely to 
be affected by increased automation (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2019), to the mental models 
of pharmacy workers. We formalize the hypothesis that anxiety about automation leads to 
perceptions that jobs will change in the future and automation will increase. We also posit 
anxiety about overpayment related to these outcomes. Results largely support the skills- 
biased hypothesis as a mental model shared by pharmacy workers regardless of position, 
with few effects for overpayment anxiety. 
Keywords: automation, future of work, mental models, pharmacy, structural equation 
modeling
Introduction
Human-technology collaboration is ubiquitous in modern organizational contexts. Today’s 
workers rely heavily on technology to remain connected, to schedule meetings, coordinate 
tasks, and collaborate with others (Colbert et al., 2016). Certain industries are embrac-
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embraced automation in order to improve efficiency and reduce errors in the often-tedious 
task of filling prescriptions. According to Gebhart (2019), “dispensing robots free up phar-
macists and technicians for more profitable clinical services that require human judgment” 
(para. 1). There are many reasons why industries might favor automation, computers, and 
artificial intelligence over human labor. Capable machines can complete repetitive and dan-
gerous work, they do not strike (Taipale et al., 2015), show up late, need time off, and gen-
erally pay for themselves (West, 2018). Further, while the average factory worker costs more 
than $36/hour, robots costs as little as $4/hour to operate (Wike & Stokes, 2018). Despite 
the organizational benefits, employees often view technology as potentially job threatening.
Complex technologies are fundamentally changing the scope and structure of human 
work. As Edwards et al. (2019) contend, “current trends suggest a near future character-
ized by more common, normalized, and sustained interactions between people and social 
robots” (p. 312). Advanced technological machines will continue to reshape the labor 
market by changing jobs, replacing positions, and generally altering the nature of work 
(Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2019). Thus, researchers must ask: How do employees perceive the 
future of human-technology collaboration?
This study seeks to test how pharmacy workers conceive of automation and comput-
erization at work. Specifically, we test the skills-biased technical change hypothesis (SBTC 
hypothesis), the prediction that low-skill work is the most likely to change or be replaced as 
computerization and automation increases (Berman et al., 1998; Frey & Osborne, 2017), in 
a situated pharmacy context where education, income, and skill vary according to role (i.e., 
pharmacists and pharmacy technicians). This study builds on past evidence to elucidate the 
mental models of both fear of automation and perceptions that one’s work will change or be 
replaced by machines in the future. 
Mental models, the “dynamic cognitive frameworks representing spatial, systemic, 
causal, or situational phenomena” (Banks, 2020, p. 2), serve as frames for interpreting the 
world. Preconceptions about machines serve as inflection points for decision, choice, and 
action with regard to both novel and well-known stimuli (Spence et al., 2018). As Banks 
(2020) succinctly explains, “mental models are sets of ideas for what the world is, how it 
works, how it unfolds, or what happens in it, and these ideas are used to describe, explain, 
and predict events or things in the world” (p. 2). Mental models are useful for consider-
ing machine communication partners because they encompass social norms, orientations 
toward machines, and other considerations of how technology has, might, or ought to be 
used (Mantovani, 1996). Because they are based on a social conception of reality, mental 
models are connected to and often precede communication behaviors (Fairhurst, 2010). In 
short, mental models shape and are shaped by communication. 
We explore mental models about automation in a sample of pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians who, despite working side-by-side, have highly discrepant education, income, 
and skill-requirements (Wheeler et al., 2019). This sample is ideal because pharmacies have 
long embraced automation practices (Hynniman & Lamy, 1967; Madden & Dreyfus, 1968), 
and pharmacies represent an environment marked by high demand for efficiency, role 
clarity, collaboration, and increasingly, human-machine communication (HMC; Albanese 
et al., 2010). Further, the pharmacy sector is a compelling context because this sector is 
increasingly adopting automation to reduce errors, improve productivity, and yield better 
patient care (Barrett et al., 2012). This study reveals how perceptions of machines manifests 
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in everyday work for pharmacy workers. Below we review relevant literature, introduce 
research questions and hypotheses, and report findings. We conclude with a discussion and 
recommendations based on findings from this unique sample regarding HMC and focusing 
on the role of mental models, feelings of anxiety, and perceptions of the future of work.
The Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) Hypothesis 
Economists do not agree about how automation will alter the future of work. The predom-
inant hypothesis is the skill-biased technical change hypothesis (SBTC hypothesis; Berman 
et al., 1998; Frey & Osborne, 2017). The SBTC hypothesis posits that due to automation 
lower skill jobs will be the most susceptible to change, more likely to be eliminated, and pay 
inequality will increase in the future. Alternatively, some studies also frame the hypothesis 
as an increased demand for high-skill jobs (Autor, 2015). For example, Frey and Osborne 
forecasted that half of occupations are susceptible to automation, based on the complexity 
of job descriptions.
Though some have argued the SBTC hypothesis is wrong (for discussion, see Frank et 
al., 2019), the basic premise, that deskilled positions involving simple and repetitive tasks 
will be increasingly automated, generally holds (Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017). However, 
there is a “lack of empirically informed models of key microlevel processes” including how 
people interact with, adapt to, and conceptualize automation (Frank et al., 2019, p. 6531). 
Our study fills this gap by exploring how American pharmacy workers feel about current 
and impending automation. We offer insights into how technology might be adopted/
avoided by the contemporary labor force.
Historically, the adoption of new technologies in face-to-face relationships has gar-
nered widespread skepticism, which Baym (2015) calls moral panic. From the printing press 
to the internet, humans tend to both assume and internalize the negative effects of new 
technologies on relational outcomes—despite a breadth of evidence suggesting otherwise 
(Green & Clark, 2015). This is no different for advanced work technologies. Overall, people 
are quite concerned about machines potentially taking jobs. For example, Google-search-
ing “will robots…” yields autofill responses of “take my job,” “take over the world,” “replace 
humans,” and other concerning outcomes. Further, European residents “overwhelmingly 
fear job displacement from robots” (Taipale & Fortunati, 2018, p. 201) as do people in nearly 
every country surveyed (Wike & Stokes, 2018). Anxieties about automation also prompt an 
introspective bias, whereby people broadly believe automation, robots, or computers will 
replace human work, yet feel their own jobs are less susceptible (Geiger, 2019). 
Views about robots, artificial intelligence (AI), and automation are often related to 
science-fiction portrayals of robots and artificial intelligence (see Horstmann & Krämer, 
2019). For instance, Liang and Lee (2017) found that fear of autonomous robots and artifi-
cial intelligence was related to exposure to media and negatively associated with education 
and income. Using a continent-wide sample of Europeans, Taipale and Fortunati (2018) 
found that those who were more educated with higher incomes were more likely to see 
their jobs as more secure in light of increased automation (see also, Turja & Oksanen, 2019). 
Moreover, income and education are positively related to concerns about automation in 
representative U.S. samples (Smith, 2016). 
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Automation in Pharmacies
Pharmacies, especially large retail chains, are blending “artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and advanced software engineering to enhance operational resilience and boost 
productivity” (BusinessWire, 2020, para. 2). Automation is incorporated in pharmacies in 
many ways including “record keeping, item selection, labeling, and dose packing” (Spinks 
et al., 2017, p. 394). Both hospital and retail pharmacies may reconfigure the behind-the-
counter workspace for machines (Barrett et al., 2012; Chapuis et al., 2010). But machines 
are also often placed at centralized distant sites to pre-fill bottles for retail locations (Spinks 
et al., 2017). 
Today, automation in pharmacies is valued at $5.1bn USD and is expected to reach 
$7.8bn USD by 2024 (Elder, 2019); this increase is largely due to reduced errors and faster 
fill times. Human error can create a tremendous cost for pharmacies, including unneces-
sary illness and even loss of life. Human errors occur at a rate of approximately 5 errors per 
100,000 orders (Gorbach et al., 2015). But automated prescription filling has error rates 
near zero (Fanning et al., 2016; cf., Chapuis et al., 2010) and significantly decreases prescrip-
tion filling time (Walsh et al., 2011). 
This bottom-line decision-making focused on operations and productivity likely 
shapes the organizational reality faced by pharmacy workers, especially those whose roles 
require less skill (i.e., technicians; Wheeler et al., 2019). Pharmacists and pharmacy techni-
cians have differentiated skill sets, education, and incomes. Thus, pharmacy workers offer 
a salient sample with differing socioeconomic positions to explore feelings of anxiety tied 
to automation.
While HMC has been studied during automation implementation in pharmacies (see 
Barrett et al., 2012), we focus on mental models about automation because mental models 
guide and are guided by communication (Fairhurst, 2010). Thus, we explore how pharmacy 
workers think about automation in pharmacy labor. Specifically, we hypothesize differences 
in automation anxiety and overpayment anxiety will influence perceptions that automation 
will increase in the future, that pharmacy work will change in the future, and that automa-
tion is helpful in pharmacy work. 
Roles in the Pharmacy 
Following the SBTC hypothesis, we analyze two divergent socioeconomic groups: phar-
macy technicians and pharmacists. Each role contributes to pharmacy work in different 
ways. Pharmacy technicians operate “under the supervision of the licensed pharmacist, 
[and] assists in pharmacy activities that do not require the professional judgment of a phar-
macist” (Albanese et al., 2010, p. e55). The technician’s role is juxtaposed alongside robotic 
interventions: “Along with robotic dispensing technology, [technician] support enables 
pharmacists to play a more proactive and expanded role in patient care” (p. e36). Pharmacy 
technicians are typically hourly workers, with less formal training, who assist pharmacists.
Conversely, the role of pharmacists is typically broader with a focus on judgment, 
decision-making, consultation, and supervising. Pharmacists are expected to manage their 
units, supervise personnel, administer medications, ensure the pharmacotherapy matches 
the patients’ needs, and that the patient understands treatment (Albanese et al., 2010). In 
addition to formal education, pharmacists are also responsible for maintaining regulated 
Piercy and Gist-Mackey 195
competencies to meet patient needs. In all, though both roles are well-defined, pharmacists 
are expected to maintain a higher level of skill relative to pharmacy technicians. This hier-
archical, educational, monetary, and expertise-driven difference positions pharmacy tech-
nicians as lower-skilled workers and pharmacists as skilled experts. If the SBTC hypothesis 
holds, technology ought to affect pharmacy technicians’ mental models more than pharma-
cists’. Given these discrepancies we propose that in mental models regarding the future of 
automation and pharmacy work:
H1: Pharmacy technicians will report higher automation anxiety than pharma-
cists. 
H2: Automation anxiety will be positively related to perceptions that (a) the 
pharmacy job will change across time, (b) automation will increase across time, 
and (c) automation is helpful to pharmacy work.
Some estimates suggest the probability of pharmacists being replaced by automa-
tion is extremely low (.00003) while the probability for replacing pharmacy technicians 
is quite high (0.92; Frey & Osborne, 2017). Ironically, the O*Net database maintained by 
the U.S. Department of Labor, which was used as the source for job descriptions in Frey 
and Osborne’s study, classifies pharmacy technicians as a “bright outlook” occupation 
(onetonline.org, 2020). Frey and Osborne’s (2017) study supports the SBTC hypothesis, but 
it remains unknown how people who work in the same environment, yet have differing 
skill, pay, and expertise might view automation and the future of their industry. Given the 
difference in roles taken on by pharmacists and pharmacy technicians, and the predictions 
by SBTC hypothesis, we ask how these two groups might differ regarding perceptions of 
future automation in the industry, the benefits of automation, and perceptions that phar-
macy jobs will change over time:
RQ1: How do pharmacists and pharmacy technicians differ in terms of  
(a) perceptions that automation will increase in the coming years, (b) perceived 
helpfulness of automation, and (c) perceptions that their job will change in the 
coming years?
Driven by capitalistic market pressures, many industries seek to reduce costs. Techno-
logical advancements, like automation, have often been a strategy to deskill work. While 
this is typically seen as a direct threat to low-income workers, Littler and Innes (2003) found 
that it also threatens knowledge workers, those with high levels of expertise. In fact, down-
sizing as a cost-saving effort weakens the job stability of those who are highly compensated 
and highly educated. This phenomenon has been called deknowledging the workforce and 
leads to a hollowing out of organizations by thinning out those who are well-paid at the top 
of the organizational hierarchy, like pharmacists (Frank et al., 2019; Littler & Innes, 2003). 
Pharmacists likely view automation as a boon to their work, given the guidance that 
pharmacists ought to leverage pharmacy technicians and automation processes to boost 
productivity. However, there has been speculation that dramatic increases in automation 
processes could threaten pharmacists’ jobs as well (Spinks et al., 2017). Spinks et al. point 
out that automation is typically implemented in a decentralized hub-and-spoke system 
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which physically displaces the jobs remaining. Given the pay discrepancies which pervade 
the pharmacy environment, it is logical pharmacists might worry about their high pay 
as a potential liability in light of sophisticated automation. Specifically, while the median 
wage for pharmacists is greater than $100,000 per year (Polgreen et al., 2011), the median 
wage for a pharmacy technician is $15 per hour ($31,200 per year for a full-time employee; 
Wheeler et al., 2019). Further, technicians often work in part-time roles and largely report 
dissatisfaction with their pay (Desselle & Holmes, 2017). This substantial discrepancy likely 
affects how both parties view their work and perceive the way automation will affect their 
career paths. While technicians might perceive pay insufficiency, it is more likely that phar-
macists view their salary as a liability. We hypothesize:
H3: Overpayment anxiety will be positively related to perceptions that (a) the 
pharmacy job will change across time, (b) automation will increase across time, 
and (c) automation is helpful to pharmacy work.




This research was done in partnership with a state-level pharmacists association. To begin 
recruitment, the state-level pharmacy association shared the study on its member listserv 
and permitted us to recruit onsite at their annual conference. We also shared the survey 
on the Reddit group r/talesfromthepharmacy, visited local pharmacies with flyers, and 
recruited online with permission on several Facebook and LinkedIn groups dedicated to 
pharmacy practice. In total we report findings from 131 pharmacists and 109 pharmacy 
technicians. Just under half of the sample was from Kansas (n = 117, 47.4%) with the 
remainder from 35 different states. 
As expected, pharmacists (M = 11.52, SD = 2.12) and pharmacy technicians (M = 4.95, 
SD = 2.75) reported very different household incomes (range: 1 = under $10,000 to 13 = 
$150,000 or more), tcorrected(224) = 2.17, p < .001, dCohens = 2.68. Pharmacists (M = 5.43, SD = 
0.90) had higher education levels than pharmacy technicians (M = 3.26, SD = 1.00; 1 = less 
than H.S. degree, 6 = doctoral degree), tcorrected(224) = 17.73, p < .001, dCohens = 2.28. Three 
quarters of participants were female (n = 184, 76.7%) and most identified as White (n = 229, 
95.4%). Participants’ ages ranged from 20 to 80 years (M = 38.15, SD = 12.07). 
Measures
Measures were based on pre-existing items when possible; we began by adding additional 
items to questions posed by Pew Research (Smith, 2016). To reduce participant burden, 
and because participants were uncompensated, we used concise measures when possible. 
Though our measures represent incomplete or limited mental model content, it is rea-
sonable that these measures likely reflect more broadly held assumptions or expectations 
(Edwards et al., 2019) about machines (e.g., tension, fearfulness, stress, negativity, danger; 
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Spence et al., 2018). We modified items to fit the pharmacy environment when appropriate. 
Unless otherwise noted, scales were measured on a Likert-type scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Table 1 presents correlations among demographics and the 
variables of interest. 
TABLE 1 Correlations, Pooled Means, and SDs, Among Study Variables
  M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1.  Income 8.59 4.05 -
2.  Education 4.38 1.41 0.66*** -
3.  Age 38.15 12.07 0.32*** -0.13* -
4.   Automation 
Anxiety 3.28 1.49 -0.19
** -0.17** -0.03 -
5.   Overpayment 
Anxiety 4.20 1.96 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.42
*** -
6.   Increased 
Automation 3.67 1.72 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.36
*** 0.13* -
7.  Job Change 5.74 1.70 0.09 0.07 -0.07 -0.38*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -
8.   Automation 
Helpfulness 4.78 1.52 0.19
** 0.20** 0.04 -0.24*** -0.21** 0.07 0.08 -
Note: N = 240, two participants did not report their age. Each scale is detailed under Sample 
and Measures above. p < .05 *, p < .01**, p < .001 *** 
Automation Anxiety
To measure feelings of automation anxiety, we used the stem prompt: “I am concerned 
about losing my job because” with four items: “My employer might use machines or com-
puter programs to replace human workers,” “Automation could lead to a reduction in the 
number of workers needed to do my job,” “The job I do today could be done by machines 
tomorrow,” and “Robotic devices could replace people in my role.” The scale was reliable, 
α = .86.
Overpayment Anxiety
We hypothesized that feelings of overpayment anxiety would operate distinctly from 
automation anxiety. We used the same stem prompt as in automation anxiety with two 
items: “My employer might find someone who is willing to do my job for less money,” and 
“Someone who will work for less might be hired into my unit.” Though these items highly 
correlated (R2 = 0.80, p < .001), the second item was a Heywood case, the indicator had 
impossible latent-to-item loadings, in the measurement model (B > 1.00 among pharma-
cists; Kline, 2015). The use of only two indicators for a latent factor increases the likelihood 
of Heywood cases (Kline, 2015). To remedy this, the first item (M = 4.23, SD = 2.09) was 
used as a single-item indicator. 
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Job Change 
Perceptions that one’s job will change were measured with the prompt: “Thinking about 
your current job and occupation, how likely is it that your job will exist in its current form 
in” with two time frames: 2-years and 5-years. Responses ranged from 1 = very unlikely to 
7 = very likely. We reverse coded these two items for analysis, they were highly correlated, 
R2 = 0.90, p < .001. 
Increased Automation
We asked participants: “Overall how likely do you think it is that robotic devices, robots, 
and computers will do much of the work currently done by humans in” with two time 
frames: 2-years and 5-years. Responses ranged from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely. 
These two items were highly correlated, R2 = .86, p < .001. 
Automation Helpfulness 
To capture the perceived benefits of automation, we developed three semantic-differential 
items which used 7-points capturing the perceived helpfulness of automation. Specifically, 
we prompted participants with “Increased use of automation in my workplace would:” with 
anchors of “Make my job harder | Make my job easier,” “Decrease my efficiency | Increase 
my efficiency,” and “Harm me | Help me.” These items were reliable, α = .92.
Measurement Invariance Testing
Given the goals of group synthesis and comparison between pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians we first assessed our models for measurement invariance, or psychometric 
equivalence of constructs across groups (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). We began by creating 
an unconstrained configural model in the R package lavaan 0.6-5 (Rosseel, 2012). Con-
figural invariance occurs when “the latent construct has similar meaning” across groups 
(Kühne, 2013, p. 155). Configural invariance is established through a similar pattern of 
loadings across groups and sufficient model fit. The initial configural model revealed a 
Heywood-case indicator, the second overpayment anxiety item. As noted above, we 
dropped this item and retained the first. Dropping this item is logical because perceptions 
that one might be replaced by another who works for less money differ dramatically across 
pay ranges. Subsequent tests of measurement invariance do not apply to this single item 
indicator for overpayment anxiety. The baseline configural model yields separate χ2 values 
for each group and a pooled model fit; this configural measurement model fit sufficiently 
well (Kline, 2015): χ2Pharmacists (90) = 56.07, p < .001, χ
2/df = 0.62, χ2Technicians (90) = 98.86, 
p < .001, χ2/df = 1.10, RMSEA = 0.08, 90% CI[.06, .10], SRMR = 0.04, CFI = 0.96.
Next, we tested metric invariance, the assumption that “each item contributes to the 
latent construct to a similar degree across groups” (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016, p. 75). To 
test this assumption, indicator loadings were constrained to be equal across the groups 
before comparing models which were metric invariant: χ2(7) = 4.66, p = 0.70. Third, we 
tested scalar invariance, the assumption the latent constructs have the same meaning and 
“there is no systematic response bias across populations” (Kühne, 2013, p. 154). This model 
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constrains both indicator loadings and their intercepts and was scalar invariant: χ2(7) = 
12.19, p = 0.09. Thus, we proceeded with analysis. We use group comparisons to test H1, 
RQ1, and H4, then use SEM for H2 and H3. 
Results
Comparing Pharmacists and Pharmacy Technicians
We first constructed a MANOVA using SPSS 25 to compare pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians. Our hypotheses were that pharmacy technicians would have greater automa-
tion anxiety (H1), while pharmacists would experience more overpayment anxiety (H4). 
Further RQ1 asked if these two groups differed in terms of (a) perceptions that automation 
will increase in the coming years, (b) perceived helpfulness of automation, and (c) percep-
tions that their job will change in the coming years.
Results of homogeneity of variance as well as normality and multicollinearity assump-
tions were tested using criteria from Tabachnick and Fidell (2019), no issues were present. 
The MANOVA was multivariate significant: F(5, 235) = 7.14, Wilks’ λ = 0.87, p < .001, 
η2partial = 0.13, power = .999. Univariate analysis revealed a significant difference in auto-
mation anxiety between pharmacy technicians (M = 3.54, SD = 1.54) and pharmacists 
(M = 3.04, SD = 1.43), F(1, 239) = 6.82, p = .010, η2partial = 0.03. Thus, H1, that pharmacy 
technicians experience greater automation anxiety, was supported. 
However, there were no significant differences between pharmacists and technicians in 
terms of increased automation in the coming years, F(1, 239) = 1.13, p = 0.289, η2partial = 0.01. 
Nor was there a difference in terms of perceived job change over time, F(1, 239) = 0.29, p = 
0.594, η2partial = 0.00. Perceptions of automation helpfulness did differ between pharmacists 
(M = 5.12, SD = 1.31) and technicians (M = 4.40, SD = 1.68), F(1, 239) = 13.89, p < .001, 
η2partial = 0.06. Thus, the answer to RQ1a–c is that pharmacists and pharmacy technicians do 
not differ in terms of perceived future automation or job change over the coming 2 and 5 
years. However, pharmacists see automation as more useful than do pharmacy technicians. 
The final group comparison was for H4 which contended pharmacists would report 
higher levels of overpayment anxiety. The univariate tests supported this hypothesis with 
pharmacists reporting higher overpayment anxiety (M = 4.48, SD = 2.04) than did techni-
cians (M = 3.94, SD = 2.13): F(1, 239) = 3.91, p = 0.049, η2partial = 0.02. Thus, H4 was sup-
ported. 
Structural Equation Modeling 
To test the remaining hypotheses, we conducted an SEM. This model specifies the rela-
tionships presented in H2 and H3. We added regression relationships to the measurement 
model specified above between overpayment and automation anxiety and three outcomes: 
perceptions that automation will increase, that the job will change in the coming years, and 
the belief that automation is helpful.
The proposed structural model fit the data sufficiently: χ2Pharmacists (90) = 56.07, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 0.62, χ2Technicians (90) = 98.86, p < .001, χ
2/df = 1.10, RMSEA = .08, 90% CI[.06, .10], 
SRMR = .04, CFI = 0.96. These values match those presented in the configural measure-
ment model because the relationships among the latent constructs are saturated. 
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Pharmacists’ Model 
Figure 1 shows pharmacists’ feelings of anxiety about automation were positively related 
to perceptions that the job would include increased automation in the future (β = 0.47, 
SE = 0.16, p < .001) and positively predicted beliefs that the job would change in the future 
(β = 0.40, SE = 0.13, p < .001). Automation anxiety was negatively related to beneficial auto-
mation outcomes, (β = –0.24, SE = 0.11, p = .037). Thus, H2a and b are confirmed among 
pharmacists. Automation anxieties positively predict perceptions of future automation and 
job change. Against H2c, pharmacists’ automation anxieties were negatively related to per-
ceived benefits of automation.
H3 proposed that overpayment anxieties would predict perceptions that (a) automa-
tion will increase in the future, (b) the job will change in the future, and (c) automation is 
helpful. None of these relationships were significant. Thus, H3 was rejected in the pharma-
cists’ subset.
FIGURE 1 Pharmacists’ Model
Note: N = 131 Pharmacists. p < .05 *, p < .001 ***
Pharmacy Technicians’ Model 
Figure 2 shows pharmacy technicians’ automation anxiety was positively related to per-
ceptions the job would include increased automation in the future (β = 0.46, SE = 0.11, p 
< .001), and positively predicted beliefs that the job would change in the future (β = 0.38, 
SE = 0.12, p = .001). However, automation anxiety was unrelated to the perceived help-
fulness of automation, (p = .523). Thus, H2a and b are confirmed among pharmacy tech-
nicians as well. Automation anxieties positively predict perceptions of future automation 
and job change. Against H2c, technicians’ automation anxiety was unrelated to perceived 
automation benefits.
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In the pharmacy technician’s model, H3a and b were not supported. However, overpay-
ment anxiety was significantly and negatively related to perceived benefits of automation 
(β = –0.21, SE = 0.08, p = .048). Therefore, pharmacy technicians who felt they were over-
paid perceived less benefit from automation in the pharmacy. Thus, H3a–c is rejected in 
both the pharmacists and pharmacy technician samples. The full technicians’ model is pre-
sented in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 Pharmacy Technicians’ Model
Note: N = 102 Pharmacy technicians. p < .05 *, p < .001 *** 
Discussion
This study tests the SBTC hypothesis (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2019) using a novel sample of 
pharmacy workers whose education, income, and skills differ by role. Our results juxtapose 
the SBTC hypothesis against mental models, which drive machine perceptions (Banks, 
2020), technology use (Mantovani, 1996), and organizational communication (Fairhurst, 
2010). This study adds to previous literature by demonstrating income and education alone 
are insufficient to determine automation perceptions. Findings reveal pharmacists and 
pharmacy technicians both experience anxiety related to automation. Despite differing 
skill, pay, education, and responsibilities, anxiety about automation shapes both parties’ 
view of the future of both automation in pharmacies and future of work in the pharmacy. 
This is a compelling finding particularly for a sector that is readily adopting automation. 
Results revealed robust effects for feelings of anxiety about automation with, surprisingly, 
few effects for overpayment anxiety. These results are intriguing given the differences on 
key outcomes when comparing pharmacists and pharmacy technicians. 
The differences between pharmacists and technicians were significant (accounting for 
13% of variance). Pharmacists and technicians seemed to agree that pharmacy automation 
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was likely to increase in the coming years, though this was not significantly different than 
the scale means for either group. Pharmacists and technicians also agreed that their jobs 
were likely to change in the coming years, both groups had scale values significantly above 
the mean (p < .001). Pharmacies are a site rich in job change and automation and these 
findings show that present anxieties about automation translate into beliefs about the future 
of work and automation. 
Pharmacists and technicians did differ in terms of perceived benefits of automation and 
overpayment anxieties; pharmacists were more likely to feel overpaid and to see automation 
as beneficial to their work. This is logical given the pay discrepancies and the clear authority 
role of pharmacists. Interestingly, pharmacists’ anxiety about overpayment did not translate 
into perceptions their work will change or that automation would increase in coming years. 
The next take-away from our study is the relatively straightforward mental-model for 
automation shared by pharmacists and technicians. The models were identical with two 
exceptions: pharmacy technicians’ overpayment anxiety was related to reduced percep-
tions of automation helpfulness, whereas pharmacists’ automation anxieties were related to 
perceptions of reduced automation helpfulness. Counter to past findings that automation 
allows pharmacists to reassert “their privileged position . . . while also increasing their insti-
tutional legitimacy,” (Barrett et al., 2012, p. 1460), these results show both high- and low-
skill pharmacy workers share automation anxieties. Feelings of anxiety manifest slightly 
differently based on position. 
We speculate automation anxieties seem to have prompted pharmacists to derogate the 
benefits of automation (Brehm & Cohen, 1962), whereas overpayment anxieties seem to 
have the same effect for pharmacy technicians. These findings regarding pharmacists’ auto-
mation anxiety likely undergird concerns about deknowledging the pharmacy workforce, 
while pharmacy technicians’ overpayment anxiety seems to reflect concerns about deskill-
ing pharmacy work (Littler & Innes, 2003). Thus, it is likely each workgroup derogates auto-
mations’ helpfulness because of varied job security concerns (reduced knowledge and skill 
requirements, respectively). Both parties anticipate change over time both in their work 
in a pharmacy and via increased automation. For both, automation anxiety was related to 
perceived changes. These results signal that while income and education are forces driving 
automation anxiety in the general population (Liang & Lee, 2017), in pharmacies, automa-
tion anxiety leads to increased beliefs about the changing nature of work and expectations 
for increased automation. Future, longitudinal, or mixed-methods research could measure 
and observe perceptions of automation adoption or adaptation over time in order to better 
understand how mental models change relative to experiences in HMC. 
To our knowledge, this is the first test of the SBTC hypothesis based on perceptual data 
in a recently automated sector. To date, this hypothesis has relied heavily on macro-level 
models of economic change with little concern about mental models, which shape individ-
uals’ everyday communication, interaction, and experiences (Frank et al., 2019). We extend 
findings from Europe (Taipale & Fortunati, 2018) and the U.S. (Liang & Lee, 2017; Smith, 
2016) that income and education buffer fears of automation and include perceptions about 
the future of work. Our findings reveal this hypothesis has translated across socioeconomic 
groups into pharmacy workers’ beliefs about automation and the changes automation 
brings to their work. 
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Further, while other studies have labeled perceptions that automation, computeriza-
tion, and AI might affect work as a “fear of automation,” we choose to label these “feelings 
of anxiety” to signal the motivational nature of such beliefs. We do not mean to suggest 
that clinical descriptions of anxiety relate to automation, though they may. Instead, anx-
iety experienced about major changes to one’s work, including the potential for displaced 
or replaced work, affects the very work practices which combine social and technological 
counterparts (Barrett et al., 2012). Indeed, feelings of anxiety about new technologies also 
affects how people adopt, use, and engage with complex machines (Leonardi, 2012). For 
HMC scholars, these findings reveal how anxieties about machine-communication part-
ners manifest in everyday work practice. It is likely that anxious mental models could foster 
resistance to HMC, regardless of the benefits technology may offer. Future research would 
do well to consider the specific manifestations of automation anxiety at work; for exam-
ple, does anxiety about automation increase/decrease one’s effort, satisfaction, or commit-
ment to the workplace? Also, for managers, how might assuring workers’ job security amid 
increased automation affect work outcomes like satisfaction, productivity, or turnover? 
For pharmacy workers anxious feelings about automation and the changing nature of 
work are proximal (i.e., 2 and 5 years) concerns with everyday implications. Indeed, these 
close temporal estimates about technological and work change were explained quite well by 
automation anxiety. In addition to the SBTC hypothesis, our study also tests and affirms the 
proposition that higher-skilled workers also feel vulnerable to technological change (Frank 
et al., 2019; Littler & Innes, 2003). Future research could benefit from further consideration 
of how exposure/adoption in specific industries affects feelings of anxiety about automa-
tion, especially as interactions with complex technological co-workers increase (Edwards 
et al., 2019). In retail environments like grocery store checkouts, medical contexts where 
algorithms aid diagnoses, and practically every other work domain machine counterparts 
will increase in use (Frey & Osborne, 2017). 
The derogation of the helpfulness of automation by pharmacists and technicians was 
unexpected. However, source and message derogation are logical responses to incompatible 
messages (Brehm & Cohen, 1962). For these workers, anxieties about automation and over-
payment prompted a derogation of the technology that could threaten livelihoods. In line 
with past research we expect that source and technology derogation affects communication 
with colleagues and subsequent technological (non)adoption (Leonardi, 2012). To under-
stand how these beliefs form through interaction, future studies might consider networks 
of HMC interaction.
Given these findings, perceived helpfulness may be tied to outside anxieties and reflect 
the relational power dynamics between organizational decision-makers and front-line 
workers. As shown in Table 1, perceptions of helpfulness are negatively correlated with 
both automation anxiety and overpayment anxiety. Yet, perceptions of helpfulness were not 
significantly related to perceptions that the job will change and automation will increase. 
As industries increasingly adopt automation, it is crucial for decision makers to be aware of 
potential anxieties that can reduce the perceived helpfulness of technology. For managers 
hoping to implement automation, this finding signals a need to assess perceptions that the 
technologies might replace workers as part of the persuasive campaign to increase adoption 
of automated technologies. Certainly, this validates the argument by HMC scholars that 
perceptions of technological partners have meaningful consequences for our subsequent 
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communication with and about such technologies (Fortunati & Edwards, 2020); indeed, 
this argument seems salient for the impending future of work. 
Conclusion and Limitations
This study extends our understanding of how technological change prompts feelings of 
anxiety among both high- and low-skilled workers. While our study offers insights to a 
racially White but relatively diversified socioeconomic groups, in a recently automated sec-
tor, the specific context also limits the generalizability of these findings. For these workers 
feelings of automation anxiety predicted variance in perceptions of the near future and the 
helpfulness of automation. The measures were limited by relatively few items for each con-
struct. Mental models represent an abstract preconception, certainly these mental models 
could be tied to a wide variety of antecedents and experiences. Future research will benefit 
from mapping the constellation of both the content and structure of these mental models, 
beyond the SBTC hypothesis, to better understand antecedents and outcomes for techno-
logical concern (see also Banks, 2020). 
In all, this study enhances scholarly understanding of how feelings of anxiety affect 
cognitive mental models, which inform HMC. The future will inevitably include increased 
automation; thus, perceptions of that process deserve continued scholarly attention. We 
argue scholars and practitioners ought to attend to automation and overpayment anxieties 
as they directly connect to feelings about the future and the mental models which permeate 
everyday communication and work, especially in complex HMC situations. 
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Abstract
This study investigates the effects of task demonstrability and replacing a human advisor 
with a machine advisor. Outcome measures include advice-utilization (trust), the percep-
tion of advisors, and decision-maker emotions. Participants were randomly assigned to 
make a series of forecasts dealing with either humanitarian planning (low demonstrability) 
or management (high demonstrability). Participants received advice from either a machine 
advisor only, a human advisor only, or their advisor was replaced with the other type of 
advisor (human/machine) midway through the experiment. Decision-makers rated human 
advisors as more expert, more useful, and more similar. Perception effects were strongest 
when a human advisor was replaced by a machine. Decision-makers also experienced more 
negative emotions, lower reciprocity, and faulted their advisor more for mistakes when a 
human was replaced by a machine.
Keywords: human-machine communication, interpersonal communication, advice, 
task demonstrability, emotion
Introduction
On August 13, 2014, a video titled Humans Need Not Apply was uploaded to YouTube and 
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over 10 million views (CGPGrey, 2014; Pagano, 2014). Detailing a future in which human 
labor is irrecoverably taken over by automation, the 15-minute video on the evolution of 
labor—and why the robot revolution is different—was described as “terrifying” and fore-
telling “an economic horror movie” by some commentators (Roggeveen, 2014, p. 1). Since 
then, public interest in the continued automation of human labor has only increased; it is 
becoming difficult to read the business section of a popular newspaper and not encounter 
an article discussing the future of work and automation. Emerging alongside the increased 
discussion of machines versus humans, human-machine communication is a quickly grow-
ing subfield of communication which studies machines as interlocutors rather than simply 
as communication tools (Banks & de Graaf, 2020; Fortunati & Edwards, 2020). This study 
draws upon both interpersonal and human-machine trust literature to investigate a com-
mon real-world use for new automation: acting as an advisor to a human decision-maker. 
Industries as diverse as health care (Langlotz et al., 2019), finance (Lourenço et al., 2020), 
supply-chain management (Fildes & Goodwin, 2020), and agriculture (Zhai et al., 2020) 
are increasingly turning toward machines as advisors. In financial advising, for example, 
robo-advisors currently manage an estimated $1 trillion in assets, a number that is expected 
to increase to over $15 trillion by 2025 (Abraham et al., 2019; Deloitte, 2016).
The interpersonal process of trust has attracted considerable interest from scholars in 
a wide variety of fields (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). More recently, the study of 
human-machine trust has also increased (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Lutz & Tamò-Larrieux, 2020). 
There is also scholarship emerging that attempts to explain the differences in how human 
and machine communicators are conceptualized (Guzman, 2020). However, little research 
has experimentally compared human-machine trust directly to interpersonal trust, espe-
cially in situations where machines replace humans or for decisions with more subjective 
and less demonstrable consequences. Given that the thought of machines replacing humans 
concerns many people, it is surprising how little research exists on the psychological state of 
people who witness machines replacing humans. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
(1) the effects of task demonstrability on trust in humans and machines, (2) how percep-
tions of advisors are affected by task type, advisor type, and advisor replacement. We begin 
by conceptualizing differences in task demonstrability and advisor expertise. 
Task Demonstrability and Advisor Expertise
A continuum of decision-making task demonstrability anchored by intellective (high 
demonstrability) and judgmental tasks (low demonstrability) was explicated by Laugh-
lin and Ellis (1986). This theoretical distinction has become important in advice research 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Demonstrable tasks are distinguished by having an answer that 
all parties can understand. For example, an algebra problem has a correct answer and any 
advice provided to a decision-maker suggesting a correct answer is demonstrably correct 
or incorrect. On the other hand, low demonstrability tasks involve uncertain future states 
or subjective consequences, and the decision is seen more as a value judgment than a cor-
rect answer. Several interpersonal advice studies have varied decision-making tasks on the 
demonstrability continuum (Tzioti et al., 2014; Van Swol, 2011). 
One of the strongest and most robust effects in advice research is that perceptions of 
advisor expertise directly affect trust in the advisor (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). Given 
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that task demonstrability and advisor expertise are key constructs in interpersonal advice 
research, human-machine communication provides an ideal context to study how the 
two factors may interact because the expertise of an advisor is tied to the domain and 
decision-making context. This suggests that perceptions of expertise for low or high demon-
strability of tasks may differ for humans and machines. In the research presented here, 
we manipulate both advisor type (human/machine) and demonstrability of the decision- 
making task. Decades of research on technology acceptance, human-automation 
(human-machine) trust, and the growing field of machine ethics provides some theoretical 
insight as to how perceptions of machine attributes differ from humans.
Perceptions of Machines and Perceptions of Humans
The comparison of interpersonal and human-machine trust in tasks of varying demonstra-
bility, especially those involving moral decisions, introduces an interesting question about 
the match between advisor characteristics and the context of a decision. The majority of 
human-machine advice research has used highly demonstrable tasks as experimental stim-
uli, such as what the next number is in a mathematical sequence (de Visser et al., 2016) or 
a yes/no question regarding the presence of military equipment in an aerial surveillance 
photo (Rice & Geels, 2010). There exists little research to guide our assumptions about 
trust of machine advisors on less demonstrable tasks. However, machines may need to 
make such decisions in the future, such as a self-driving car that must decide to protect 
vehicle occupants at the cost of endangering pedestrians (Awad et al., 2018). Although not 
focused on specific decisions, some scholars have investigated perceptions of various forms 
of machines (e.g., robots) for varying roles in society (Katz & Halpern, 2014; Takayama et 
al., 2008). Machines are often perceived as being more suitable for roles that do not require 
emotion or sensitive communication, and more suitable for roles that require memoriza-
tion and unselfish service-orientation (Takayama et al., 2008). 
Several perspectives in human-machine communication literature highlight the 
importance of the different expectations between humans and machines (Gambino et al., 
2020; Guzman, 2020; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). For example, according to the per-
fect automation schema model (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), automation is expected to 
be high performing but invariant, whereas humans (if not as high performing) are adapt-
able and are expected to learn from their mistakes. Additionally, mistakes are less expected 
from machines in general because decision-makers do not see machines as susceptible to 
biases and emotions that plague human judgment (Merritt et al., 2015). On the other hand, 
people know that other people are not perfect. Several authors in human-robot trust have 
investigated questions of emotion, but there is only limited evidence that humans consider 
machines to possess emotion (Guzman, 2020; Kahn et al., 2012). 
If human and machine advisors are perceived as having differing fundamental attri-
butes, it will affect the perception of either advisor’s capabilities. It follows that when an 
advisor is not assessed to have expertise (i.e., capabilities required for a certain task), the 
assessments of the advisor that are dependent on the task will be affected as well. Because less 
demonstrable tasks require value judgments that, in turn, are tied to emotion and subjective 
evaluation (Horberg et al., 2011), we believe that the underlying assumption that machines 
lack emotion will lead to lower assessment of advisor expertise in less demonstrable tasks.
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Hypothesis 1a: Machine advisors will be perceived as having less expertise in 
less demonstrable decision tasks than more demonstrable tasks.
Perceptions of advisor expertise also affect perceptions of the advice itself. If advice 
comes from non-expert sources, it is perceived as less useful and less appropriate. This effect 
is both logical and established in past advice research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).
Hypothesis 1b/c: Advice from machine advisors will be perceived as being less 
(1b) useful (1c) appropriate in less demonstrable than more demonstrable deci-
sion tasks.
Task, Advisor, Trust, and Perception
In the experiment below, we attempt to control factors like task that moderate the relation-
ship between perceptions of the advice and advisor expertise, therefore we expect to see the 
effects of hypotheses 1a–1c reflected in our behavioral trust measure (advice-utilization) as 
well, especially as advice utilization and perception of advice are measured closely in time 
and previous research has found a strong relationship between perception of advice and use 
of advice (Bonaccio & Van Swol, 2014).
Hypothesis 2: Machine advice will be utilized less than human advice, in  
general, when the decision is less demonstrable.
Our third hypothesis is reasoned from hypotheses 1 and 2. Because different tasks may 
result in different advisor characteristics becoming more salient, we predict that recipient 
perceptions of thought process and value similarity with human advisors will be higher 
in less demonstrable decision tasks because the task is thought to be better suited to a 
decision-maker that possesses emotion.
Hypothesis 3a/b: Human/machine advisors will be perceived as having more 
(3a) thought process and (3b) value similarity in less demonstrable decision 
tasks.
Advisor Replacement
In the research study below, we manipulate advisor type, task type, and advisor replace-
ment. There is essentially no interpersonal or machine trust research that has been con-
ducted specifically to test the effects of advisor replacement, but because perception of 
humans and machine relies on different underlying assumptions, perceptual effects related 
to the comparison of two stimuli may be applicable to guide our expectations. When one 
advisor is replaced by another type, this may elicit a comparison of the two advisors that 
makes the perceived attributes of both more salient. Such an effect would fit into exist-
ing literature on contrast effects in communication and impression formation research 
(Palmer & Gore, 2014). 
Contrast effects describe the process by which exposure to one target of evaluation can 
change the evaluation of targets presented subsequently. For example, unattractive faces are 
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rated as more unattractive if the evaluator is shown an attractive face before the unattractive 
one (Wedell et al., 1987). We are not aware of any literature to suggest that contrast effects 
will not extend to the evaluation of one advisor after replacing another. If a contrast effect is 
found, we expect it to result in our hypothesized effects of advisor type becoming stronger. 
For example, if a decision-maker is presented with a new machine advisor after gaining 
experience with a human advisor, it may result in an even stronger perception of invariance 
and exaggerate expectations of high performance. To be clear, we only manipulate advisor 
replacement, we do not replace one task with another; our hypothesis below therefore only 
covers effects driven by advisor perception. For brevity, we summarize these effects in the 
below hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a/b: Machine/human advisors will be evaluated as less expert, use-
ful, appropriate, and similar in less/more demonstrable decision tasks when they 
replace human/machine advisors than when replacing another machine/human 
advisor.
Hypothesis 4c/d: In more/less demonstrable tasks, when a machine/human 
advisor replaces a human/machine advisor, the machine/human advice will be 
utilized more than when a machine/human advisor replaces another machine/
human advisor.
Decision-Maker Emotions
Our earlier discussion of emotions primarily discussed a decision-maker’s perception that 
an advisor possesses emotions or at least the capability to understand emotions. But per-
ceptual processes themselves are affected by emotions, and interpersonal advice research 
has shown decision-maker emotions to have substantial effects on trust (MacGeorge et al., 
2013). In interpersonal advice research using demonstrable tasks, researchers have manipu-
lated decision-maker emotions, finding that the induction of other-directed negative emo-
tions (i.e., anger, frustration) resulted in less advice utilization, while other-directed positive 
emotions (i.e., happiness, gratitude) resulted in more utilization (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). 
Such effects were also found in research using less demonstrable tasks (de Hooge et al., 
2014).
Research on the effects of decision-maker emotions and trust in machines is less con-
clusive about the effects of emotions on trust. This is largely because advisor anthropomor-
phism can have strong effects on emotion (de Visser et al., 2016; Waytz et al., 2014), and 
there are large differences in anthropomorphism for machines (i.e., a social robot versus 
a calculator). Because we do not manipulate decision-maker emotion in our study, we are 
only able to predict potential effects that result from our manipulations advisor type and 
task, but our study design is ideally suited to investigate the emotions that may be produced 
by interacting with human versus machine advisors and the effects of replacing one advisor 
with another. A human being replaced by a machine, for example, could produce a negative 
emotional reaction due to the belief that the machine is not suited for the decision task or 
vice versa. Thus, we incorporate measures of positive emotions (e.g., happiness) and nega-
tive emotions (e.g., anger).
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In addition to emotions, we also measure two processes related to trust: reciprocity and 
fault. Reciprocity—the belief of owing something to one’s advisor—is interesting because 
trust is often conceptualized as a reciprocal process (Mayer et al., 1995). We also examine 
attributions of fault for mistakes because if humans are expected to be fallible and imper-
fect (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), it may result in decision-makers generally finding 
less fault in human advisors’ mistakes. We are also interested in fault because it is possible 
that decision-makers will fault machines to a greater degree than human advisors because 
fault may be related to blame. Our low demonstrability decision task in this experiment has 
consequences that result in the loss of human life, and though the measurement of what is 
perceived as “moral” is complicated, it is not unreasonable to assume that decision-makers 
could sense moral implications. Some research and emerging machine ethics research sug-
gests many humans have a discomfort with placing blame on machines for making deci-
sions with moral implications because many people do not perceive machines to possess 
moral accountability (Kahn et al., 2012), our experimental manipulations offer a unique 
opportunity to investigate this question.
RQ1/2/3: Are decision-maker (1) emotions, (2) reciprocity, and (3) attributions 
of fault affected by task and advisor type?
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service and were 
required to be U.S. citizens over 18. Typical MTurk samples have limitations; for example, 
they tend to be younger and more likely to vote Democratic (Levay et al., 2016), and the use 
of scripts or bots is possible. To minimize potential problems, we first specified that sub-
jects were “Master” workers (have a history of providing high quality work), and we used 
MTurk worker qualifications (i.e., age, gender, geographic location) to ensure a sample sim-
ilar to the U.S. general population. Finally, our screening questions on the survey itself were 
set with quotas of demographics such as age and gender as a second layer of verification. 
Throughout the survey, attention and bot check questions were presented at random inter-
vals; any subject failing two or more check questions was eliminated. Power analyses were 
conducted based off of past research (see appendix) and given the very slight manipulations 
present in our research, we recruited a large enough sample to detect effects. A total of 689 
participants completed the study. In the high demonstrability task: n = 321, there were 
n = 80 participants in the machine advisor replaced by machine (MrM), n = 77 in human 
advisor replaced by human (HrH), n = 84 in machine advisor replaced by human advisor 
(MrH), n = 80 in human advisor replaced by machine advisor (HrM). Low demonstrability 
task: n = 368, n = 82 (MrM), n = 74 (HrH), n = 104 (MrH), n = 108 (HrM). 
Task
A forecasting task was chosen to maximize relatability to previous research comparing 
human and machine advice (e.g., Fildes et al., 2006; Önkal et al., 2009), because it allowed 
for the clean manipulations of task demonstrability, and because forecasting is a task for 
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which machines are being increasingly used in the real world, for example, in supply chain 
forecasting (Fildes & Goodwin, 2020). Participants completed 20 forecasting tasks; all 20 
graphs/forecast scenarios were randomly assigned within each task condition. In the high 
task demonstrability condition, the forecasting scenarios related to hospital operating room 
management (screenshots in appendix). In the low task demonstrability condition, the 
same graphs were displayed, but the scenarios dealt with humanitarian relief.1 
Procedure
The manipulation of advisor type was simple and similar to past studies (Önkal et al., 2009; 
Prahl & Van Swol, 2017). Participants were told at the opening that the advice would come 
either from an algorithmic software program (OptiLytics), or an experienced surgeon at 
the hospital in the high demonstrability condition (in the low demonstrability condition, 
a humanitarian relief professional). The advisors were introduced to participants with a 
short photograph describing their/its role in the organization (see appendix for descrip-
tions). Midway (after trial 10), the advisor was replaced with either the same type (human/
machine) or different type of advisor to create the HrH, HrM, MrM, and MrH conditions.2
Compensation for participants was set at 25% above the federal (USA) minimum wage 
rate assuming a 45-minute completion time. Participants were presented graphical repre-
sentations of past data, similar to a stock price chart, and then asked to make an initial fore-
cast of where the value would be in the future. After making an “initial” forecast, the advice 
from a human (or algorithmic) advisor was presented; participants could make a “revised” 
forecast on the screen and submit it as their final forecast.3
At the end of each trial, a performance feedback screen was shown that displayed the 
participant’s final forecast, the advisor’s forecast, and the actual correct answer. Addition-
ally, percentage errors were calculated for each forecast (allowing them to compare their 
own performance versus the advisor’s performance). The participant was also shown their 
average percentage error across all trials so they could see if their performance on the indi-
vidual trial was better or worse than previously. Finally, in the high demonstrability con-
dition, the participant’s percentage error was multiplied by 1000 and presented as (for a 
1% error): “This forecasting error is estimated to have cost the hospital $1000.” In the low 
demonstrability condition, the percentage error was multiplied by 100 and displayed as: 
“This forecasting error is estimated to have resulted in 100 deaths.” This was to reinforce 
that the decisions had either financial consequences or consequences resulting in adver-
sity to humans. The first 10 trials were performed to set the stage for the second group of 
10 trials where our research interest in advisor replacement lies.
1. We picked these domains partially to control for participants having personal intuition for what the 
outcomes would be. Recipients often use advice less if they believe themselves to possess unique domain 
expertise (Lawrence et al., 2006); our task minimizes this risk.
2. When advisors were replaced midway through the survey, the introduction text was preceded by “Due to 
time constraints, we were not able to get [advisor]’s advice for every forecast. Therefore, you will have a new 
advisor to help you on the remaining tasks. Your new advisor is . . . ”
3. Javascript coding was written into the survey to control the accuracy of the participant forecast and advice 
forecast, which was varied slightly between trials. This resulted in the relative performance of the participant 
and the advisor always being the same across all participants to control for related confounds.
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Measures
A measure used in past research to assess behavioral trust, the “SHIFT” variable, was used 
to measure advice-utilization. This measure not only provides commonality with forecast-
ing research and algorithmic advice research (e.g., Önkal et al., 2009), but also commonality 
with interpersonal advice studies which have used the equivalent “Weight of Advice” mea-
sure to assess trust as a behavioral measure (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The 
SHIFT formula is: 
(Judge revised forecast − Judge initial forecast) / (Advisor forecast − Judge initial 
forecast)
A questionnaire was administered to assess perceptions of the advisor (e.g., expertise), 
advice (e.g., appropriateness), and decision-maker emotions, reciprocity, and fault after the 
first set of 10 trials and after the final 10 trials with the replacement advisor.4 The survey, 
consisting of sematic differential and Likert style survey questions, was constructed with 
survey items from previous advice literature (MacGeorge et al., 2013), details of survey 
measures and reliability can be found in the appendix.
Results
Manipulation Checks
To confirm participants perceived the tasks differently, we conducted independent sample 
t tests on our manipulation check questions between tasks. Means and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 1. The task manipulation was successful.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 stated that machine advice would be perceived as (1a) less expert, (1b) less 
useful, and (1c) less appropriate than human advice in the humanitarian than the manage-
ment task. We conducted two-way ANOVAs for perceptions of advisor expertise, appro-
priateness of advice, and usefulness of advice in the first block (pre-replacement) with 
task type and advisor type as independent variables. There was no significant interaction 
between task type and advisor type for expertise of advisor F(1,669) = 0.062, p = 0.803, 
d = 0.062, appropriateness of advice, F(1,658) = 0.025, p = 0.873, d = 0.058, or usefulness of 
advice, F(1,658) = 0.003, p = 0.998, d = 0.001. Follow-up univariate tests indicated a main 
effect of advisor only: human advice was always perceived as being more expert F(1,669) = 
20.681, p < 0.001, d = 0.356, more appropriate F(1,658) = 53.803, p < 0.001, d = 0.570, and 
more useful F(1,658) = 62.350, p < 0.001, d = 0.616, in the first block of trials. Because the 
main effect of advisor type was significant in the survey results from the first block of trials, 
4. The questionnaire measures were identical and measured perceptions of advice usefulness and advisor 
quality on a sematic differential scale. Additionally, Likert survey questions measured emotions when 
receiving advice, trust of advisor, similarity (value, social norm, and thought process) to advisor, and 
perceptions of advisor effort.
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we could not treat every participant as coming from the same baseline condition when 
completing the second survey. Thus, we created a difference score by subtracting scores in 
the first advisor evaluation from the second. We then conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
task type, advisor type, and replacement type as factors. Results indicated no significant 
interaction between the three factors and advice appropriateness, F(1,659) = 1.297, p = 
0.255, d = 0.086; but there was a significant interaction for advice usefulness, F(1,662) = 
5.829, p = 0.016, d = 0.189, and advisor expertise F(1,662) = 3.940, p = 0.048, d = 0.155. 
To understand these interactions, we conducted two-way ANOVAs comparing the 
effect of replacement and advisor type on expertise and advice usefulness within each task. 
In the humanitarian task there was a significant interaction between replacement and advi-
sor type for advisor expertise, F(1,355) = 13.156, p < 0.001, d = 0.288; this interaction was 
not significant in the management task condition, F(1,305) = 0.058, p = 0.810, d = 0.005. 
The interaction analyses were similar for advice usefulness: significant in the humanitarian 
task, F(1,360) = 8.205, p = 0.004, d = 0.0224, but not in the management task, F(1,300) = 
0.605, p = 0.437, d = 0.051. An inspection of the means indicates machine advisors replac-
ing human advisors in the humanitarian task produced the largest decrease in evaluations 
of advisor expertise (M = -0.439, SD = 0.714) and advice usefulness (M = -0.317, SD = 
0.627), whilst human advisors replacing machine advisors produced the largest increase 
in ratings of expertise (M = 0.038, SD = 0.818) and advice usefulness (M = 0.063, SD = 
0.766). Thus, we find partial support for hypothesis 1a and 1b, human advice is perceived as 
more expert and more useful than machine advice in humanitarian decision-making tasks, 
but only when one advisor type has replaced the other. A table detailing the three-factor 
ANOVAs for H1a–c, H3a–b, and our RQs can be found in Table 2; see figures for graphs of 
significant three-way interactions.








Task is more about 
Human Life
  M = 5.573
SD = 1.381
  M = 2.938
SD = 1.554 2.634 0.001* 1.845
Task is more about 
Money
  M = 2.781
SD = 1.283
  M = 4.008
SD = 2.190 1.226 0.001* 1.064
Task has no right 
answers
  M = 2.641
SD = 1.269
  M = 2.349
SD = 1.284 0.293 0.004 0.251
Task requires 
compassion
  M = 3.424
SD = 1.761
  M = 3.058
SD = 1.363 0.365 0.002* 0.334
Task relevant to all 
humans
  M = 3.831
SD = 2.061
  M = 3.265
SD = 1.446 0.567 0.001* 0.301
Task relevant to me 
personally
  M = 2.961
SD = 1.060
  M = 2.954
SD = 1.155 0.007 0.960 0.005
* Signifies Levine’s test for equality of variances violated, equal variances not assumed test statistics used.
** Cohen’s d effect size (maximum likelihood estimator).
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FIGURE 1 Advisor Expertise Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived advisor expertise with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived advisor expertise with second advisor
FIGURE 2 Advice Usefulness Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived advice usefulness with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived advice usefulness with second advisor
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Hypothesis 2 stated that in the less demonstrable task (humanitarian), machine advice 
would be used less, in general, than human advice. Because all participants started the 
first 10 trials with a human or machine advisor, we first conducted a 2 (humanitarian/ 
management task) × 2 (machine/human advisor) ANOVA with average advice utilization 
as the dependent variable for the first 10 trials. There was no significant interaction between 
advisor and task type F(1,671) = 3.136, p = 0.077, ηp2 = 0.005. There was a main effect of 
task (F(1,671) = 8.775, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.013) that indicated advice was used significantly 
more in the humanitarian (M = 0.561, SD = 0.191) than management task (M = 0.521, SD = 
0.188), see Figure 1 in the appendix. To analyze the second block of trials, we had to account 
for similar or different advisor replacement as well as advisor type and task. We computed 
a variable composed of average advice utilization on the second block of trials and then 
conducted a 2(human/machine advisor) × 2(similar/different advisor replacement) × 
2(humanitarian/management task) ANOVA but found no significant interaction between 
task, advisor, and replacement type, F(1,667) = 0.656, p = 0.418. We conducted a follow-up 
2(humanitarian/management task) × 2(machine/human advisor) ANOVA but we did not 
observe a significant interaction, F(1,667) = 0.320, p = 0.858, or observe a main effect of task 
(p = 0.133) or advisor (p = 0.602). In sum, hypothesis 2 is not supported.
FIGURE 3 Advice Utilization First 10 Trials
Higher values = more advice utilization
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Hypothesis 3a and 3b stated that perceptions of human/machine advisor thought pro-
cess and value similarity would be greater/less in the humanitarian compared to the man-
agement task. For brevity, we used similar analyses to hypothesis 1, but with perceptions of 
value and thought process similarity. In the first block of trials there was no significant inter-
action between advisor and task type for perceptions of thought process similarity, F(1,662) 
= 0.109, p = 0.741, or value similarity, F(1,656) = 0.256, p = 0.613. Tests on the second 
block of trials revealed a significant three-way interaction of task, advisor, and replacement 
type on perceptions of thought process similarity F(1,645) = 7.067, p = 0.008, d = 0.208; 
but not on perceptions of value similarity F(1,634) = 1.236, p = 0.267. Follow-up two-way 
ANOVAs indicated a significant interaction between advisor and replacement type in the 
humanitarian task condition F(1,352) = 38.038, p < 0.001 d = 0.672, but in the management 
task condition this interaction was only marginally significant, F(1,297) = 3.556, p = 0.060, 
d = 0.217. Similar to ratings of advice usefulness (H1b), a human advisor replacing a machine 
advisor resulted in an increase in perceptions of thought process similarity (M = 0.464, 
SD = 1.282), whereas a machine advisor replacing a human resulted in the largest decrease 
(M = –1.156, SD = 1.298). In sum, we find partial support for hypothesis 3a, decision- 
makers do perceive more thought process similarity with human advisors compared to 
machine advisors in humanitarian decision-making scenarios, but only when one advisor 
type has replaced the other. We did not find support for Hypothesis 3b regarding value 
similarity; results are summarized in Table 2.
FIGURE 4 Thought Process Similarity Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived similarity with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived similarity with second advisor
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TABLE 2 Difference Between Rating of First Advisor and Second Advisor,  
Three-Way ANOVAs and Follow-Up
Measure Interaction F p ηp2*
Expertise (H1a)1,2 Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.954 0.047 0.006
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 13.966 0.001 0.037
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.100 0.752 0.001
Usefulness (H1b) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 5.494 0.019 0.008
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 7.786 0.006 0.021
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.565 0.453 0.002
Appropriateness (H1c) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 1.381 0.241 0.002
Thought Process Similarity (H3a) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 6.817 0.009 0.011
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 38.369 0.001 0.099
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.931 0.048 0.013
Value Similarity (H3b) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 1.202 0.273 0.002
Positive Emotions (RQ1) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 2.528 0.112 0.004
Negative Emotions (RQ1) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.888 0.049 0.006
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 4.114 0.043 0.011
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.673 0.413 0.002
Reciprocity (RQ2) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.976 0.324 0.001
Faulting the Advisor (RQ3) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 9.659 0.002 0.014
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 12.434 0.001 0.034
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.814 0.368 0.003
1 Significant three-way interaction graphs in Figure 2.2–5 (Appendix).
2 Bold = significant at the p = 0.05 level.
* Effect size (partial eta-squared).
Hypothesis 4a–4d suggested that the effects posited by hypotheses above would be 
affected by advisor replacement, making the observed effects stronger. Our results above 
effectively answered these questions. We find partial support for hypothesis 4a and 4b (see 
results for H1a, H3a) that referred to perceptions advisor expertise, advice usefulness, 
advice appropriateness, and perceived advisor thought process similarity. Machine advisors 
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that replace human advisors are rated as having less expertise, less useful advice, and having 
less similar thought processes to the decision-maker when they (machine advisors) replace 
human advisors compared to when they replace other machine advisors in the humanitar-
ian task, but this interaction between advisor type and replacement effect is not present in 
the management task. Similarly, human advisors that replace machines are rated as hav-
ing more expertise, advice usefulness, and similar thought processes to the decision-maker 
when they (human advisors) replace machines as opposed to replacing another human; 
again, this effect is present in humanitarian but not management tasks. We do not find that 
ratings of appropriateness are significantly affected by advisor replacement. Hypotheses 4c 
and 4d suggested there would be an effect of advisor replacement type on utilization as well, 
but there was no significant interaction between task, advisor, and replacement type on 
advice utilization (see results for H2), hypotheses 4e and 4f are unsupported.
FIGURE 5 Negative Emotions Change From Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more negative emotions with second advisor
Negative values = less negative emotions with second advisor
With regard to RQ1 (emotions), RQ2 (reciprocity), RQ3 (fault), our analyses above 
suggested that the most interesting investigation would be in the difference between the 
rating of both advisors. We summarize the results of both exploratory paired samples t-tests 
and tests of three-way interactions between task, advisor, and replacement type in Table 3. 
Although these tests have not been corrected for type I error rate, we find them sufficient 
to answer our research questions that both decision-making task and advisor replacement 
type affect the emotions of decision-makers, reciprocity, and fault. 
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TABLE 3 Summary of paired samples t-tests for RQ1-3. MDiff is mean difference  
of second advisor rating—first advisor rating (negative value = less endorsement  
of survey item for second advisor compared to first advisor).
Item 1
Humanitarian Task Management Task
MDiff t Df p MDiff t df p
Positive 
Emotion
MrM -0.09 1.05 76 0.306 -0.092 2.78 74 0.001
MrH 0.09 1.18 102 0.246 -0.03 0.32 80 0.755
HrM -0.34 5.13 107 0.001 -0.16 1.56 71 0.125
HrH -0.15 1.41 71 0.161 -0.03 0.30 73 0.762
Negative 
Emotion*
MrM 0.01 0.12 78 0.90 0.14 2.67 74 0.01
MrH -0.05 0.78 105 0.441 -0.07 0.81 82 0.422
HrM 0.10 1.91 105 0.054 0.02 0.27 70 0.793
HrH 0.14 1.31 70 0.198 -0.09 1.08 74 0.292
Reciprocity
MrM 0.26 2.03 76 0.052 0.08 0.70 74 0.494
MrH 0.74 5.02 102 0.001 0.89 5.08 80 0.001
HrM -0.96 7.62 105 0.001 -0.86 4.22 71 0.001




MrM 0.19 1.43 78 0.160 0.13 1.12 76 0.278
MrH -0.13 1.05 105 0.304 -0.08 0.58 82 0.577
HrM 0.70 4.82 106 0.001 0.35 2.16 72 0.035
HrH 0.40 2.45 71 0.002 -0.07 0.48 75 0.639
1: Advisor/Replacement Type: MrM = Machine Advisor replaced by Machine Advisor (similar replacement 
condition). MrH = Machine replaced by Human Advisor (different replacement condition), etc.
*Advisor Type × Replacement Type × Task Type three-way interaction is significant at the 0.05 level.
2 Bold = significant at the p = 0.05 level.
Discussion
Technological innovation is leading to the increased prevalence of algorithmic, machine 
advice in personal and professional life for decisions of varying demonstrability in fields as 
diverse as medicine, financial advising, and consumer goods. Additionally, machines are 
increasingly replacing human workers, and this trend is being exacerbated by recent events 
including the Covid-19 pandemic and advancements in artificial intelligence (Hayasaki, 
2020). Our results show how the field of human-machine communication can use extant 
research from many communication subfields to inform our understanding of an increas-
ingly automated world. To summarize, our findings show effects relating to the perception 
of an advisor as well as actual advice utilization, although both sets of effects are not always 
related. We found support for our first hypotheses which suggested human advice would 
be perceived as more expert and useful than machine advice for a humanitarian relief plan-
ning decision than a management decision. However, this effect was only significant when 
a machine advisor had replaced a human advisor and vice versa. Our third hypothesis 
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suggested that advisors would also differ across tasks on decision-maker’s perceptions of 
advisor similarity (humans perceived as more similar in humanitarian tasks). We found 
that human advisors were perceived as having more thought process similarity (to the 
decision-maker) but, again, only when the human advisor had replaced an advisor and vice 
versa. We did not find significant effects of task demonstrability or advisor replacement on 
perceptions of advice appropriateness or perceptions of advisor value similarity. There were 
no significant differences in advice-utilization once the decision-makers had their advisors 
replaced. Overall, there are not large effects of task and advisor type on utilization. Finally, 
our research questions showed that decision-maker emotions, reciprocity, and fault can be 
affected by advisor replacement and task type.
Perception and Behavior With Machines
There are a number of potential explanations for why the manipulation of advisor type, 
replacement, and task type may affect perceptions of advisors differently than affecting 
actual utilization behavior. One explanation regards the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the 
task. Interpersonal advice research finds that decision-makers seek and utilize advice more 
when they perceive tasks to be more difficult (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). If decision-makers 
in our experiment perceived the actual act of forecasting as something they were not able 
to do well, it may have driven the utilization of advice regardless of perception of the advi-
sor or perceived quality of the advice. In other words, although one advisor was perceived 
more positively, participants may have still perceived either advisor as more informed than 
themselves. An interesting manipulation for future study is to select easier tasks or tasks on 
which decision-makers perceive themselves to have expertise. People who believe they are 
experts are more prone to overconfidence and advice-discounting in general (Bonaccio & 
Dalal, 2006), and thus, there would be a higher bar toward advice utilization. 
Another potential explanation relating to expertise is the possibility that differing rat-
ings of expertise between advisors in task conditions was due to decision-makers feeling that 
human advisors had more expertise than machines in understanding the consequences of a 
decision (human lives), but not in actually comprehending the forecasting data and produc-
ing an optimal forecast. This is an interesting direction for future study in research compar-
ing human versus machine advice because it may uncover further underlying assumptions 
that decision-makers have about machine and human advisors that are specific to different 
parts of a decision process (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). In our experiment, the graph stimuli 
remained exactly the same, but the numbers clearly meant something different (lives ver-
sus dollars). Thus, evaluation of the numbers themselves may involve a different cognitive 
process (i.e., information processing) than evaluating their meaning, which is a more judg-
mental process. Utilization of the advice may have reflected a decision-maker’s assessment 
of advisor’s ability to perform one aspect of the decision process, but perceptions of the 
advisor’s expertise and usefulness may reflect an assessment of a different process such as 
judgment. Expectations of machines play a critical role in predicting detrimental behaviors 
such as over- or under-reliance on machines (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), and a better 
understanding of what aspects of the decision-making process these expectations refer to 
may lead to better machine advisor design and integration. 
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Emotion and Machines
Another potential moderator between perception and behavior is decision-maker emotions. 
We examined both positive and negative emotions due to past research showing emotion’s 
effect on decision-maker perceptions and utilization (de Hooge et al., 2014). Our results 
showed a significant effect of task on negative emotions, but perhaps the more interesting 
result is that for positive emotions there was only one condition that produced an increase 
in positive emotions: when a human advisor replaced a machine advisor on humanitarian 
tasks. In the same task, machines replacing a human produced the largest decrease in pos-
itive emotions (see Table 3 for mean differences). These results should be interpreted with 
caution because they did not result in significant omnibus effects, but there is a clear direc-
tion implied—decision-makers are not feeling positive emotions when machines replace a 
human advisor when making a less demonstrable decision. In our study and interpersonal 
advice research in general, it is unclear how emotions are tied to utilization behavior. For 
example, Gino and Schweitzer (2008) found that inducing anxiety led to more advice utili-
zation, but de Hooge et al. (2014) found that negative emotions resulted in lower perceived 
expertise of an advisor and lower utilization. Our results show that emotion is an important 
area for future research, especially because the emotional reaction to receiving advice seems 
to differ between human and machine advisors.
Human Similarity and Liking
Perceived advisor similarity is another set of findings that provide insight into the compli-
cated relationship between humans and machines. Advisor thought process similarity rat-
ings for human advisors increased more when they replaced machine advisors. Although 
we do not know if decision-makers are consciously comparing one advisor to the other, 
a large amount of contrast effect research suggests this process happens unconsciously 
(Palmer & Gore, 2014). Perceived similarity does generally result in more liking (Strauss et 
al., 2010) and the implication of this is not only that humans may like human advisors that 
replace machines, but that humans do not like machines that replace other humans. This is 
an important area for future research; there is conflicting survey evidence about how much 
the average people like the idea of machines replacing humans (Savela et al., 2017), and 
some field research suggests that machines are sometimes welcomed as a replacement to 
humans (Wasen, 2010) or desired not to replace humans (Kristoffersson et al., 2011).
Human advisors also may be liked more in general because our results show that 
decision-makers feel more reciprocity (i.e., “I owe something to my advisor”) toward human 
advisors. This is quite a remarkable result if one considers that our manipulation of human 
versus machine advisor was very minimal in this experiment. While agency and influence 
(Banks & de Graaf, 2020) were present for the advisor, there was almost no interactivity 
with either advisor nor was there any conversational wording added to the advice; it was 
simply delivered as a number. In conjunction with our results regarding advisor perception 
above, this result has important implications for human-machine trust theory—especially 
continued efforts to investigate what degree people see machines as social actors (Gambino 
et al., 2020). Our results suggest that even our small manipulation with no social interaction 
leads to very different assessments of a social feeling like reciprocity.
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Research Implications and Conclusion
Our results also have real-world implications. If a human is replaced by a machine in the 
workplace, the interpersonal advice process clearly is a more social process than the human 
advisor in this experiment. Yet, our experiment revealed this perception of a social process 
is substantially different for human versus machine advisors despite the advice being hardly 
social at all thus. In settings outside the lab, there are likely to be several differences between 
human and machine advice that would act as confounds if not controlled in a laboratory 
setting. Our experiment removed the confounds introduced by actual real-world social 
relationships between humans that exist in the workplace, and thus this was a very conser-
vative comparison of humans versus machine. When humans with real relationships are 
replaced by machines, perhaps these elements of social interaction are not “replaced,” but 
actually “lost” instead. Humans are social creatures and the feeling that someone is helping 
you is a good one. There could be serious long-term consequences to the lost positive emo-
tions that come from social interaction, everything from organizational commitment to 
productivity (Oswald et al., 2015) is at risk when employees are not happy at work. Moving 
forward, gaining a more thorough understanding of what happens socially and emotionally 
when a human colleague is replaced by machines is critical.
Additional real-world implications of our study are numerous. It is clear that humans 
do not like it when machines replace a human advisor, even a human advisor who is 
zero-acquaintance and only imagined. Furthermore, our results suggest that decision- 
makers really do not like it when this replacement occurs on a task that is less demonstrable. 
But the negative feelings experienced when machines replace a human do not necessarily 
mean that the machine advisor will be used less than the human advisor. If anything, our 
utilization results suggested machine advisors were used more in the humanitarian task, 
the same task that produced the most negative evaluations of the machine advisor when 
it replaced a human. Understanding how the manipulation of advisor characteristics, sit-
uational context, decision-maker self-efficacy, and advice accuracy affect this complicated 
relationship is important if machine advisors are to be effectively introduced into the areas 
they are being developed for including health care, financial advising, and disaster manage-
ment. These industries are just a few of the many which will see the increased presence of 
machine advisors—and this trend is only projected to increase as the Covid-19 pandemic 
has dramatically increased corporate efforts to automate workforces. In conclusion, our 
research shows the process of replacing human advisors with machines will be complicated. 
Moreover, our research shows that it is not only the humans who are replaced that will be 
unhappy; the people who must work with these new machines may not be happy either.
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1: Additional Methods Information
Design Considerations. Our literature review revealed the need for careful design. For 
example, research on how the perceived machine suitability for societal roles is affected by 
anthropomorphism has important design implications. First, we do not anthropomorphize 
the machine in order to provide the cleanest manipulation of advisor type. Second, we limit 
the social aspects of the advice exchange process; there is no direct interaction with either 
advisor type, and advice is delivered in a simple text format. Additional design implications 
are based on above review of advisor expertise—we avoid creating implied expertise by 
clearly introducing the human and machine advisors as having equivalent expertise. We 
also precisely control the accuracy of advice to rule out the confound of an advisor actually 
being better at a decision-making task. Our design therefore is optimized to discover differ-
ing assumptions that people have about the attributes of machines versus humans on tasks 
of different demonstrability.
Survey Measures. The questionnaire measures were identical and measured perceptions 
of advice usefulness and advisor quality on a sematic differential scale. Additionally, Likert 
survey questions measured emotions when receiving advice, trust of advisor, similarity 
(value, social norm, and thought process) to advisor, and perceptions of advisor effort.
Positive emotions were measured with four Likert questions on a 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) scale for four positive emotions: Appreciative, Happy, Grateful, Thankful. The 
negative emotion scale was composed of Mad, Frustrated, Annoyed, Irritated. The four 
positive and negative emotion questions produced sufficient reliability (positive: α = 0.940, 
negative: α = 0.943), and the mean was used as an index of positive/negative emotion. Four 
sematic differential questions were used to measure advice usefulness (e.g., thoughtful, use-
ful); and achieved sufficient reliability (α = 0.811) and is hereon presented as an index of 
advice usefulness. Finally, in order to keep the survey a reasonable length, a pair of ques-
tions was asked to assess feelings of reciprocity to the advisor (i.e., “I feel like I owe some-
thing to my advisor for their help”).
Advisor Descriptions. We pilot-tested 20 descriptions (10 human, 10 machines) with 
23 undergraduate students and selected the descriptions that were closest to one another in 
ratings of perceived expertise, clarity, and performance expectancy.
Intellective (high demonstrability) Task: Machine. Your advisor today is a computer pro-
gram called OptiLytics. OptiLytics is a software program used by the Gain Healthcare Sys-
tem to help with forecasting. The statistical models in OptiLytics have been built using 
10 years of past Gain Healthcare data, as well as some data from the Center for Disease 
Control in the United States.
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Intellective (high demonstrability) Task: Human. Your advisor today is Logan Girard. 
Logan is a medical doctor who has been working for Gain Healthcare for 10 years doing 
operating room management and hospital operations. Prior to joining Gain, Logan gained 
experience in healthcare management with the Center for Disease Control in the United 
States. 
Judgmental (low demonstrability) Task: Machine. Your adviser today is a computer pro-
gram called ReliefLytics. ReliefLytics is a computer program used by the UNHCR to help 
with forecasting. The statistical models in ReliefLytics have been built using 10 years of past 
UN data, as well as some data from the Center for Disease Control in the United States.
Judgmental (low demonstrability) Task: Human. Your adviser today is Logan Girard. 
Logan is a medical doctor who has been working for the UNHCR for 10 years doing camp 
management and emergency relief. Prior to joining the UNHCR, Logan gained experience 
managing medical crises in developing nations while working for the Center for Disease 
Control in the United States. 
2: Power Analysis
A power analysis for the comparison between human and machine advisors was conducted 
using G*Power 3.1 and drew upon the three studies determined to be most similar to 
the research proposed (Dietvorst et al., 2015; Önkal et al., 2009; Prahl & Van Swol, 2017). 
Although these studies did not all report repeated measures results, the effect sizes were cal-
culated as best as possible using published data. Dietvorst et al., reported effect sizes of 0.52 
(Study 1) and 0.55 (Study 2); Önkal et al. effect size was calculated at 0.82; and Prahl & Van 
Swol reported a Cohen’s d of 0.42. Of these, the most conservative estimate of total sample 
size needed by using the Prahl & Van Swol study, with G*Power calculating a needed N = 
142 at alpha = 0.95 and a desired power of 0.80. Due to the well-known tendency of fore-
casting studies to experience high subject attrition due to missing data or the drawbacks of 
the weight of advice measure (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Prahl & Van Swol, 
2017; Tzioti et al., 2014) the target n is 162 in each advisor/task condition (human/machine 
& high/low demonstrability), leading to a total N = 648. Given the lack of previous studies, 
we have no power analyses for the advisor replacement effects, but subjects will be split into 
replacement conditions in each advisor/task condition and, given equivalent effect sizes, 
the above sample should be adequate. 
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3.1: Task Screenshots 1: Initial Forecast
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3.2: Task Screenshots 2: Feedback Screen
